Ceo Paul Otellini - Paul Otellini - Paul S. Otellini

Intel Shareholder Fraud over iViewit Technologies Still Undisclosed by Intel CEO Paul Otellini

2011-01-28T01:05:00.000-08:00

"iViewit Technologis SEC COMPLAINT against INTEL CORPORATION

White Collar Crime Division and Any and All Compliance Division Heads and Related
Offices:

I, Eliot Bernstein, of .....
Street, Boca Raton, Florida 33434 as the
Original Owner and Inventor of key "backbone technologies" for video and imaging as
further described herein, am filing this Formal Complaint against Intel Corporation ( Intel ) with United States headquarters located at 2200 Mission College Blvd, Santa Clara, Ca,
95054-1459, and bring to your attention ongoing investigations involving multiple
federal offices around the country as well as International investigations pertinent in this
matter.

Intel is a primary wrongdoer as a named defendant in a presently Pending Trillion
Dollar international RICO Conspiracy Lawsuit involving the theft and fraud of my Intellectual Property rights as further set out herein.

In addition to liabilities claimed in this lawsuit, are separate direct primary liabilities and obligations from signed agreements including Non Disclosure’s, Strategic Partner Agreements and Licensing Agreements.

Further, on information and belief Intel corporate management including at least the
President, Paul S. Otellini and corporate counsel Bruce D. Sewell, and Stephen R.
Rodgers are also involved in an ongoing and undisclosed massive international Fraud
against the Intel shareholders and investors.

Upon information and belief, the frauds include but are not limited to the failure
to disclose both the lawsuit and the Intellectual Property Infringements in direct violation
of various SEC laws and rules including but not limited to FASB No. 5 requirements for
disclosing liabilities and more.

Merely one claim in this lawsuit involves the attempted Murder upon my family by an Iraqi style car bombing that blew up three vehicles in addition to mine during the early phases of the high stakes corporate theft and fraud of my Intellectual Property Rights.

Notably, federal Judge Shira Scheindlin referred to this as a case involving Murder that has also been marked as legally “related” by Scheindlin to an ongoing Federal Whistleblower Case

In summary, dating back to 1998-1999 at the time the inventions were discovered,

I had Signed Non Disclosure Agreements, Strategic Alliance Agreements and Licensing

Arrangements, including Agreements that were at the time in legal review for R3D

relating to the USE of my Proprietary Rights in inventions which were hailed as the "Holy

Grail" of the internet.

The technologies were deemed the “Holy Grail” by multiple experts under signed NDA’s as it permitted full screen full frame rate video previously thought impossible and zoom and pan imaging technologies which removed pixel distortion.

The stolen technologies are now commonly found on virtually all digital imaging and video hardware and software.

These Signed Agreements were amongst hundreds of signed agreements with many Fortune 1000 Companies.

After signing Agreements with Real 3D, Inc. ( R3D ), a company whose ownership was composed of Lockheed Martin ( 70% ), Intel ( 20% ) and Silicon Graphics Inc. ( 10% ), Intel later took over complete ownership of R3D of Orlando Florida.

In the subsequent months thereafter, a series of critical events occurred including

but not limited to the discovery of fraudulent patent applications and the discovery of

fraudulent corporations, the corporate frauds were discovered by Arthur Andersen during

an audit for the largest investor in the companies Crossbow Ventures of W. Palm Beach

Florida.

Nearly two-thirds of the Crossbow funds were secured through SBIC Loans from

the Small Business Administration making the SBA the largest investor in the

technologies and companies.

On information and belief, the SBA Inspector General’s office is conducting an ongoing investigation into these and other matters please refer to the SBA Inspector General’s office to obtain relevant information.

As you will see by the letter and petition to the 44

the US President, Barack Hussein Obama II, found @

http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court%20Southern%20District%20NY/

20090213%20FINAL%20SIGNED%20LETTER%20OBAMA%20TO%20ENJOIN%20US%20ATTOR

NEY%20FINGERED%20ORIGINAL%20MAIL%20l.pdf

and also sent to US Attorney General Eric Holder, I was then directed by Harry I. Moatz,

Director of the United States Patent & Trademark Office, Office of Enrollment and

Discipline to file charges with the Commissioner of Patents claiming Fraud Upon the

USPTO, my companies and myself.

This led to the Suspension of certain Intellectual Properties while investigations remain ongoing; please refer to Moatz and the Commissioner of Patents office to obtain relevant information.

In addition, Moatz directed me to seek Congressional Legislation to obtain an Act of Congress to correct the falsified Oaths on my Intellectual Properties submitted by my former legal counsel at the law firms of Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Schlissel, Foley & Lardner and Proskauer Rose.

An Act of Congress is necessary to make the changes in inventors, owners and assignees

that are fraudulent, for which we have sought aid from The Honorable Senator Dianne

Feinstein who remains working through her offices regarding such.

These backbone technologies which were stolen in 1998-1999 have since been

used throughout the United States and across the globe throughout the entire value chain

of content creation and distribution of video and images for both software and hardware

in the transmission of Digital Video and Imaging across ALL Spectrums, including, the

Internet, Television, DVD, HD DVD, Micro Processing Chips, as well as, a mass of

applications for Defense, Flight & Space Simulation, including on the Hubble Space

Telescope (providing a deeper view into time) and on virtually all Medical Imaging

Devices, and more.

In fact, members of R3D and Intel were some of the earliest champions of the value of the technologies claiming they were “Priceless” and were valued in the hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars over the life of the Intellectual Properties, having transformed the world of Digital Imaging and Video that now are considered part of daily life.

Intel was one of the earliest players in this scheme and has continued to not only

defraud myself and the other rightful owners of the technologies, including Ellen

DeGeneres and Alanis Morissette, but has simultaneously defrauded the Intel's

shareholders and investors for years by failing to report and disclose the liabilities with

full knowledge of their Binding Obligations regarding the technologies.

These frauds and failures by the Intel management team have continued despite multiple communications over several years that have gone directly to the President of Intel, Mr. Paul S. Otellini and their Corporate Counsel Mr. Bruce D. Sewell and Steven R. Rodgers and continue despite the knowledge of the signed Agreements.

At this time, however, as noted in my Feb. 2009 letter to the Office of the US

President Barack Hussein Obama II and the US Attorney General Eric Holder, I wish to

bring to your direct attention the identities of several federal offices already involved in

this ongoing national and international Intellectual Properties theft and fraud.

Investigations that will aid and facilitate the SEC with background information for the

proper performance of complete investigations by the SEC allowing for information

sharing with these agencies, some of the key offices are as follows:

1. Glenn A. Fine, Office of Inspector General of the US Department of Justice

2. Harry Moatz, Director, OED of the USPTO

3. H. Marshall Jarrett, Office of Professional Responsibility of the FBI

4. A complete list of Federal, State & International Actions can be found @

http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/INVESTIGATIONS%20MASTER.htm. ..."

Source of Post and Full Document on Intel Corp. Stealing
the iViewit Digital Video and Imaging Patent Pending Technologies.

http://www.iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court%20Southern%20District%20NY
/20090325%20FINAL%20Intel%20SEC%20Complaint%20SIGNED2073.pdf

Posted here by

Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox

Crystal@CrystalCox.com

iViewit Digital Video and Imaging Patent Pending Technologies STOLEN, a Decade and Counting.

2011-01-27T20:58:00.000-08:00

Time for Accountability for Proskauer Rose Law Firm, Foley and Lardner Law Firm, Intel Corp., Lockheed Martin, IBM, Bruce Sewell, Jeffrey Bewkes, Paul Otellini, Time Warner Inc. , AOL ... and ALL involved in the Stealing of a the iViewit Technology that We all Use in Our Every Day Life.

Proskauer Rose Stole a 13 Trillion Dollar technology originally through a Corrupt U.S. Bankruptcy Court Preceding and Hid this Technology in Patent Pooling Schemes withMPEG LA via Proskauer Rose Corrupt Patent Attorney Kenneth Rubenstein.

This Technology is Now Used by Time Warner Inc., Clearwire Corporation, Intel Corp. , Lockheed Martin, Verizon, Apple, Nokia, Motorola, IBM, and Well anyone who uses ModernHigh Speed Video Technology.

Once iViewit Technologies issues a Cease and Desist that is Up Held by a Non-Proskauer Rose Controlled Court - Well 95% of all Cable TV, Video on Phones, Internet Video ... Will Come to an Abrupt Halt UNTIL they can Negotiate with iViewit Technologies.

Time Warner Inc. Has Signed Agreements and non-compete agreements with the iViewit Technologies and IGNORED these Signed - Binding Contracts.

Time Warner Inc. - CEO Jeffrey Bewkes has known for a very long time that Time Warner Inc., Warner Bros., and AOL will face Massive Liabilities over the iViewit Technology they STOLE. Yet Time Warner Inc. - CEO Jeffrey Bewkes Continues to Ignore this Fact and Time Warner Inc. - CEO Jeffrey Bewkes continues to Fail to Disclose to the "Board of Directors".

Intel Corp. Knows Full Well they Screwed over Iviewit Technologies and Intel CEO Paul Otellini, as Well as Ex-Intel General Counsel Bruce Sewell Have Known and NOT Disclosed this Massive Shareholder Fraud.

Even though there is Massive Criminal Complaints Filed, There is over 1200 documents of proof online at Iviewit.TV, there is Criminal Complaints against the New York Attorney GeneralNowGovernor Andrew Cuomo over the Stolen Iviewit Technology, there is a Federal RICO Lawsuit, and a VERY Detailed SEC Complaint.

And for Now Intel Corp, Time Warner Inc., Apple, IBM, Lockheed Martin, Clearwire Corp., and More seem to be able to STOP massive action against them in the Iviewit Case. This will NOT continue much longer, their corruption and cover up is OVER. The Truth is Roaring and it is Simply a matter of time.

Resources To Research the Stolen Iviewit Technology in more detail

https://docs.google.com/View?id=dgvpzjzw_9ghxg4km9&pli=1

iViewit SEC Complaint

http://www.ceopaulotellini.com/

Intel Corp. CEO

http://www.jeffreybewkes.com/

Time Warner Inc. CEO

http://www.stolentechnology.com/2010/12/criminal-complaint-against-nyag-andrew.html

http://www.iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court%20Southern%20District%20NY/20090325%20FINAL%20Intel%20SEC%20Complaint%20SIGNED2073.pdf

http://www.brucesewell.com/

http://www.kennethrubenstein.com/

Corrupt Proskauer Rose Lawyer - MPEG LA

http://www.jeffreybewkes.com/2010/02/warner-bros-signed-non-disclosure.html

posted Here by

Investigative Blogger

Crystal L.Cox

Crystal@CrystalCox.com

FTC, FBI, SEC, State Attorney Generals, DOJ, ALL Ignore Intel Corp. Monopolies - RICO Violations, Sherman and Clayton Act Violations and More

2010-12-26T13:09:00.000-08:00

Intel Corp. Monopoly

more at
CEOpaulOtellini.com

Intel Corporation Competition Case Update - Intel Consumer Monopoly Overcharge

2010-12-26T12:32:00.001-08:00

"Novermber 8, 2010; Nations Interest Publication release 3.2, now with fifteen monopoly examples and Intel Corporation source Attorney on DOJ and FTC antitrust compliance obligations

To: FTC Inspector General

FTC Commissioners

SEC Commissioner

Senate & Congress

State Attorney Generals

United States Attorneys

Director Robert Mueller, FBI

Honorable Eric Holder, DOJ

Vice President Joseph Biden

Fm: Mike Bruzzone

6025 McBryde Avenue

Richmond, CA 94805

campmkting@aol

Re: Intel Corporation Competition Case Update

- FTC Investigator Notice of Fiduciary Failure in Docket 9341

- Added pointers calculating 9341 consumer monopoly overcharge

- Lettered Relator Seeks Attorney; FCA, 31 USC 3279, recovery of monopoly & fraudulent cost imposed on Federal Government’s Intel based PC purchases.

“If the preoccupation of its official is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal

opportunity but is to be barter in the markets that is not liberalism, it is degeneration”.

President Herbert Hoover

FTC Inspector General, Senate, Congress, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys, FTC & SEC Commissioners, Director Mueller, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, DOJ Antitrust, DOJ Cartel Divisions and Vice President Joseph Biden:

On non address of up to $48.735 billion# consumer recoverable and no antitrust remedies associated with FTC v Intel Corporation Docket 9341 consent order, please find analyst comment on reorganizing Federal Trade Commission toward financial self sufficiency, pros and cons of Section 5 for competitive case investigation, summation of Intel Inside tied charge back, fifteen Intel microprocessor production examples on which 9341 Intel consumer recovery estimates are calculated.

Consumer Monopoly Overcharge

Similar to prior Intel production examples 9341 consumer recovery pointers document monopoly overcharge in Docket 9288 and 9341 review periods. Herein fifteen examples 1995 through 2003 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC vs. Intel Docket 9288. That cause is Intel intent to monopolize markets for the next decade actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation Cartel.

A cartel composed of Intel, PC Dealers, Media Sales Agents, investment banking, security operatives, corporate political relations and network confidence agents embedded by Intel, Media Sales Agents, and likely foreign Nation’s interest, into domestic x86 competitors to steal from and dismantle competition.

A network of extended relation’s who long time conceal Intel vertical by horizontal matrix of integrated dealing cells streaming intra platform computers to end buyers in system field effects. Where Federal authority in position to resolve systematic economic crime, have not, raising the question of blocker or detractor?

Nothing in Docket 9341 consent order addresses these facts, continued Nations, society harms and consumer financial recoveries form this history of anticompetitive system’s conduct, racketeering, industrial and economic espionages. An environment understood by industry players for nearly two decades. And many in government authority who seem to sit on the side lines? In fact the extent of those in DC with knowledge of the high level espionage and enterprise network corruption case investigations is really quite extensive.

“If such combinations be not destroyed all the advantages which would naturally come to

the public operating under the general laws of competition, will be lost, and the entire

commerce of an immense territory will be at the mercy of a single holding company.”

Justice Harlan Stone

All aspects of Intel monopolization beyond commercial fraud remain deleted from Docket 9341 consent order as accepted by FTC Commissioner’s on November 1. Resulting in this third Federal example of Intel Corporation dodging competition, racketeering and espionage violations pursuant to three investigative tracks that also validate Federal agency failures to regulate competition, racketeering, cross enterprise, cross profession network crime including in progress economic espionages; DOJ v Intel 1991 – 1993, FTC v Intel Docket 9288 1998 – 2001, FTC v Intel Docket 9341 2009-2010.

How is one to explain the result of this continuous compounded series of misfeasance and failures in oversight control across Intel case matters for nearly two decades?

FTC Reorganization

On two of three Intel case anomalies this analyst suggests the Federal Trade Commission should be reconfigured for financial self sufficiency. Up to $48.735 billion and antitrust remedies is a lot of funding to leave off the table.

Too earn its keep can FTC be reconfigured to lead virtual competition case actions? Like any private plaintiff attorney partnership paid for monitoring, regulation, investigation, leading case work for competitive recovery from the very corporations the agency is suppose to regulate under Sherman and Clayton Acts. Too modernize an agency held captive by the political agenda of corporate legal guild in relation to employment and professional placements beyond the agency itself. Including where corporate political and institutional influences are often responsible for making and sustaining employment placements in those agency’s in question.

Obviously not a fault of the institution or its Congressional Charter but of society and the personal boundaries of individual actor’s responsible for implementing and overseeing that charter. And where there are questions of oversight control perhaps State Attorney Generals should be included as added check under FTC Congressional charter? Certainly more desirable than this False Claim’s Act Relator.

Where, perhaps, State Attorney Generals should be able to initiate and oversee cases within FTC for spot control across the country.

Who’s been minding shop in DC? Where Intel case matters are concerned why are the continued symptoms of regulatory, oversight, corporate law enforcement and attorney fiduciary dysfunction so pronounced and for so long?

In the face of Intel Network again demonstrating administration of corporate and attorney fraternal ties that are greater than the Federal Power itself, making FTC financially self sufficient is designed to increase competitive effectiveness, to cut corporate ties, earn its keep under Charter on the very recoveries FTC is supposed to be delivering. No different from Relator under False Claims Act. Why shouldn’t FTC be rewarded operating returns on antitrust and commerce case recoveries?

In doing so like any partnership offer an incentive to federal employees on that return, under the Federal Power, which would surely keep FTC focused on the high value cases. With of course some ratio of funding for all other types of matters that require attention. Delivering on the administrative front a lean organization in step with its ability to self sustain organically. To counter corporate guild control it just might take a separate stronger independent public partnership.

On FTC case review under Section 5 of Antitrust Act

Having participated in two Section 5 investigations of Intel competitive practices; Dockets 9288 directly with FTC investigating attorney Mr. Lin, 9341 through attorney team liaisons Ms. Espeldon, Ms. Kransky and Mr. Cox, this analyst’s stated view has been that Section 5 offers an all encompassing umbrella to research, discover, validate Intel Network program and practices that harm competition and consumers.

Providing broad vantage to detect and calculate the costs of Sherman and Clayton Act violations on enterprises, industries, consumers, society and Nations.

For 9341 perhaps Section 5 should not be considered an unusual first approach to research and validate antitrust claims and harms.

Two decades of Intel Network concealing and misrepresenting harms and costs on competition and consumers requires a broad approach to systematically filter from superset too subset for stringent structural proofs.

Pointers and proofs decomposed from a monopoly broth relied on to conceal and divert from active system, structure and economic findings, error detection and correction through three Federal investigations, that is Intel Network monopolization for much too long.

Favorably Section 5 has revealed a springboard too evolve Section 2 case precedent concerning industry competitive effects claimed to cause competitor harms that may also be competition and consumer harms. Where Section 5 investigation has filled a gap in antitrust enforcement revealing a Section 1 path too hear on industry competitive claims.

Claims that are industry causes within system, structure and economic proofs of competition and consumer harms under Sherman, Clayton Acts, commerce and racketeering laws.

This path to remedy industry claims through Section 1 affirmative findings offers a bracket too review and evolve Section 2 case precedent for industry competitors.

Long time industry claims are worth judicial review within the bracket of established antitrust, commerce and racketeering case precedent. On this strategy the total case cannot be lost; only won. Where it’s more important than ever for Commission too actively exercise its full Congressional authority under Section 5 judicial hearing.

Two decades of Intel Network concealing espionage that is intended to monopolize multiple industries and markets through corporate political multipoint manipulation of Federal, State, and inter nation authority by organized network crime cannot be left unresolved.

Anyone in DC who continues along non address of antitrust, criminal and commercial frauds should be questioned. And if incapable of doing this job for fear of what Intel Network will do to you and your family as done to mine find someone capable to do that job. Mr. Holder, Mr. Mueller, Ms. Varney please place individuals into these positions who will do the job. No more varnishing over eighteen years of a compounding misfeasance.

The FTC has shown itself hampered in monitoring, regulating, remedying Intel corporate crime network. The U.S. DOJ through its inaction is suspect of similar.

The FBI informed of Intel marketing Media Agent spy ring over a decade ago and there are still no arrests? While these known individuals have buried themselves deeper into strategic influence positions within technology industry, media and society.

One has to ask why and what’s the next step toward reorganizing Federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies for competition espionage and cartel case effectiveness for industry, public and nation good.

Everyone close to these case matters knows the real Intel; society damaging enabler of cross enterprise, cross profession organized network crime.

Demonstrating debilitating affects on society Intel Corporate Political Network must be reformed to achieve any rational level of enterprise, industry and competition reform. Docket 9341 consent order fails to state any antitrust remedies.

This analyst believes Docket 9341 consent order will be ineffective on sole address of industry commercial frauds and futile to administer from antitrust conduct left unaddressed. Apparently not to be monitored under the order?

Under 9341 consent order, provision for Intel internal monitors of the order’s provisional frameworks has been established by the FTC.

However, ironically, the very act of compliance monitors identifying out of bounds anti competitive practices, and pressing Intel for correction, can be reversed too Intel’s advantage under the order. Typical of Intel style a provision within the order enables compliance monitor’s to be dismissed by Intel for monitoring anticompetitive compliance beyond the order itself.

This loop hole in compliance monitoring is significant and places monitors under Intel control. And other than for compliance monitors who are Intel Network placements presents a loosing proposition for any credible monitor.

Citing antitrust compliance boundaries Intel remains unable to comprehend the basis of market barriers of there own network creation.

Intel Corp. Compliance Position according to Intel source Attorney December 22, 2010

1) Boundaries of antitrust compliance obligations do not require Intel Antitrust Compliance Committee to address outside the organization itself, a) monitoring internal external relations associated with contract negotiations or sales agreements, b) addressing outside parties notice of current or ongoing antitrust and criminal violations to Intel’s attention.

2) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require policing for internal crime, including error correcting subgroup crime within organization to conceal antitrust, ongoing and lingering criminal violations.

3) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require focus on externalities as the catalyst for fraud and concealment of fraud to propagate antitrust and criminal violations.

4) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require policing the Intel legal department, or any department, for operation of sub groups engaged in network crime.

5) Antitrust compliance obligation does not require addressing claims of parties afflicted by Intel commercial frauds, antitrust violations including where Intel employee and contractor obstructions are designed to mask antitrust and other crime violations by internal and external co-relations.

Where Intel presents a lot of excuse’s not to regulate for antitrust compliance. And that is because Intel cannot demonstrate management consent to regulate anticompetitive conduct or organized network crime within and proximate to that enterprise.

Academic Attorney Position on FTC v Intel Docket 9341

Some academic attorneys suggest fault in FTC Section 5 to convene an investigation to find proofs of unfair methods of industry competition and deceptive practices that may not fit judicial interpretation within the range of established consumer antitrust cases. I acknowledge the criticism and FTC should have better prepared their complaint.

And stated so before the complaint was filed. That is to state specific Clayton Act and Sherman Act violations harming consumers under Anti Trust Section 5 authority in the face of Judiciary up front. At the time a Section 1 focus.

Were I suggest FTC key mistake following blindly parallel actions which contain built in faults ahead of 9341 research opening up the 9288 affirmative discovery paths.

All the while FTC remained surrounded within the traditional confines of an Intel invented reality of no foul driven by Intel long time network manipulation intended to keep it that way.

Noteworthy Docket 9341, similar to Docket 9288 Section 5 investigation again deflects from channel causes that are antitrust true positives, to industrial causes that may or may not fit judicial interpretation as competition and consumer antitrust harms.

Plaintiff causes repositioned by media to deflect from Intel Dealer and Media Sales Agent tied channel monopolization known too harm competition and consumers. Including tactics per se condemned by the Sherman and Clayton Acts that is price fixed product routing and structured market rigging, deflected toward the litigation trap of whether industrial harms harm consumers.

Where case focus is deflected in this fashion, directed away from known antitrust violations toward industry harms that might fit as competition and consumer harms, Section 5 questions are raised.

This analyst would like to propose a corporate political concern with FTC reliance on Section 5. A transparency concern that Section 5 is being used to mask competition espionage and the crime syndicates responsible for concealing them. And discovery rules which grant Intel advance notice on what evidence to destroy or alter.

And while there are multiple discovery cross checks to determine if Intel has destroyed or altered evidence, wouldn’t it be more effective to obtain a warrant on pointers and proofs, raid Intel, PC Dealers and Media Sales Agents, capture suspect and supporting documents and subsequently conceal discovery focus until the refined complaint is filed and criminal prosecution paths determined.

For a RICO case confronting the largest most financially destructive inter nation cartel in the history of modern business why would there be any other way? Perhaps this is not the FTC’s fault in poking around with their Section 5 action but indicative of drag within the U.S. DOJ Antitrust and Cartel divisions not stepping up to the plaintiffs desk sooner?

And FBI, where a problem in the San Francisco Bureau has been known for over a decade where Washington including the Director himself has always been copied on the complete case investigation as it progressed. Continued inaction in the case is a telling indicator of continued dysfunctional governance.

Network manipulation of FTC Section 5 inquiry has twice now confused and misinformed academics, attorneys, influencing observers, Congress and Senate affecting working views from information withheld.

Has stymied DOJ, FTC, industry plaintiff case outcomes and how many others?

By Intel Network deflecting commercial harm of their tied Dealer channel toward industry claims of harm that may or may not fit judicial interpretation of competition and consumer harms. The history of Intel investigation under 9341 & 9288 Section 5 has made government appear ineffective.

On 9341 repeated result of 9288; encompassing voids in overall remedies, Section 5 method again falls short by failing to tell the whole story.

Similar to 9288 system, structure and economic violations that prove intent to monopolize have been left out of 9341 consent order. In doing so refocus on industry competitor conduct has caused confusion that Intel competitor harms may not be competitive antitrust and consumer harms.

Obviously the most efficient way to address any litigation is facts on focused claims. I suggest ambiguity the downfall of Section 5 method in relation to a laser beam focus to hear Sherman and Clayton Act violations from the start. Supporting secondary focus on industry commercial frauds that are competitor harms for their determination by the court as competition and consumer harms.

This upfront approach of discovery raid followed by complaint and criminal prosecution addresses criticism for FTC action out of the pubic and judicial oversight where a new layer of FTC law may now be added under established law.

Perhaps too establish a layer of guild law under Federal competition law? Or reaffirm Intel law above the Federal Power and Nation’s law?

FTC, DOJ, U.S. Attorneys and State Attorney Generals supporting judicial review to determine whether competitor harms are also competition and consumer harms would undo these concerns. With Section 1 focus removes the question of chasing down Intel on false positives. And makes FTC and DOJ leader’s in supporting virtual private law satellites by detailing known discovery paths to affirmative antitrust true positives, opposed to negatives, supporting plaintiff actions including consumer actions.

For Docket 9288 and 9341 the core violation has always been contract, combination and conspiracy in an enterprise network fraud to conceal the Sherman Act Section 1 violation. A long time antitrust violation established on case precedent validated by established Clayton Act and RICO cases.

This Section 1 violation has always been intended by Intel Combination and Cartel practice to monopolize markets maximizing their combined system economic benefit. Too limit and steal from competitors and manipulate consumers.

And has always been cost too consumers including hidden transport tax for product routing affixed to primary Dealer’s Intel intra platform PC end sales price. An illegal transport fee enabled by Intel and Dealers, taxed too consumers in PC end sales price, where 100% of this route fee is collected by Media Sales Agents many who are codefendant propagandists concealing their own involvement in these continuous enterprise network crimes.

In this Section 5 process failure Intel Network deflection from consumer to industry causes of action has been experienced by all of us. There can be no more reversing the obvious even as cover for FBI and DOJ investigative intervention.

Its time to bring this racketeering case into the public light so all citizens can be instructed how to report and remedy competition espionage occurring in the domestic work place in real time and not over eighteen years time.

Regardless of FTC intention or bumble Section 5 false start has been a blessing in its success to reveal yet another Intel Network manipulation of federal regulatory and law enforcement. Including Intel Network media misrepresenting 9341 proposed consent agreement, as the final FTC settlement, prior to Commissioner’s November 1st acceptance. Limiting awareness of public comment opportunity? Resulting in Commission acceptance I can not agree with on lacking remedies. However discovery and remedies that still support the consumer case, State by State if necessary, on exact causes of action freed from its industrial divergence.

Now focused on consumer harms from monopoly price overcharge and Section 1 contract, combination and conspiracy too conceal Cartel price fixed product routing raising consumer PC price average 6%.

Section 5 ambiguities presenting a vague case disconnected from its complete set of facts has in fact benefited follow on case work from FTC exposure in a first round of Intel Network Judo. And will the FTC or Department of Justice now respond with Federal Jujitsu and Karate? Will State Attorney Generals? Will private actions?

For FTC 9341 refilled under Economic Espionage Act of 1996 31 USC § 1832 within the wrapper of Sherman, Clayton Act and RICO findings an easily won round two toward recovering $48.735 billion stolen by Intel Network from consumers.

And for industry plaintiffs to prove their commercial claims and recover financial harms under Section 2 assuring remedies that yield no undesirable concessions to Intel Network.

Having participated in a technical assistant capacity for both Docket 9288 and 9341, I agree with academic attorneys today who’ve chastised FTC hunting for antitrust causes of action that might fit under the Section 5 umbrella.

What a waste of time Section 5 has been in relation to focused address on specific structure and system causes that are Section 1 and Clayton Act per se condemnation’s of law that are proofs of Section 2 intent to monopolize and economic theft.

“The enforcement of free competition is the least business can expect”.

President Franklin Roosevelt

Intel Inside Tied Charge Back in Summary

Building on prior analysis reflecting on Intel Inside tied charge back the system metric can be summed up thus. That Intel Dealing Cartel combined cross enterprise cross market too venture back its own Cartel channel development in advance of the Intel microprocessor supply ramp. Where Intel and PC Dealers paid for their media channel’s expansion plan from Intel rebate fee credits earned in advance on every future computer sale from a predetermined production plan. Presenting the basis of the laundering violation; USC 1956, well before Docket 9341 identified Intel off the book kickbacks to Dell and how many others recorded as PC sales revenue.

A cartel venture which combines a minimum of six separate markets; x86 microprocessors, PC component platforms, Windows Operating System & Applications, PC design producers, investment banking and the media. With their push through system enabled between Intel Dealer Entry and Media Channel Exit Points from November 1991 through approximately 2006. After which push through system is more tightly coupled by Intel to individual PC Dealers on redesigned tying mechanisms that Docket 9341 and EUCC record as bribes and kickbacks.

Where Intel in combination with primary PC Dealer’s and Media Sales Agents agreed to redirect revenues from Intel and PC Dealers stockholder’s, disguised as legitimate sales costs, too pay for the combination’s Media Sales Agent channel build out from 1993 through Pentium 4 exponential growth.

A period of commercial set up by the Combined Cartel where Media Sales Agent’s promote Intel microprocessors routed in Dealer’s computers to end buyers tied to their own media revenue generation ahead of the Intel supply ramp.

A supply ramp detailed two year’s in advance on Micro Design Resource Intel forecast (now suspect as the actual Intel supply schedule by this analyst) under the ownership of the Ziff Davis Soft Bank Companies (1995 – 2000) headquartered in New York, New York and Tokyo, Japan. Followed in 2000 MDR purchase by Cahners Publishing from ZD Market Intelligence merged into Cahner’s Instat Market Research Group. In period ZDNet computer titles are purchased from SoftBank by CNET through final peak of Intel Inside tied charge back program.

In addition to Ziff Davis prominent Media Sales Agents include IDG PC World, CMP Windows Magazine, other technical and mass media; ZDTV?

Sales agency that would last through the cartel’s implosion in 2005/6 on hard copy publishing reconfiguration toward Internet dissemination compounded by Intel process hurdle to race microprocessor frequency past 3.8 GHz.

A period where Intel artificial press of process lithography to maintain its fabrication monopoly morphs from tied charge back to first dollar and loyalty rewards which are clearly the outcome of a continuous racket.

“The essential subordinate status of social justice as a goal of rational political discontent is illustrated by the principle that any group will find it eventually unprofitable to redistribute income toward itself at the cost even of the smallest decline in the rate of economic development. For any group which succeeds in such a redistribution there will be some year in the future beyond which it will be worse off in an absolute sense because it effected the initial redistribution in its favor”.

Richard Brandt, Social Justice in Social Dynamics, 1961 Twenty year ironies of Intel domestic PC protectionism are three fold. First, the cost impact on society exposed to artificial accelerants, systematic growth and concentration of the Dealing group.

Second, a combined cartel that did not deliver domestic PC protectionism but the system means for domestic economic theft. Third, with Toshiba and NEC limited to secondary status in the PC dealing group, Soft Bank purchase of Ziff Davis and then teamed with CNET (CNET up to 10% Intel owned in period) positioned both media companies, along with International Data Group’s PC World, to capture majority of Intel Inside margin rewards through the tied charge back program.

The cartel did not protect domestic industry but acted as the catalyst for inter nation organized attachment. Soft Bank who purchased Ziff Davis in 1995 knew exactly the benefits of Meizaru Kieretsu (hidden cartel) operating within the Intel Zaibatsu (vertical monopoly business conglomerate). Is this what Intel monopoly was meant to protect? And in respect to Soft Bank, why not, Intel Combine is an American Cartel.

Cross enterprise cross directorate because this sort of business combination can’t be coordinated singularly and requires mutual cooperation and direction. Although the network responsible for cartel operation’s including executives of Ziff Davis and other media responsible for enterprise infiltration to fill Cartel key man positions, in PC companies and Intel competitors, did attempt to keep the cartel’s coordination a secret.

From publisher’s top executives and regional ad reps who coordinated the placement’s to advertising and public relation agency personnel who policed the Intel sales system while acting as informant transfer bridges (along with some journalists) from Intel competitors back into Intel. The competitive rape of enterprises, industry and country for Intel tied charge back ad space sales, space commissions, publisher and agency directed client assignments and sustained employment that are network rewards of cartel membership.

A secret scheme reported by this analyst to his employers Cyrix, NexGen, ARM and AMD beginning 1991 through 1996 caused by Agent solicitations.

On employer inaction and Intel Network retaliation, followed by first reports to FBI in the summer and fall 1996.

Which was not the beginning of a legal system failure, but the beginning of an escalation in legal failures that has always plagued Intel case matter’s right up through 9341 result and the writing of this briefing today.

Intel monopoly profits are once again at their traditional inflated high. And that is because corporate fiduciary responsibilities, governance, regulatory and some in the Bar; no doubt specializing in serving white collar crime to sustain their attorney employments, have kept democracy stuck in Intel failure mode within the Intel lie that is a panacea of best practices meant to conceal criminal practice.

With Intel Network thumbing their noses and beating their chest’s in a victory over the FTC masking organized network crime. Where Intel CFO Smith on News Hour October 13 is positioned in front of posters that are microprocessor die photos resembling in gold hue the commercial bastions of Wall Street that are lower Manhattan office towers. Intel clinging too this constituency for support offers one indicator that all is not well in Intel Land. Followed by increasing the stock dividend as if this token of stockholder appreciation could resolve so many year’s of Intel enterprise network crime and corporate stockholder thefts.

Intel Network is responsible for a lot of looting and laundering; $42 billion# by Intel and Dealer financial records on Intel Inside explicit contract and tacit administration of the tying system. Taken from Intel and Dealer stockholders, advanced to media, intended to limit participation and monopolize their combined supply and distribution system.

These stolen funds sit waiting for consumer recovery within Intel, PC Dealer and some Media enterprises. Also I would think partner profit from INTC QUANDA players made within their investment banking operations. Using a secret tool, riding on other people’s money, and suspect as never crediting gains back to client’s accounts?

For Docket 9341 Intel system structures prove intent to monopolize. Economic analysis points to monopoly consumer overcharge and Intel industrial price below cost.

Intel explicit contractual agreements and their tacit provisions prove consumer price fixing of approximately 6%. All conduct proofs including commercial channel frauds are secondary in support.

There is no risk of antitrust false positive associated with these pointers to affirmative proofs; systems intent, consumer monopoly overcharge, industrial below cost, PC price fixing for holding the cartel and its tied distribution structure in place even now.

Added production examples on which 9341 consumer recovery is calculated.

Analysts June 4th brief estimates up to $88 billion in Intel consumer and industrial monopolization available for judicial recovery. Current consumer recovery estimate is approximately $48.735 billion. June 4th brief revision 2 and latter offers these three economic examples:

1) P3 code name Katmai 512 Desktop Performance pointer to consumer monopoly

overcharge of $300,990,000 and $764,517,480 in Intel Inside charge back values.

2) P3 code name Copper Mine 128 Value Mobile pointer to industrial monopolization;

$2,780,853,050 revenue less than average fixed cost, $351,211,950 less than variable

cost suspect below marginal cost end of run, and $187,923,900 in charge back values.

3) Cartel signaling embedded in P3 Xeon Tanner and P3 Cascades product dumping

RICO proof.

Pentium 3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop, P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Mobile and P3 Xeon Tanner Cascades are shown again below in their updated average weighted price versions. New to revision 3.2 and 3.1 find Pentium Pro P6 Workstation, Server and Desktop followed by Pentium ll Klamath 256, Pentium ll Deschutes 512 plus Pentium 4 Northwood 512 Performance Desktop and Pll Mendocino 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop.

Included reported in prior briefing are Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile and Pentium ll Dixon 256 Performance Mobile. Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop, Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile and P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop, Pentium 4 256 Willamette Performance Desktop and Pentium 4 256 Foster Workstation.

Consumer overcharge, industrial monopolization, Intel Inside tied charge back is now estimated on refined average weighted price method, for 23 production short runs, in progress for discovery purposes. As anticipated from note in July 4th brief analyst refinement from average price, to average weighted price on infra marginal speed splits, has shown consumer monopoly price overcharge growing in value.

Economic analysis including latest input to FTC on October 29 is now calculated on Intel average weighted price on MDR Intel quantity estimates, by microprocessor frequency speed split, at Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Resulting in ability to calculate consumer monopoly overcharge on exact infra marginal product quantities at monopoly price. Infra marginal ‘short lots’ of Intel microprocessors subjecting consumers to monopoly price overcharge associated with Dealer’s newest PC product introductions. Also where Intel Inside commission tied charge back values too Media Sales Agents are at their highest values.

Refined economic analysis including 9341 review period; December 1995 through 2003 is here meant to validate Intel monopolization before, during and following Docket 9288 negotiated settlement. With the objective of confirming Intel employee perjuries and criminal network manipulation of Docket 9288 result including this analyst’s push under in a covert security sting at that time. A sting that includes by production record Intel chief executives, Intel security operators, three private security firms and regional law enforcement believed to be the working associates of corporate and contract security personnel. Analyst’s aim is to show cause on witness tampering in an obstruction of justice; affirmative act of constructed fraud. Too offer causal proof for forestalling 9288 remedies and Intel Network aim to disrupt the administration of justice in all following State, Federal and civil actions and case investigations.

“True reasons of the distinction upon which the probation's of voluntary restraints are founded are: 1st, the mischief which may arise from them, first to the party by the loss of his livelihood, and the substance of his family; 2ndly, to the public, by depriving it of a useful member.

Another reason is, the great abuses these voluntary restraints are liable to; as for instance, from corporations, who are perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as possible; as likewise from masters who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, in their custom, when they come to set up for themselves .

C.J. Parker delivering resolution of court in Mitchell vs. Reynolds, King’s Bench, 1711, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep 347

Below from August 2000 find one of hundreds of analyst’s FTC and CDOJ original submittals to Messrs. Lin, Pitofsky at FTC, Mr. Greene at CDOJ, Ms. Reno, Mr. Klein USDOJ, entire Senate Judicial Committee followed by supporting economic pointers of Intel intent to monopolize and for proving Docket 9288 manipulated obstruction.

Following, fifteen examples 1995 through 2003 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC vs. Intel Docket 9288. That cause is intent to monopolize markets actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation cartel.

Monopoly pointers from MDR advance Intel production estimates, segmented by speed split, when multiplied by Intel Stated 1,000 piece price reveals a QUANDA relied on by INTC inside stock traders, PC Dealer procurement and Media Sales Agents.

A network game to calculate Intel revenue and margin potential on future Intel product route purchases including tied charge back values to Media Sales Agents up to eight quarters into future time. Note mechanism for cartel stock pumping 2002 demonstrated to FTC before October 29.

On average weighted price analysis analyst now suspects MDR estimates are the Intel supply schedule. The product of virtual network resource does MDR validate Intel production plan? Intel relies on external resources from which the organization gleans other’s ideas and makes them Intel’s ideas. This analyst’s marketing ideas and plans have been gleaned by Intel marketing. Trailed in the field and made into a feature exhibit at one Intel marketing department luncheon; don’t talk to that guy at the Intel trade show booth was their aim to inform marketing and sales personnel.

One of several encounters court ordered production shows Intel theft of analyst market plans from AMD in 1996. Separate, analyst record for AMD Security that is theft of NexGen K6 development schedule and the executive transfer of NexGen AMD confidential product details to Intel in period.

“From a scientific standpoint, what counts is knowledge not talk . . . if we want to continue to talk metaphorically about things called answers, then we still do better to speak about finding the answer, than making it . . .”

- Gabriel Stolzenberg, Inquiry into the Foundation of Mathematics

Below new to briefing find Pentium Pro P6 Workstation and Server 512 KB and 1 MB large cache versions, plus Desktop 256, showing consumer monopoly overcharge > $975 for desktop, > $1692 for large cache versions on infra marginal quantity ‘speed splits’ at Intel stated 1,000 piece price. Showing $4,818,212,535 revenue on total production of 7,206,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 211,637 units is $128,321,067. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 1.5% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $144,546,376. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing consumer recoverable from Pentium Pro P6 Workstation Server is $272,867,443.

Pentium Pro P6 industrial monopolization over top of Pentium P54CS dumping destroys any potential for Cyrix competitive survival while infringing AMD growth potential for at least the next two years.

Below Pentium ll Klamath risk production and Deschutes commercial run showing consumer monopoly overcharge > $537 on infra marginal quantity speed splits at Intel stated 1,000 piece price. For $35,669,762,000 revenue on total production of 96,165,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 9,050,000 units is $1,590,850,000. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $2,140,185,720. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing consumer recoverable from Pentium ll Performance Desktop is $3,731,035,720.

Noteworthy one half of Pentium ll Performance Desktop run is priced at or less than Intel Average Total Cost to produce; range eleven quarters $313 down to $292. With P3 risk transition Pentium ll end of run volumes offer brief platform life. End of run Pll is below cost sludge which Microsoft rides horizontally tied to an Intel frequency modulation displacing 45,847,000 microprocessor sale’s potentials from Intel horizontal competitors Cyrix / National and AMD. That is industry theft valued at $11,985,717,000 revenue potential.

Above in lower left inset find Pentium ll Mendocino 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop priced at and below average fixed cost. Showing revenue of $5,764,331,920 on 50,879,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $758,547,000 less than Average Fixed Cost of $156. And $5,005,784,920 industrial theft less than Average Variable Cost of $136 suspect as below Marginal Cost. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Celeron value desktop short run is $345,859,915.

“As soon as the problem of freedom as opposed to laissez-faire - is seen to consist in the creation of free zones within the planned structure, the whole question becomes more detailed. Instead of the unified and abstract conception, concrete issues arise. The various historical interpretations of freedom, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom from caprice and tolerance are all special obligations which must be met by the new society”.

Karl Mannheim, Freedom Under Planning, 1941

For Celeron 128 KB version of PII speed grade beginning 300A clocks higher than rated. Produced with fast, traditionally more costly L2 SRAM is a given for manufacture up to Intel fixed cost level. In this Celeron run Intel engages in predatory production of 39,405,000 unit’s suspect below marginal cost. And goose’s all units with fast SRAM as a cost add tied to Intel process monopoly advantage here relied as a weapon too destroy competition; in x86 alternative microprocessors and alternative PC operating systems.

“. . . all we can ever know about the real world is what the world is not”.

Ernest Von Glasersfeld, Radical Constructivism

Above Pentium ll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $537 on infra marginal quantity speed splits at Intel stated 1,000 piece price. On $25,679,260,000 revenue from total production of 77,952,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 1,580,000 units is $714,695,000. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $1,499,250,480. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing consumer recoverable from Pll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile production short run equals $2,501,907,280.

Below Pentium ll Dixon 256 Performance Mobile including price below Average Total Cost and suspect below Marginal Cost end of run. For revenue of $6,104,196,000 on 18,029,000 units estimates industrial monopolization from dumping at cost monopsony period three at $1,574,703,000 where price is less than competitive equilibrium price range $329 to $350. Followed by $1,128,636,000 industrial monopolization periods four and five where price is less than Average Total Cost of $292 and suspect below Marginal Cost for .18 micron process lithography. Total industrial monopolization on 10,057,000 units estimates $2,703,339,000 approximate. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel mobile short run is $360,851,760.

“An environment where hard work works the worker out of work, parsimony produces unemployment, price systems redistribute wealth without regard to worldly virtues, net worth disappears in deflation, earned interest and pensions evaporate in inflation, where the speculator and the manipulator reap the rewards of their competitive elimination through forms of economic theft that shift an industrial market’s relative values”.

-Mike Bruzzone, Camp Marketing Brief U.S. Senate Edition, January 2003

Below P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop now indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed split at Intel stated 1,000 piece price. On $12,741,958,000 revenue from total production of 34,124,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 11,195 880 units is $1,022,694,800. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $764,517,480. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing recoverable from P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop production short run is $1,787,212,280.

Below P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed splits by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. P3 Performance Desktop on MDR Intel supply schedule estimate 1 shows $37,995,339,220 revenue on 136,364,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 7,150,000 units is $1,103,498,344. Consumer surcharge from monopsony setting up for predatory price on run down volumes period five through ten is $1,348,392,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $2,279,720,353. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop production short run equals $4,731,610,697.

Note consumer surcharge periods two and three on Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move supporting P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes period five through ten. Note consumer surcharge periods two and three on Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move supporting P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes period five through ten.

Next page P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed split by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Note consumer surcharge period four through seven for Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move period eight on P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes through period ten. Tualatin 256 price regulates upward Copper mine 256 end of run average weighted price and in its own short run adds to the consumer monopoly overcharge value.

P3 Performance Mobile on MDR supply schedule estimate 2 shows $20,735,225,000 revenue on 57,050,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 16,325,000 units is $1,323,710,000. Consumer surcharge period’s four through seven for Dealer monopsony benefit and Intel predatory price on run down volumes is $1,440,325.000. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $1,244,053,500. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile production short run equals $4,008,088,500.

“Monopoly or monospony represents a kind of knot, kink, or distortion in the general field of the economic relationships, or a toll gate in the network of economic communications which enables some individuals to capture and exploit power positions which otherwise competitive forces would have eroded away”.

Principle of Personal Responsibility,

Presentation to the Catholic Economic Association, 1953

Below P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop priced at and below fixed cost. For revenue of $7,753,871,000 on 86,740,000 units, estimates industrial monopolization of

$384,704,000 at Average Fixed Cost of $136. Further industrial monopolization of $7,405,167,000 where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel desktop short run is $465,232,260.

Below Pentium 3 Celeron Value Mobile priced at and below fixed cost. Revenue of $3,132,065,000 on 25,790,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $2,780,853,050 at price is less than Average Fixed Cost of $136. And $351,211,950 industrial monopolization where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost at production end of run. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel mobile short run is $187,923,900.

In RICO proof that follows find partial classic Intel Xeon Tanner and Xeon Copper mine economic analysis average price version.

Playing signaling revealed by the Quanda, savvy PC Dealers were informed to stick with the quasi static equilibrium and back eddy offered by Xeon Tanner, and to avoid being washed over the falls that is Xeon Cascades.

Noteworthy calculating Intel revenue and margin potential on ‘average price’ verse ‘average weighted price’ calculation generally tempts some QUANDA traders to play. Average price players likely lost on Cascade Xeon short run in relation to average weighted players who knew too stay away from run down values.

Cascades is the Intel desktop microprocessor Copper mine 256, repackaged as a high performance Xeon server product at monopoly price premium and for dumping onto AMD. Xeon Cascades was not a high performance product and by June 2000 main board suppliers serving the broker system market, had rejected it, causing Intel to cancel its retail boxed version of the Cascade product line. Cascade’s was then left to sell through Intel primary Dealer channels.

Please note that AMD Opteron code names; Sledge Hammer and Claw Hammer, follow in response to Intel Network notice of Tanner signaling and pending Cascade predatory product dumping. Dumping is relied on by Intel a lot. Strategically to stop current competitive product flows in channels or to make it unprofitable for competitors to enter that product category.

Next, below, Pentium 4 Willamette 256 Performance Desktop indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed splits by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Analysis is simply that run is to long and price too low.

Consider the industrial social effect of at cost dumping monopsony periods six and seven and excess volume at period eight end of run. Always calculating on the conservative periods four and seven priced below average total cost are close enough to efficient end of run scenario within $73 of monopoly competitive equilibrium and $95 of average total cost respectively. Both periods show the artificially low price inherent with all run down volumes and this short run overall.

P4 Performance Desktop on MDR Intel supply schedule estimate 1 shows $11,241,349,546 revenue on 49,594,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 2,200,000 units is $449,745,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $674,480,973. Total consumer recoverable from P4 Willamette 256 Performance Desktop production short run is $1,124,225,973.

Pentium 4 Foster 256 Xeon Workstation not shown here in plot indicates $128,458,490 total consumer recovery. That is consumer monopoly overcharge and tied charge back fix on 5,728,000 units and $1,616,119,000 revenue.

Pentium 4 Northwood 512 Performance Desktop not shown here in plot on MDR partial (Northwood A) first five quarter production phase through 2.8 GHz, plus analyst end of run estimate on 3.0 to 3.4 Gigahertz volumes (Northwood B) suggests total revenue range $17,604,460,750 to $34,826,460,380 between 71,772,000 and 157,572,000 units. That is conservatively minimum 85,000,000 to around 126,000,000 units.

P4 Northwood consumer monopoly overcharge on MDR estimate for Northwood A infra marginal production of 3,800,000 units is $509,600,000. Analyst conservative estimate for Northwood B infra marginal production on 1,200,000 units is $333,600,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger ranges between $1,056,267,645 and $2,089,557,623. Total consumer recoverable P4 Northwood 512 Performance Desktop production short run anticipated between $1,565,867,545 too $2,599,157,623. 130 nanometers remains an expensive production set aimed for Prescott @ 90 nm.

P4 analysis continues to show production runs too long, priced too low, dropping below average total cost mid through end of run. For Northwood B end of run volumes including 3.4 GHz Extreme Edition at $925 appears meant to lift run down average price. Likely there’s a bridge upward for select end of run speed grades. Of interest comparing P4 short runs to P3 is tied charge back value continuing to walking away in excess of consumer monopoly overcharge value.

Summary of Intel Network Recovery Value’s in part for 1997 through 2003 on revision 3 average weighted price method. Addressing Intel Network two decade misrepresentation of no monopoly, no consumer monopoly overcharge, no price fixing, no product routing, no exclusive dealing, no combined cartel, no kick back and no foul are not true.

Consumer Monopoly Price Overcharge = $ 7,121,477,615

Consumer Surcharge Monopsony Price = $ 2,788,717,000

Consumer Tied Charge Back Price Fix = $ 10,701,936,652

Partial Consumer Recovery = $20,612,131,267

Industrial Monopolization Price < afc =" $">

Industrial Monopolization Price < mc =" $">

Industrial Monopolization Price < avc =" $">

Partial Industrial Recovery = $17,814,903,920

Note at cost dumping is calculated for FTC across 23 production short runs. However is not recorded here as industrial monopolization when price is above average fixed cost pending that intent to monopolize outcome in litigation.

Microsoft industrial social harm calculated from twelve Intel production short runs herein suggests $7,537,248,000 monopolization at $48 OEM price attached horizontally by Microsoft OEM license to 157,026,000 Intel microprocessors priced less than Intel variable and suspect as below marginal cost to produce. Up to $10,889,836,800 on $48 OEM price attached horizontally by Microsoft OEM license to 221,876,800 Intel microprocessors priced less than Intel Average Total Cost to produce.

“The position of those who maintain that there is no defect in an unregulated market economy was made undeniable by the Great Depression”. Economics; Taming of Mammon, Frontiers in the Knowledge of the Study of Man, Lynn White, 1956

In Conclusion

On pointers and proofs whether Intel employees and witnesses perjured themselves in a Network multipoint manipulation of the FTC, to deflect from core causes of action in Docket 9288, and again in 9341 are clear. System, structure, economic, conduct pointers and proofs examined under lens of legal case precedent reveals this fact. A premeditated network obstruction to forestall remedies and disrupt the administration of justice in all Intel case matters over the last twelve years including now.

Intel Network case matters are about insuring innovation production short run to short run. Assuring civil rights while preserving ability to innovate based on examples that demonstrate Intel methods of creative destruction can be very destructive economically, structurally, holistically and socially. Intel Network RICO is proven. Section 1 and Section 2 case proofs wait to be discovered by FTC or sit delivered at FTC and DOJ.

“The agent of expansion is not the capitalist but the innovator”.

Peter Drucker, The New Society, 1950

I look forward to open Intel hearings for a transparency that will educate every American on forms of domestic economic terrorism caused by illegal monopolization, combinations, cartels, frauds, theft, deceit and the cover ups that have stymied these Intel Network case matters from their complete remedies and resolutions for over a decade.

Respectfully Submitted

Mike Bruzzone

Camp Marketing

FBI Original Source of Intel Network RICO; 1996

FTC Invited field reporter Docket 9288, 1998-2000

CDOJ and NYDOJ first to report; 1998

CDOJ lettered to work report; Intel Section 1 Framework; 2000 –

SEC Notice; 2007

U.S. Attorney NCD recognized FCA Relator; 2008

FTC voluntary analyst Docket 9341; under Labor Code 3363.5; 2009

* * * * *

Assessment and Models of

Technical Business Systems,

seen through Field, Primary

& Secondary Research.

Mike Bruzzone

Managing Director

Camp Marketing Consultancy

Partial list of primary research, undertaken and completed by lettered invitation on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition followed by Office of the California State Attorney General.

May 10, 1998 Bureau of Competition invitation to input; F.T.C. vs. Intel; Docket 9288.

Lettered to work report, March 21, 2000; Office of California State Attorney General.

Assessment and models of technical business system - competitive strategy, system’s framework, operational clockworks defined through field, primary and secondary research, as seen through the lenses of ten academic disciplines: the law, economics, industrial management best practice, cybernetics, general system’s theory, value theory, system psychology, network dynamics, analysis of responsible science in technocracy 1926 – 2002, communication’s science.

Partial Primary Research:

Economic analysis across 21 consecutive Intel microprocessor production short runs.

Assessment of Intel P5, P6 production; wave front analysis, surplus reverberation & concentration patterns.

Intel Pentium (P5) economic analysis; 1993 – 2002.

Intel Pentium (P6) economic analysis; 1996 – 2002.

Intel Pentium 4 economic analysis; 2001 – 2004.

x86 microprocessor and graphics processing unit design share research 1990 - 2008.

Assessment of Intel intra-platform horizontal component/matrices consolidation; 1993 – 2009.

Assessment of Editor Choice Awards effecting consolidation of Intel Inside dealer combination.

Assessment of Intel Inside page space allocation as weight of rebated fee pools.

Identification of Intel intra platform microprocessor broker dealers by Intel Inside space allocation.

Assessment of industrial de-structuring inside and outside the rungs of periodic and point attractors.

Complete System’s Structure Map; industry taper, channel attractors, value ties, mechanics over structure.

Legal case studies and economic overlays over Intel system’s structure and supply chain map; 1993-2000.

Filters for moving Intel case to hearing stage; Easterbrook, Calvani, monopoly share, 9th Circuit filter considering Intel in input and output markets, MCI test, no economic sense & profit sacrifice test, Areeda-Turner below cost price test, predator price test, elasticity analysis, efficient components price standard, general universal test.

Including 1,000,000 words of written analysis through 128 months of reporting to the U.S. Senate & National Association of Attorney Generals.

Partial syllabus of secondary research sources:

Allen, Gary

None dare call it conspiracy

Ashton, T.S.

The Industrial Revolution

Ayers, Clarence E.

The Industrial Way of Life

Baron, Hank

Crisis in the Early Italian Renaissance

Bagdikian, Ben

Media Monopoly

Baumgartel, Howard

The Concept of Role

Bavelas, Alex

Group Dynamics and Inter-group Relations

Beene, Kenneth D.

An Approach to Problems of Inter-religious Conflict

Case Methods in the Training of Administrators

Deliberate Changing as the Facilitation of Growth

Democratic Ethics and Human Engineering

Operational Research

Beer, Stafford

Decision and Control

Bennis, Warren G.

A Theory of Group Development

A Typology of Change Process

Group Observation

Interpersonal Communication

Leadership Theory and Administrative Behavior

Blake, Robert R.

Psychology and the Crisis of Statesmanship

Boulding, Kenneth E.

Beyond Economics

Brandenburger, Adam M.

Co-opetition

Bradshaw, Leland P.

The Teaching-Learning Transaction

Brealy, Richard

Corporate Finance

Breshnahan, Timothy

Competition in the New Computing Industry

Brooks, Harvey

Technology Assessment in Retrospect

Bronowski, J.

Technology and Culture in Evolution

Brynner, Gary

Worker Alienation

Buckminister, R. Fuller

Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth

Burke, John G.

Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power

Burt, Dobler, Starling

World Class Supply Management

Campbell, Robert

Fisherman’s Guide; systems approach to creativity in organization

Cartwright, Dorwin

Achieving Change in People

Group Dynamics and the Individual

Power; a Neglected Variable in Social Psychology

Chin, Robert

Human Relations: A “New” Discipline or an Integrative Force?

Problems and Prospects of Applied Research

The Utility of Systems Models and Developmental Models of Practitioners

Cipolla, Carlo, M.

Clocks and Culture

Clark, Wilson

Intermediate Technology

Commoner, Barry

Are We Really in Control

Counts, George

The Impact of Technological Change

Covey, Stephen R.

Seven Habits of Highly Effective People

Cringeley, Robert J.

Accidental Empires

D’Aveni, Richard A.

Hyper-Competition

Dahrendorf, Ralf

Toward a Theory of Social Conflict

Daniels, George H.

Technological Change and Social Change

Davidow, William

Marketing High Technology

The Virtual Corporation

Davis, Kingsley

The Migrations of Human Populations

de Solla Price, Derek J.

Little Science, Big Science

Dixit, Avinash K.

Thinking Strategically

Douhet, Giulio

The Command of the Air

Drucker, Peter F.

Applied Science and Technology

Management

The First Technological Revolution and Its Lessons

The Futility and Dangers of Technology Assessment

The New Society

Du Bois, Cora

The Public Health Worker as an Agent of Socio-cultural Change

Dubos, Rene

The New Environmental Attitude

Durant, William and Ariel

The Age of Louis XIV

The Age of Reason Begins

The Renaissance

Ellul, Jacques

The Technological Order

Einstein, Albert

Letter to President Roosevelt

Engles, Friedrich

Freedom through Socialism

Fairbain, William

The Engineering Profession

The Invention of the Riveting Machine

Ferguson, Charles H.

Computer Wars

Ferguson, Eugene S.

Nonverbal Thought in Technology

Ferkiss, Victor C.

Bureaucracy

Fine, Charles

Clockspeed

Florman, Samual

In Praise of Technology

Foster, Richard

Innovation

Frank, Lawrence K.

Fragmentation in the Helping Professions

Frank, Thomas

One Market Under God

Gates, Bill

The Road Ahead

Galbraith, John

The New Industrial State

The Economics of Innocent Fraud

Geidon, Siergfried

Engineering the Household

Geiger, George

Values and Social Science

Geisst, Charles

Monopolies in America

General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission

Report on the “Super”

Getzels, Jacob W.

Administration as a Social Process

Gimpel, Jean

Environmental Pollution in the Middle Ages

Glacken, Clarence J.

Nature and Culture in Western Thought

Gleck, James

Chaos, making a new science

Glidewell, John C.

The Entry Problem in Consulting

Goleman, Daniel

Working with Emotional Intelligence

Gracian, Baltasar

The Art of Worldly Wisdom

Greenwood, Ernest

The Practice of Science and the Science of Practice

Greider, William

Who Will Tell the People, the Betrayal of American Democracy

Gouldner, Alvin W.

Engineering and Clinical Approaches to Consulting

Organizational Analysis

Theoretical Requirements of the Applied Social Sciences

Gruen, William

The Moral Dimension of Science

Grove, Andrew S.

High Output Management

Only the Paranoid Survive

Guest, Robert H.

Scientific Management and Assembly Line

Gunderson, Robert Gray

Group Dynamics, Hope or Hoax?

Hammer, Michael

Reengineering Revolution

Heilbroner, Robert L.

Do Machines Make History

Henderson, Carter

The Frugality Problem

Henderson, Hazel

Paradigms in Progress, Life Beyond Economics

Hibbard, Walter R.

Mineral Resources; challenge or threat?

Horwitz, Murray

The Conceptual Status of Group Dynamics

Hostetler, John A.

Amish Society

Jaques, Elliott

Technocracy or Collaboration?

Jenkins, David H.

Force Field Analysis Applied to a School Situation

Group Self-evaluation

Jensen, Gale

A Model for Analyzing Small Group Properties Pertinent to Planned Change

Jensen, Neal F.

The Food-People Problem

Jewkes, John

The Sources of Invention

Jolly, Vijay K.

Commercializing New Technologies

Kaplan, Jerry

Start Up

Kawasaki, Guy

Selling the Dream

Kelman, Herbet C.

Process of Opinion Change

Keniston, Kenneth

Technology and Human Nature

Kelman, Herbert C.

Group Dynamics, Neither Hope or Hoax

Kestin, Hesh

21st Century Management

Kuhn, Thomas S.

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Jackson, Tim

Inside Intel

Jager, Rama Dev

In the Company of Giants; conversations with the visionaries of the digital world

Lakoff, Sanford A.

Knowledge, Power and Social Purpose

Laszlo, Ervin

The Systems View of the World

Lao-tzu

Tao Te Ching

Leary, Timothy

The Theory and Measurement Methodology of Interpersonal Communication

Lerner, Max

The Discovery of the “Irrational”: Personal and Collective

Levit, Grace

Learning through Role Playing

Levitt, Theodore

Marketing Imagination

Levinger, George

Kurt Lewin’s Approach to Conflict and Its Resolution

Levison, Conrad Jay

Guerrilla Marketing Attack

Guerrilla Marketing

Lewin, Kurt

Principles of re-education

Quasi-Stationary Social Equilibria and the Problem of Permanent Change

Lilenthral, David E.

Democracy at the Grass Roots

Lippitt, Gordon L.

What Do We Know About Leadership?

Lippitt, Ronald

Dimensions of the Consultant’s Job

Value-Judgement Problems of the Social Scientist in Action Research

Loomis, Charles P.

Tentative Types of Directed Social Change Involving System Linkage

Lynch, Dudley

Strategy of the Dolphin

Machiavelli, Nicole

The Prince

Mann, Floyd C.

Studying and Creating Change

Manniheim, Karl

Freedom Under Planning

From Trial and Error to Planning

Roots of the Crisis of Evaluation

Marlowe, Donald E.

Public Interest, First Priority in Engineering Design?

Marrow, Alfred J.

Changing a Stereotype in Industry

Martin, James

The Great Transition

Mathis, Robert

Human Resources Management

McChesney, Robert W.

Rich Media, Poor Democracy

McGregor, Douglas M.

The Human Side of Enterprise

McKenna, Regis

Relationship Marketing

McLuhan, Marshall

Automation

Meier, Hugo A.

Technology and Democracy, 1800 - 1860

Merton, Robert K.

Social Scientists and Research Policy

Miles, Mathews

The Training Group

Moe, Edward O.

The Nature of Community

Morison, Elting E.

A Case Study of Innovation

Moore, Barrington

Sociological Theory and Contemporary Politics

Moore, Geoffrey A.

Crossing the Chasm

Inside the Tornado

Moore, James F.

Death of Competition

Morgan, Arthur E.

The Garrison Dam Disaster

Morgan, Thomas, D.

Modern Antitrust Law and its Origins

Morici, Peter

Antitrust in the Global Trading System; reconciling U.S, Japanese and EU Approaches

Mumford, Lewis

The All Seeing Eye

The Technique of Total Control

Murphy, Arthur E.

The Efficacy of Reason

Nadar, Ralph

Unsafe at Any Speed

National Training Laboratories

Some Dimensions of Group Growth

Nelkin, Dorothy

The Technological Imperative versus Public Interest

Nordlinger, Eric

On the Autonomy of Democratic State

Ogburn, William F.

Technology as Environment

Ostrander, Shelia

Psychic Discoveries behind the Iron Curtain

Pages, Max

The Socio-therapy of the Enterprise

Parson, Talcott

The Problem of the Theory of Change

Pascale, Richard T.

The Art of Japanese Management

Peter, Paul J.

Marketing Management

Pigors, Paul and Faith

The Incident Process

Porter, Michael

Competitive Advantage

Competitive Strategy

On Competition

Pursell, Carroll M.

The Government and Industrial Technology

Ramo, Simon

The Systems Approach

Ravitz, Jerome R.

Social Problems of Industrialized Science

Riesman, David

The Researcher and His Audiences: Introduction to Crestwood Heights

Rogers, Carl

A Process Conception of Psychotherapy

Rogers, T.J.

No Excuses Management

Rosenberg, Nathan

Economic Growth, Technology, and Society

Technology and Resource Endowment

Roszak, Throdore

The Citadel of Expertise

Sakharov, Andrei D.

Nuclear Weapons Development

Salvatore, Dominick

Managerial Economics in a Global Economy

Sanders, Irwin T.

Approaches to Social Change

Sanders, W.J

Is the Semiconductor Industry Mature?

Samuelson, P

Economics

Schein, Edgar H.

Interpersonal Communication, Group Solidarity and Social Influence

Schmookler, Jacob

Economic Sources of Inventive Activity

Schutz, William C.

Interpersonal Underworld

Schumpeter, Joseph

Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy

Schwartz Cowan, Ruth

The “Industrial Revolution” in the Home

Schwartz, Morris S.

Intervention and Change on a Mental Hospital Ward

Seashore, Charles

The Consultant-Trainer Role

Semrad, Elvin V.

The Use of Group Processes in Teaching Group Dynamics

Senge, Peter M.

The Fifth Discipline

Shalin, Leonard

Art & Physics; parallel visions in space, time and light

Sheppard, Herbert A.

The T-Group as Training on In Observant Participation

Shrode, William

Organization and Management

Siler, Todd

Think like a Genius

Simon, Herbert A.

What Computers Mean for Man and Society

Slater, Phillip E.

Displacement in Groups

Spiegel, John P.

The Resolution of Role Conflict within the Family

Stanley, William O.

The Collapse of Automatic Adjustment

Stein, Maurice

The Eclipse of Community

Strachey, John

The Nature of Capitalist Crisis

Strauss, Anslem L.

Transformations of Identity

Sullivan, Harry S.

Multi-disciplined Coordination of Interpersonal Data

Tabb, William

Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization

Terry, Earle Melvin

Advanced Laboratory Practice in Electricity and Magnetism

Thelen, Herbert

The Growth of a Group

Thompson, Arthur, A.

Crafting & Executing Strategy

Thompson, James D.

Organizational Management of Conflict

Treacy, Michael

The Discipline of Market Leaders

Tzu, Sun

Art of War

Varian, Hal R.

Intermediate Microeconomics

Veblen, Thorstein

The Role of the Engineers

Wager, J. Alan

Growth versus the Quality of Life

Wallace, James C.

Freedom and Direction

Ward, Barbara

The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations

Watzlawick, Paul

The Invented Reality

Weiner, Charles

How the Transistor Emerged

Winner, Langdon

Technology as Legislation

Wik, Reynold M.

The Government and Agricultural Technology

White, Lynn

Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered

The Act of Invention

The Taming of Mammon - Frontiers in the Knowledge of the Study of Man

Wright, Quincy

Technology and Warfare

Yergin, Daniel

Commanding Heights

York, Herbert F.

Strategic Reconnaissance

Zaheer, S. Husain

India’s Need for Advanced Sciences and Technology

Zander, Alvin

Resistance to Change – Its Analysis and Prevention

Journalism Oversight for Democracy Prerequisite; revision 3

Mike Bruzzone, Camp Marketing

campmkting@aol.com

Introduction:

“The specialization of science is an inevitable accompaniment of progress; yet it is full of dangers, and it is cruelly wasteful, since so much that is beautiful and enlightening is cut off from most of the world. Thus it is proper to the role of the scientist that he may not merely find new truth and communicate it to his fellows, but that he teach, that he try to bring the most honest and intelligible account of new knowledge to all who will try to learn . . . it is here in teaching of men who by profession must themselves be both teachers and taught, that the narrowness of scientific life can best be moderated, and that the analogies, insights, and harmonies of scientific discovery can find their way into the wider life of man”.

Robert Oppenhemier,

Prospects in the Arts & Sciences, 1955

In relation to Federal Trade Commission June 8th Docket 9288 complaint, the settlement proposal addresses three issues which in the opinion of this analyst are insufficient. That Intel cannot cut off customers, stifle competition, and impede innovation in relation to intellectual property disputes. Incident’s where Intel shuts out rivals, changes the structure of organic competition, steals the intellectual property of competitors and then offers to license on Intel terms after.

Disputes raised by enterprises who are horizontally and vertical compliments, as well as competitors to Intel. Independent enterprises with know how and technology enablement capability beyond Intel franchise. These are more than just companies working on extensions of Intel reference designs or system integration and distribution houses. They are established contributors to domestic economic renewal that maintain ground up technology enablement expertise. Know how driving development of competitive semiconductor, microprocessor and compute platform architectures in relation to Intel’s own.

Unique and differentiated approaches to computing; Alpha, Clipper, Power PC, Sparc, Nx586, Nx686, AMD, Cyrix, Rise, IDT Centaur and Transmeta alternative x86 offerings. Offering a broad foundation for subordinate economic potentials to attach, that are unique system block, logic and system implementation’s supporting these co-development initiatives. All minor in volume compared to Intel architecture yet capable of seeding innovation, too drive new business structure, including new levels of product utility and economic benefit for computer user’s world wide.

Thus competitive threat’s capable of upsetting Intel status quo. Where inventive corporations with the potential of displacing parts of the Intel monopoly derived surplus barrier are intellectual targets to be leveled. To be targeted and stripped of their incentives, inventive and competitive potentials, know how, manpower, financial resources and branding ability.

Disrupt bread and butter ‘Intel architecture’ PC sales for companies with enablement expertise on the one hand, and their ability to fund alternate computing approaches whether replacements or substitutes to Intel architecture, can be compromised on the other. I trust this dispels a myth perpetrated by some academics, press and analysts. That the few domestic microprocessor and compute platform companies remaining with ground up system design and development capabilities are in fact Intel competitors.

Alternative processor and computer company’s then are a threat too Intel Network. Options for these inventive companies then are simple. Bow to Intel and be assimilated. Walk a thin blue line. Defend against proactive and premeditated obliteration. Carry along a larger constituent club.

“One of the most challenging, and tantalizing propositions of what may be called the larger economics, is that the success of economic institutions depends to a large extent on the nature of the whole culture in which they are embedded, and not solely on the nature of these institutions themselves”.

Religious Foundations of Economic Progress

President and fellows of Harvard College, 1952

Situation Analysis:

Underworld characters with local political and law protection are infiltrating legally established businesses and snatching working controls in various semiconductor design fabricators, compute systems design producers, media, venture, banking and financial institutions.

Such characters it is held have a made a bundle in the underworld; threatening executives, rigging markets, product distribution operations, concealing abuses through network manipulations, fraud, media propagandist controls and covert security operations. Pyramiding their illicit gains into the labyrinthine of the enterprise they have endangered legitimate corporate, State and Federal governance, worldwide regulatory, law enforcement and Nation’s controls.

The Intel Corporation case matters are a green field for evolving constitutional, federal & state, competition, civil, labor & world human rights laws & legislation.

Mike Bruzzone

Camp Marketing

Various dangers loom from these industrial, financial, channel and political infestations. Where their confidence men and woman loot legitimate corporations, sabotage product development, manufacturing, and manipulate governance within institutions from the inside and outside. They can rig situation assessment, tamper with executive decision making, dissuade from competing, will make examples out of resistors, mislead and tamper with law enforcement, jurists, Judges, manipulate elected leaders to defraud the public and Nations.

To better procure political support their network manipulations portray business operations as nirvanas of best practice. These misrepresentations enable a form of mass corruption that preys on legitimate businessmen especially those who would challenge them. They have turned happy, honest corporations into devils dens leading in the consequent demoralization of an orderly society.

I cannot over emphasize the danger that can lie in the muscling into legitimate industries by hoodlums, there is too much evidence before us of racketeers and industrial spies teamed to gain control over legitimate technical, product, investment and media concerns. Positioned by their propagandists as leading executives they utilize all the old mob tricks – extortion, strong arming, threats, pay offs, sabotage and constructions. Efforts covering their crime ring’s criminal advantage over legitimate competition, democratic methods of capital accumulation for reinvestment and economic renewal. This break down has endangered all legitimate enterprise institutions in performing system regulatory and governance functions across all democratic societies.

“Participation as an ideology in American society seems to be of growing importance just when technical complexity threatens to limit effective political choice. The actual scope of citizen influence on technological development depends on many of the usual factors that affect any political decisions: leadership, community, organization, access to the media, the visibility and urgency of the issue.

Information can be mustered to support either side of a debate, and power hinges on the ability to manipulate knowledge and control uncertainty. Technical expertise, therefore, is a crucial political resource in politics and technology. And the key questions focus on the relationship between policy makers and their experts, on the ways in which decisions about innovation deal with uncertainty concerning social costs, and on the dilemma of democracy in this increasingly complex and professional policy arena”.

Dorothy Nelkin

Technological Imperative vs. Public Interests, 1976

This August 2000 edition of the Art & Science of Camp Marketing Brief hopes to trigger reflection on social, civil, industrial and political issues associated with U.S. vs. Intel: FTC Docket 9288 and now 9341. For eighteen years this analyst has recorded and reported on organized crime infiltration molding the state of competition in the x86 microprocessor, PC platform and media markets. Detail’s associated with discovery and recording criminal infiltrations into Cyrix, NexGen, ARM, AMD, PC distribution and media channels. Where organized crime intent was meant to dismantle competitors, too monopolize the x86 and PC platform markets, to loot competition, competitive enterprises and Nations.

Now at the level of inter nation dialogue moving toward Intel Network remedies. Responsible frameworks for monopolist and rackets error detection and correction, within Intel, cluster and channels, for the provisional administration of a remedial framework assuring regulatory compliance and monopoly oversight control.

From anyone who can add value. These crimes are not unknown to many of the observing witnesses reading these communications. Many who are capable of bringing specific knowledge to the situation assessment for a complete and total democracies’ solution.

Contribute by reporting publicly through your mass media outlet or write:

Attn: Secretary

Federal Trade Commission

Docket 9341 Public Comment

600 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington, DC 20580

On Enterprise Networks -

We are about to discover where between truth and justice, the four corners of misfeasance, malfeasance, fraud and accomplice competition rebounds on legitimate address of all subsets of the Intel Corporation competition case matters. These are enterprise remedies for participation, industrial stability, economic efficiency, competitive and employment potentials, revenue and profit contributions.

On this subject as field reporters we have options. Silence, or that worse option, the mimicking repeater of the certified Intel Blogger, alternatively, the all encompassing business report, investigative report or opinion piece.

This innovator in a tough environment for innovation chose investigative reports. Reporting that supports the journalism tradition of corporate political oversight, as a best practice, for protecting freedom in any democracy; chose yours.

On FTC Docket 9341 settlement proposal we’ve heard from Intel Network and herd. Now act for society on journalism as one foundation for our democratic freedoms.

“A free press can and should be an accountable press. The received wisdom of press freedom assumes that freedoms and rights can be free standing. In fact, there are no rights without counter part obligations and duties.”

Onora O’neill,

Doctor of Philosophy,

Cambridge University

Where journalism as a democratic protection can introduce the need for legitimate corporate governance institutions; rackets error detection, support courage to admit organized crime infiltration, timely correction, for monopoly and organized network crime prevention. Where Intel DOJ antitrust compliance obligations have always required Intel employees to be the first to report and remedy. That is not to attack those who are first to report. Or too deny and then too attack. More so we cannot negate this inherent report responsibility from citizens residing in a civil society. Responsibility to report where ever competition espionage endangers enterprise, municipality, State, Nation, life and liberty, industry, competition, truly a free press and our freedom to compete in a functioning democracy.

Every American needs to be familiar with the indicators of competition espionage occurring within the enterprise and how to report it for remedy in real time. Intel Network and associated x86 and PC market failures are our foremost teachers.

“The ingenuity and the perseverance of industrial management in the pursuit of economic ends have changed many scientific and technological dreams into commonplace realities. It is now becoming clear that the application of these same talents to the human side of enterprise will not only enhance substantially these materialistic achievements but will bring us one step closer to the good society. Shall we get on with the job”.

The Human Side of Enterprise

Douglas M. McGregor, 1957

Where knowledge based solutions that free critical industries from mob controls can deliver everyone a return to the well regarded principles of democratic capitalism. Where investments and capital accumulations are naturally grown and sustained on an enterprise’s good business decisions, and not on the decisions of a criminal network in an Intel police state.

Universally accepted methods of level industry supporting open participation from all contributors, based on organic models, where all are naturally enabled to pursue their full potentials and none criminally limited.

Please pursue the journalist oversight cycle, over and over again, until technocracy gets this right.

“As originator and prime mover over the mass-production revolution, this country has risen to world leadership and become the greatest power. So far this leadership has been confined to the realm of technology. We have not developed the social and political institutions to go with this technology. But precisely because mass production technology is a corrosive acid which no pre-industrial culture or social order can resist, the world requires a working model of the political and social institutions for an industrial age. Without such a model to imitate and learn from, the mass production revolution can only produce decades of war, chaos, despair and destruction. If the model is not furnished by the West, if it is not a model of a free industrial society the model will be that of a slave industrial society.

If this country fails to serve as a working model, it if does not succeed in developing at home a functioning and free industrial society, our very technological leadership will bring catastrophe to the world and to our selves. It will lead to the acceptance, on a worldwide bases, of institutions and beliefs unacceptable and deeply hostile to the basic beliefs and institutions of the American tradition and to the tradition of the West. In such a world, the United States could not maintain its own institutions and perhaps not even its independence. No amount of military strength, no success of anti-Communist diplomacy, no Marshall Plan, could in the long run prevent this. These, however, necessary and beneficial, are stopgaps and futile in the end unless they are followed up by the assertion of world-leadership which only the successful development of a Constitution for a Free Industrial Society can provide.”

Peter Drucker, The New Society, 1950

I suggest the structure of scientific revolution associated with Intel Network monopoly represents one of the worst case scenarios of what can go wrong when any government allows protection of an industry by a sub-society of its participants. In this case engineers under the influence of professional managers who are the members of a cross enterprise, cross profession network crime ring. Who through the extended period of their proactive chaos dismantled multiple enterprises and industries cloaked behind the back drop of a worldwide business and economic realignment.

Beginning 1991 escalating even today corporate influence networks have proven themselves untrustworthy; for governance and oversight, including as government educational resources. In this worst case Intel example where a monopoly for two decades is granted total control, and unfettered freedoms, to pursue whatever course it chooses to achieve its desired level of industry, economic and trade law protectionism. Intel x86 microprocessor and the disintegrated cells of the intra-platform PC market was the worst possible choice for a monopoly experiment of this type.

“The government’s need for science has frequently stimulated it to new organizational experiments. The basic problem has been that, much as the government needs science, science has, by and large, offered its services only on its own terms. Those terms have been support without control, or in other terms, power without responsibility”.

Carrol W. Pursell Jr.

Science & Government Agencies, 1966

Today the value of production continues too consolidate toward the few capable of its mass production. Where a history of monopoly abuses by organized crime continues in industries where technocrats utilize the mysteries of their business specialty to gain control from active governance, democratic forms of competition and system regulation.

Yes, action regulation and governance do help. Too prevent cross enterprise organized crime infiltration, and to insure the means to deliberate on issues of correction and control, methods and results of actions which in fact touch upon all of us; in every industry, across all civil society.

“The political world is today defined through its relation to the technological society. Traditionally, politics formed a part of a larger social whole; at present the converse is the case”

Jacques Ellul, Sociologist

The Technical Order, 1962

While this analyst feels the Intel Combination achieved its objective of domestic PC protectionism, the network franchise did so for its own vested interest unobservant of law. Where there has been a war against the capital, economic, civil and human rights of many regardless of these harms still being masked over by Intel invented reality.

Intel intra platform PC vertical by horizontal sales system wiped out a massive number of domestic inventors through methods positioned as beneficial to U.S. economic growth. When, in fact, Intel Network through artificial system accelerations to rig and monopolize markets drove an international political bumble whose effects are now known. By you and me and officials within industry and government, across multiple nations, on which Wintel and America will continue too be judged.

A systematic reconfiguration of industry and channels by organized network crime undermining economic rights and democratic foundation’s across many countries. Crimes masked by organized network crime. A crime ring that today is scattered across and buried into multiple corporation and media enterprises. The result of two decade’s of delay in error correcting Intel Network from our overcoming the deceptions and misrepresentations that comprise the Intel lie.

Students of democratic societies recognize that when large organizations wield concentrations of economic power, political power is not far behind .The unnamed fear behind this realization is of a drift toward fascism, where the power of large organizations supplants the role of the individual in society.”

Charles Geis,

Monopolies in America, Oxford Press

On Intel -

As astonishing as it might seem, there is nothing unique or complicated about the way in which Intel monopolized the x86 microprocessor and PC platform markets. The methods are as old as guild control of commodities, secured through majority ownership of production facilities, some sharing of production data, ability to manufacturer in excess of demand, to control surplus ownership, its value distribution, and in these technologic times to accelerate distribution system structure and to conceal that acceleration in combination with mass media.

Through every kind of terrain, the signposts are there along the roadside. Sometimes they point out the hazard’s, other times the general direction, the turns or forks in the road. It is in the congested valleys of the industrialized West that they are often obscured along detours or diversions cluttered with neon lights and billboard advertising. The system sign posts are still there, but they have to be carefully sought out”.

Robert Campbell,

Management Consultant - Mobil Corp.

Where some media enterprise participated in propagating espionage’s forcing computers onto consumers for a fee, while hiding behind our first amendment right. This aspect being hideously noteworthy; relied on for microprocessor and intra-platform monopoly maintenance, product routing, industrial concentration, to steal the revenues of one company and to divert those revenues to other favored concerns. Too artfully cover the simplicity of these anti-competitive and criminal acts. To create the counterintuitive illusion of an Intel Nation success out of fundamentally much less.

After earning stewardship over a natural x86 monopoly, and shortly following the SBC 386-16 MHz development cluster, Intel’s intent to monopolize through anti-competitive means in violation of law was clear. As of October 1989, and with volume production of the 386-33 class platform, Intel had established a channel surplus of graded 386 CPU product; effective as a monopoly price support, and had demonstrated the utilization of legal rigs, retroactive restraints, production capacity and allocation to suppress other x86 microprocessor design fabricators from competitive market entry and channel growth.

“A near monopolistic company may be especially privileged, by insisting on longer (production) runs without incurring the loss of large stocks. This can be done by the simple expedient of holding the customers to ransom and making them accommodate the necessary stocks. It is fortunate for the national economy that few companies are in a position to get away with this, for it ties up unnecessary amounts of capital”.

Dr. Stanford Beer, Industrial Scientist

Decision & Control, 1966

Channels, as the 486 platform transition occurred, now filled with aging strata of prior Intel CPU class and speed grades. Class and speed grades that as the Intel monopoly matured would be dumped onto competitors as a method for their elimination. Speed grades ideally sold by channels on a first-in-first-out basis for capital recovery. So that new product, both Intel and competitive substitutes and replacements, could be purchased and enter some channels. Substitute x86 microprocessor and microprocessor platform replacements offering utility value to consumers including a lower price. However a price that traditionally delivered lower margin to channels. The stage was now set for the combination of Intel’s PC development with channel bottleneck monopolies into the Intel Power Complex.

Intel is an anomaly in our domestic technology industry. While other semiconductor and inter platform PC design/manufacturers produce from a forecast of customer demand supporting process economic migration, Intel over produces to monopolize process, utilizing its production might combined with intra industry financial incentives to block others from competing and entering the x86 and PC platform’s market.

There is nothing new or complex about these methods of monopolization addressed in antitrust and commercial case law precedent. The next time an Intel representative proclaims Intel is not a monopoly you can inform them you know differently. As a result of Camp Marketing Briefs and from some of your own observations and experiences, you know the truth. Publish on it.

On Media -

Through a ten month IPO quite period when your primary competitor is Intel, and during the second quarter of 1993 in the midst of all out war with Ziff Davis, two Cyrix employees appealed to the publisher of PC World to explain why this was happening. Why was Cyrix being attacked by another industry and specifically Ziff Davis? This soon to be president of IDG stared into space for a moment and said one thing, “they are a profit maximizer”.

What we know now is the greater foundation on which this strategy was driven. Intel is not just a profit maximizing monopoly. Intel is a sales maximizing monopolist. Capable of driving marginal revenue gains from a predetermined production plan that can deliver multiple periods of monopoly profit across anyone production short run. Monopoly profit required to offset the cost of a pressed lithographic acceleration required to maintain Intel’s process, x86 microprocessor, and intra platform PC monopolies.

Where media could plan ahead of Intel cash intake based on the Intel production plan. Knowing full well they could plan, model, and shape their own revenue growth within this Intel planned economy. Including concentration of satellite sales toward their own tied sales channels. Based on agreed upon contracts, rebates and discounts, with Intel, that protect leading channels and built upon their market shares. By media misappropriating and redirecting competitors share. Where the use of many illegal restraints lead to the systematic elimination of Intel horizontal competitor’s, and the lateral concentration of Intel PC dealers, given known parameters and programs including those which PC Media was directly involved.

Program’s for which Ziff Davis played a crucial role. Where the Ziff Davis sales force rolled out and initially managed the Intel Inside program. A first move for Intel and Ziff Davis that forced other PC media too participate in the pursuit of these immense and illegal Intel Inside ad pools, or financially be left out of this game. A program that would eventual spread to the entire media layer, across multiple categories; PC print, business print, local newspaper, broadcast, web, and leaves us with the democratic mess, and the affront on journalism we have today. Including journalism’s continued democratic error to remain mum on this subject.

Over the last 15 years how many journalists have thought about walking into the Publisher’s office and asking why?

Corporate plus media combination in a tied sales system has been incredibly destructive. The ability of media operating in vertical by horizontal sales agreement with Intel; a bottleneck monopoly, to misappropriate the sales revenues of one PC company for redirecting those revenues to another PC Company is an espionage. Under commercial code in similar situations we know it’s a racket. This commercial fraud sales loop hole needs to be closed permanently; including by augments to RICO and antitrust law.

“The megatronic system or power is the source of our troubles. Rampant technology results from the decisions of anonymous technocrats - scientists, engineers, attorneys, corporation and publishing and advertising executives. They compose the ‘system’ which attempts to gain complete power and to extend its authority into all areas of human life. We must resort to cultural inventions to rid ourselves of their system”.

Lewis Mumford, Sociologist,

The Technique of Total Control, 1970

By 1995 continuing through this decade in combination with Intel and primary OEMs, media would be instrumental in the use of system’s structures to deposition the marginal utility value of substitute products and platform replacement’s, while agreeing to fix Intel PC platform pricing by CPU, core logic and platform class in cooperation with some Intel Dealers.

PC World and other’s participated in, while Ziff Davis lead many of these Intel programs. Including too actively shift manufacturer share, and revenues, to specific Intel Combination OEMs who are media’s major advertisers; insuring media’s own revenue gains. Racketeering, Section 1 vertical by horizontal combination and Section 2 intent to monopolize are noted.

Recognizing the sole hold out Byte Magazine, who like all dissenters is blacklisted and put out of business by Intel Network.

In this closed distribution system, Ziff Davis and media communications in general, through various environmental interactions persuaded industry, often through extortion, to adopt too mob practices and controls. Alternate x86 senior executives could have averted this situation on at least three occasions in the 1992 through 1993 timeframe. Intel and media executives, on the other hand, could have prevented it from happening all together. This is Intel Networks foremost crime.

Guiding levels of dialogue on technology concern:

From Technology and Change Boyd & Fraser 1979

Courses by Newspaper - National Endowment for the Humanities

1) Immediate or urgent problems such as unchecked technological advance related to our physical environment; quality of air and water, endangerment of species, climatic changes.

The exploitation of consumers, hazardous working conditions, the use and misuse of computers, nuclear reactors and radioactive waste.

2) Tracking down the sources of immediate and urgent problems which are spawned by technological advance.

To determine responsibility or to pinpoint deficiencies in the structure of the economy, political, legal or societal institutions or customs, which permitted the problems to arise in the first place.

3) Philosophical and ethical considerations having to do with the very nature of technology and what effects its development on human beings.

FTC Docket 9288 and 9341 touch all three areas concerning technology change considering anticipated implementation of Intel Network environment and democracies remedies.

On domestic microprocessor, other semiconductor and computing platform management –

Coming events cast their shadows in the present. As we study those shadows through 18 years of Intel Network monopolization it is possible to observe the forces and trends shaping the future of microprocessor, semiconductor and compute platforms development. Force’s that affect the stability of industry and nations and will continue to shape management styles of technical concerns into the ensuing decade.

Where executive prerequisite of legitimate governance and corporate fiduciary responsibility over network system’s and practices has never been as great. A management responsibility for insuring open innovation across industries based on organically sustainable growth models.

Responsibility that supports the scope of participant’s for industry stability, profitable expansion over sales concentration, for organizational excellence, customer and stockholder value from these firms offering the potential for technical excellence into a new millennium. Leadership best practices based on a return to democratic principles, democratic rights supporting the freedom of any individual to invent, enable, produce, and market free from criminal effect.

The microprocessor, segment, platform, channel or partner manager of the future has and will continue to encounter accelerating growth in the size and complexity of organizational systems, technical coalitions and camps. Whether emancipated members of the former Intel Power Complex, traditional competitors set free, among channel’s including media, for a re-emergence of independent inventors and platform design and manufacturing clusters.

Where technical development and marketing has been moving away from the formal authoritarian and hierarchical management style’s of a monopoly computing concern. Mired in industrial and channel dogma, bound to their x86 surplus racket, where vertical by horizontal ties among Intel PC and Media Dealers were disguised as legitimate value streams for a very long time. Where corporate gangs have demonstrated control over certain development, industry production and end markets for their own aim and that of their channel puppet masters. Debilitating to every Nation calculated on the costs to society from Intel Dealership. With antitrust and RICO multipliers = $432,000,000,000.

As industry transforms one would hope movement away from this frightening trend, reversed and redirected toward more informal, equitable and fluid ways of bargaining, brokerage, advice and consent, service to customers, stockholders and employees. Service based on a return to management best practice and principle given a renewed emphasis on equitable values. Industry values free from integrative mob attitude forced onto others. The application of intellectual property rights of owners, freedom to develop and compete independently including in cluster, fair bargaining, corporate and government support of these rights including antitrust law, the practice of management ethics and employee rights. Too reverse all harms and recover from an era where lack of ethics has lead to lacking management if management at all.

Karl Mannheim,

Freedom Under Planning, 1941

Evidence of the increasing complexity of organization is observable in the growth and influence of the Intel Power Complex, the formation of transnational camps, investment and bank holding companies, distribution cartels including corporations in combination with media to manipulate industry, consumers and government.

Where corruption in and around Intel forced corruption onto other’s as a method to compete. Among corporate entities who dominate much of the global production and growing at such a rate to eclipse the potential of new entrants. Entities no less than individuals, whom exert great influence on the world’s affairs and have grown in economic size beyond all but the wealthiest Nation’s, and have demonstrated an eclipse in the power of democratic government, justice and law.

Catalysts for economic and social upheaval that has and can continue to rival the impact of any prior revolution. Delivering opportunities for industry, management and system reforms that can in fact be revolutionary. For technical governance institutions to demonstrate that semiconductor, and compute platform companies, are once again in control of their valley’s namesake and all around the world.

Where their network marketing, distribution, HR, sales and communication princes and princesses are as obsolete as their racket’s and practices. Industry and society at a critical juncture where action regulation can support reform sending a signal of emancipation, or where no action signals business as usual under environmental mob controls.

The environmental factors and forces at work, such as changing human and management values, along with rapid technological advances, the growing size and complexity of organizational patterns have blurred the traditional lines of morality, what are in the best values of the corporation and for stockholders, what is in the best interest of the private and public sectors. And have changed the very foundation of management itself. Where the application of intellectual activity and service too mankind has degraded under the Intel x86 microprocessor and intra platform monopoly status quo.

“Once technology risks have been assigned, the safeguards evaluated, the costs calculated, one is then prepared to worry about distribution. Who will enjoy how much of the benefit? Who will bear the burden on the uncertainty or the price tag of the costs? Here is where normal politics - pressure groups, social and economic power, private and public interests, bargaining and so forth - enters.

We expect that those most aware, best supplied, and most active will manage to steer a larger proportion of the advantages of technological productivity their way while avoiding most of the disadvantages. But for those who have raised technology as a political problem under this conception, reforms are needed in the distribution process. Even persons who have no quarrel with the inequities of wealth and privilege in a liberal society now step forth with the most trenchant criticisms of the ways in which technological “impacts” are distributed through the social system. A certain radicalism is smuggled in through the back door. The humble ideal of those who see things in this light is that risks and costs from a particular innovation should be able to account for the consequences beforehand. They should also shoulder the major brunt of the costs of undesirable side effects. This in turn should eliminate some of the problems of gross irresponsibility in technological innovations and application in previous times.

Since equalization and responsibility are to be induced through a new set of laws, regulations, penalties and encouragement's, the attention of this approach also aims at a better understanding of the facts of practical political decision making.

Obviously the ‘implementing’ systems have a great deal to do with the eventual outcome. My question is, however, in what technological context do such systems themselves operate and what imperatives do they feel obliged to obey?”

Langdon Winner, Political Scientist

Technology as Legislation - Autonomous Technology, 1977

The future executives of microprocessor, semiconductor and platform enablers must gravitate toward the concept that they are responsible for their activities, people in general, the advancement of industry, customer, stockholder and employee values, to do away with criminal activity, expecting a renewed focus on institutional governance over their business affairs to maintain justice, law, civil rights, democracy and democratic capitalism.

A technical environment regulated for supporting independent contribution, invention, development, manufacture, law abiding marketing, sales and communications. Supporting constituent and consumer freedom of choice; where you don’t have to cheat to compete, made possible through adherence and maintenance of liberty by legitimate institutional governance which must become a real Intel value.

No business or governmental organization, whatever its formal relationship, will be able to escape these industry, customer, stockholder, social, public and citizen responsibilities. All levels of management will be faced with the major responsibility of merging human values with the potential from technological advance to preserve human capital, the creation of goods and services for improved lifestyles, in the interest of everyone, where economic potentials based on democratic principles sustain liberty.

Today’s professional managers must modify their managerial styles and methods in manning the transition toward the era of public managers who are both economically and socially oriented. Operating in the best interest of their customers, employees, society and operating in the service of stockholders free from mob effect.

Managers can develop from a hired man status for private corporation shareholders into business institutional leaders who will manage the enterprise for the best balanced interests of society, to preserve and maintain the private enterprise system, individual participation, industry sustainable growth models, for technical invention and enablement. These concepts are essential for technology growth and management into the future.

“We still think and talk of the basic problems of an industrial society as problems that can be solved by changing the ‘system’, that is the superstructure of political organization. Yet the real problems lie within the enterprise.

It is not the solution of the problems of the ‘system’ that will set the structure of the enterprise. On the contrary, it is the solution of the problems of the enterprise that will shape the system under which we shall live” - Peter Drucker

In Conclusion –

The ramification of U.S. v Intel; FTC Docket 9288 and 9341 cross all levels of technology concern reflecting on the path and impact of technology, its use and misuse in human society. Noteworthy these Section 5 actions identify substantial economic and per se violations of law and pass all judicial filter’s prompting immediate movement to hearing including criminal proceedings.

For FTC Intel settlement step, no doubt under cartel amnesty of some sort, Intel chief executives owe each of us, all society, a complete, honest and rationale explanation of what has happened their from their vantage. A civil necessity for our understanding how to recognize and remedy competition espionage occurring in the workplace in real time, and not over 18 years time.

Lacking this citizen requirement and to do otherwise over the next decade provides an open invitation for organized crime use of system mechanic’s to rig the internet, command quantum improvements in semiconductors, computing, nano electro mechanical and molecular, chemical, genetic and bio technologic resources.

The social, economic and political degeneration associated with the growth of the Intel Power Complex was known and implications understood prior to 1979, subsequent growth and control over government by the Intel Business System.

Technocrats, media, academia and analysts used this prior understanding to craft system’s structures deployed by a constituent monopoly, and specifically the media, to manipulate and deceive our society. Too persuade us differently. Too hide this truth.

The painting of an illusion to defuse what in fact sociologists, historians, economists, political scientists and some members of the technical elite already knew was occurring; that organized network crime can significantly damage society. Research, write and publish. "

More on Intel Corp. Fraud, Corruption, Anti-Trust Violations, Sherman Act Violations ..

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Posted Here by

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Crystal L. Cox

Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Intel Corporation Competition Case Update - Intel Monopoly and Fraud Against the Government.

2010-12-02T23:48:00.000-08:00

Demand Intel Corp. Transparency and Accountability.

"Re: Intel Corporation Competition Case Update

- FTC Investigator Notice of Fiduciary Failure in Docket 9341

- Added pointers calculating 9341 consumer monopoly overcharge

- Lettered Relator Seeks Attorney; FCA, 31 USC 3279, recovery of monopoly & fraudulent cost imposed on Federal Government’s Intel based PC purchases.

On non address of $47.2386 billion# consumer recoverable and no antitrust remedies associated with FTC v Intel Corporation Docket 9341 consent order, please find analyst comment on reorganizing Federal Trade Commission toward financial self sufficiency, pros and cons of Section 5 for competitive case investigation, summation of Intel Inside tied charge back, additional production examples on which 9341 Intel consumer recovery estimates are calculated.

Consumer Monopoly Overcharge

Similar to prior Intel production examples 9341 consumer recovery pointers document monopoly overcharge early in Docket 9341 review period.

Herein five examples 1999 through mid 2002 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC v Intel Docket 9288. That cause is Intel intent to monopolize markets for the next decade actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation Cartel.

A cartel composed of Intel, PC Dealers, Media Sales Agents, investment banking, security operatives, corporate political relations and network confidence agents embedded by Intel and Media Sales Agents into x86 competitors to steal from and dismantle competition.

A network of extended relation’s who have long time concealed Intel vertical by horizontal matrix of integrated dealing cells streaming intra platform computers to end buyers in system field effects. Where Federal authority in position to resolve systematic economic crime, have not, raising the question of blocker or detractor?

Nothing in Docket 9341 consent order addresses these facts, continued Nation, society harms and consumer financial recoveries form this history of anticompetitive system’s conduct, racketeering, industrial and economic espionages understood by industry players for nearly two decades. And many in government authority who seemingly sit on the side lines?

Where, in fact, the extent of those in DC with knowledge of the high level case investigation is really quite extensive.

“If such combinations be not destroyed all the advantages which would naturally come to

the public operating under the general laws of competition, will be lost, and the entire

commerce of an immense territory will be at the mercy of a single holding company.”

Justice Harlan Stone

All aspects of Intel monopolization beyond commercial fraud remain deleted from Docket 9341 consent order as accepted by FTC Commissioner’s on November 1. Resulting in this third Federal example of Intel Corporation dodging competition, racketeering and espionage violations pursuant to three investigative tracks that validate Federal agency failures to regulate competition, racketeering, cross enterprise, cross profession network crime including resulting economic espionages; DOJ v Intel 1991 – 1993, FTC v Intel Docket 9288 1998 – 2001, FTC v Intel Docket 9341 2009-2010.

How is one to explain the result of this continuous compounded series of misfeasance across
Intel case matters for nearly two decades?

FTC Reorganization

On two of three Intel case anomalies this analyst suggests the Federal Trade Commission should be reconfigured for financial self sufficiency. $47.2386 billion and antitrust remedies is a lot of funding to leave off the table.

Obviously not a fault of the institution or its Congressional Charter but of society and the personal boundaries of individual actor’s responsible for implementing and overseeing that charter. And where there are questions of oversight perhaps State Attorney Generals should be included as added check under FTC Congressional charter? Certainly more desirable than this Relator. Where, perhaps, State Attorney Generals should be able to initiate and oversee cases within FTC for spot control across the country?

Who’s been minding shop in DC? Where Intel case matters are concerned why are the continued symptoms of regulatory, oversight, corporate law enforcement and attorney fiduciary dysfunction so pronounced and for so long?

Why shouldn’t FTC be rewarded operating returns

on antitrust and commerce case recoveries?

In doing so like any partnership offer an incentive to federal employees on that return, under the Federal Power, which would surely keep FTC focused on the high value cases. With of course some ratio of funding for all other types of matters that require attention.

Delivering on the administrative front a lean organization in step with its ability to self sustain organically. To counter corporate guild control it just might take a separate stronger independent public partnership.

On FTC case review under Section 5 of Antitrust Act

Having participated in two Section 5 investigations of Intel competitive practices; Dockets 9288 directly with FTC investigating attorney Mr. Lin, 9341 through attorney team liaisons Ms. Espeldon, Ms. Kransky and Mr. Cox, this analyst’s stated view has been that Section 5 offers an all encompassing umbrella to research, discover, validate Intel Network program and practices that harm competition and consumers. Providing broad vantage to detect and calculate the costs of Sherman and Clayton Act violations on enterprises, industries, consumers, society and Nations.

For 9341 perhaps Section 5 should not be considered an unusual first approach to research and validate antitrust claims and harms. Two decades of Intel Network concealing and misrepresenting harms and costs on competition and consumers requires a broad approach to systematically filter from superset too subset for stringent structural proofs.

Pointers and proofs decomposed from a monopoly broth relied on to conceal and divert from active system, structure and economic findings, error detection and correction through three Federal

investigations, that is Intel Network monopolization for much too long.

Favorably Section 5 has revealed a springboard too evolve Section 2 case precedent concerning industry competitive effects claimed to cause competitor harms that may also be competition and consumer harms. Where Section 5 investigation has filled a gap in antitrust enforcement revealing a Section 1 path too hear on industry competitive claims.

Claims that are industry causes within system, structure and economic proofs of competition and consumer harms under Sherman, Clayton Acts, commerce and racketeering laws. This path to remedy industry claims through Section 1 affirmative findings offers a bracket too review and evolve Section 2 case precedent for industry competitors.

Long time industry claims are worth judicial review within the bracket of established antitrust, commerce and racketeering case precedent. On this strategy the total case cannot be lost; only won. Where it’s more important than ever for Commission too actively exercise its full Congressional authority under Section 5 judicial hearing.

Two decades of Intel Network concealing espionage that is intended to monopolize multiple industries and markets through corporate political multipoint manipulation of Federal, State, and inter nation authority by organized network crime cannot be left unresolved.

Anyone in DC who continues along non address of antitrust, criminal and commercial fraud should be questioned. And if incapable of doing this job for fear of what Intel Network will do to you and your family as done to mine find someone capable to do that job. Mr. Holder, Mr. Mueller, Ms. Varney please place individuals into these positions who will do the job. No more varnishing over eighteen years of a compounding misfeasance.

The FTC has shown itself hampered in monitoring, regulating, remedying Intel corporate crime network. The U.S. DOJ through its inaction is suspect of similar. The FBI informed of Intel marketing Media Agent spy ring over a decade ago and there are still no arrests? While these known individuals have buried themselves deeper into strategic influence positions in technology industry and society. One has to ask why and what’s the next step toward reorganizing Federal agencies for competition espionage and cartel case effectiveness for industry, public and Nation good.

Everyone close to these case matters knows the real Intel; society damaging enabler of cross enterprise, cross profession organized network crime. Demonstrating debilitating affects on society Intel Corporate Political Network must be reformed to achieve any rational level of enterprise, industry and competition reform. Docket 9341 consent order fails to state any antitrust remedies.

This analyst believes Docket 9341 consent order will be ineffective on sole address of industry commercial frauds and futile to administer from antitrust conduct left unaddressed. Apparently not to be monitored under the order?

Under 9341 consent order, provision for Intel internal monitors of the order’s provisional frameworks has been established by the FTC. However, ironically, the very act of compliance monitors identifying out of bounds anti competitive practices, and pressing Intel for correction, can be reversed too Intel’s advantage under the order.

Typical of Intel style a provision within the order enables compliance monitor’s to be dismissed by Intel for monitoring anticompetitive compliance beyond the order itself. This loop hole in compliance monitoring is significant and places monitors under Intel control. And other than for compliance monitors who are Intel moles presents a loosing proposition for any credible monitor.

Some academic attorneys suggest fault in FTC Section 5 to convene an investigation to find proofs of unfair methods of industry competition and deceptive practices that may not fit judicial interpretation within the range of established consumer antitrust cases. I acknowledge the criticism and FTC should have better prepared their complaint.

That is to state specific Clayton Act and Sherman Act Violations harming consumers under Anti Trust Section 5 authority in the face of Judiciary up front.

Where I suggest the key mistake blindly following parallel actions which contain built in faults ahead of 9341 research opening up the 9288 affirmative discovery paths. All the while FTC remained surrounded within the traditional confines of an Intel invented reality of no foul driven by Intel long time network manipulation intended to keep it that way.

Noteworthy Docket 9341, similar to Docket 9288 Section 5 investigation again deflects from channel causes that are antitrust true positives, to industrial causes that may or may not fit judicial interpretation as competition and consumer antitrust harms. Plaintiff causes repositioned by media to deflect from Intel Dealer and Media Sales Agent tied channel monopolization known too harm competition and consumers.

Including tactics per se condemned by the Sherman and Clayton Acts that is price fixed product routing and structured market rigging, deflected toward the litigation trap of whether industrial harms harm consumers.

Where case focus is deflected in this fashion, directed away from known antitrust violations toward industry harms that might fit as competition and consumer harms, Section 5 questions are raised.

This analyst would like to propose a corporate political concern with FTC reliance on Section 5. A transparency concern that Section 5 is being used to mask competition espionage and the crime syndicates responsible for concealing them.

And discovery rules which grant Intel advance notice on what evidence to destroy or alter. And while there are multiple discovery cross checks to determine if Intel has destroyed or altered evidence, wouldn’t it be more effective to obtain a warrant on pointers and proofs, raid Intel, PC Dealers and Media Sales Agents, capture suspect and supporting documents and subsequently conceal discovery focus until the refined complaint is filed and criminal prosecution paths determined.

For a RICO case confronting the largest most financially destructive inter nation cartel in the history of modern business why would there be any other way? Perhaps this is not the FTC’s fault in poking around with their Section 5 action but indicative of drag within the U.S. DOJ Antitrust and Cartel divisions not stepping up to the plaintiffs desk sooner?

Network manipulation of FTC Section 5 inquiry has twice now confused and misinformed academics, attorneys, influencing observers, Congress and Senate affecting working views from information withheld. Has stymied DOJ, FTC, industry plaintiff case outcomes and how many others?

By Intel Network deflecting commercial harm of their tied Dealer channel toward industry claims of harm that may or may not fit judicial interpretation of competition and consumer harms. The history of Intel investigation under 9341 & 9288 Section 5 has made government appear ineffective.

On 9341 repeated result of 9288; encompassing voids in overall remedies, Section 5 method again falls short by failing to tell the whole story. Similar to 9288 system, structure and economic violations that prove intent to monopolize have been left out of 9341 consent order. In doing so refocus on industry competitor conduct has caused confusion that Intel competitor harms may not be competitive antitrust and consumer harms. Obviously the most efficient way to address any litigation is facts on focused claims.

I suggest ambiguity the downfall of Section 5 method in relation to a laser beam focus to hear Sherman and Clayton Act violations from the start.

Supporting secondary focus on industry commercial frauds that are competitor harms for their determination by the court as competition and consumer harms.

This upfront approach of discovery raid followed by complaint and criminal prosecution addresses criticism for FTC action out of the pubic and judicial oversight where a new layer of FTC law may now be added under established law. Perhaps too establish a layer of guild law under Federal competition law?

Or reaffirm Intel law above the Federal Power and Nation’s law? FTC, DOJ, U.S. Attorneys and State Attorney Generals supporting judicial review to determine whether competitor harms are also competition and consumer harms would undo these concerns.

With Section 1 focus removes the question of chasing down Intel on false positives. And makes FTC and DOJ leader’s in supporting virtual private law satellites by detailing known discovery paths to affirmative antitrust true positives, opposed to negatives, supporting plaintiff actions including consumer actions.

For Docket 9288 and 9341 the core violation has always been contract, combination and conspiracy in an enterprise network fraud to conceal the Sherman Act Section 1 violation. A long time antitrust violation established on case precedent validated by established Clayton Act and RICO cases. This Section 1 violation has always been intended by Intel Combination and Cartel practice to monopolize markets maximizing their combined system economic benefit. Too limit and steal from competitors and manipulate consumers.

And has always been cost too consumers including hidden transport tax for product routing affixed to primary Dealer’s Intel intra platform PC end sales price. An illegal transport fee enabled by Intel and Dealers, taxed too consumers in PC end sales price, where 100% of this route fee is collected by Media Sales Agents many who are codefendant propagandists concealing their own involvement in these continuous enterprise network crimes.

In this Section 5 process failure Intel Network deflection from consumer to industry causes of action has been experienced by all of us. There can be no more reversing the obvious even as cover for FBI and DOJ investigative intervention.

Its time to bring this racketeering case into the public light so all citizens can be instructed how to report and remedy competition espionage occurring in the domestic work place in real time and not over eighteen years time.

Regardless of FTC intention or bumble Section 5 false start has been a blessing in its success to reveal yet another Intel Network manipulation of federal regulatory and law enforcement. Including Intel Network media misrepresenting 9341 proposed consent agreement, as the final FTC settlement, prior to Commissioner’s November 1st acceptance. Limiting awareness of public comment opportunity?

Resulting in Commission acceptance I can not agree with on lacking remedies. However discovery and remedies that still support the consumer case, State by State if necessary, on exact causes of action freed from its industrial divergence. Now focused on consumer harms from Section 1 contract, combination and conspiracy for Cartel price fixed product routing raising consumer PC price 6%.

Section 5 ambiguities presenting a vague case disconnected from its complete set of facts has in fact benefited follow on case work from FTC exposure in a first round of Intel Network Judo. And will the FTC or Department of Justice now respond with Federal Jujitsu and Karate? Will State Attorney Generals? Will private actions?

For FTC 9341 refilled under Clayton Act within the wrapper of Sherman, Clayton Act and RICO findings is an easily won round two toward recovering $47 billion stolen by Intel Network from consumers.

And for industry plaintiffs to prove their commercial claims and recover financial harms under Section 2 assuring remedies that yield no undesirable concessions to Intel Network.

Having participated in a technical assistant capacity for both Docket 9288 and 9341, I agree with academic attorneys today who’ve chastised FTC hunting for antitrust causes of action that might fit under the Section 5 umbrella. What a waste of time Section 5 has been in relation to focused address on specific structure and system causes that are Section 1 and Clayton Act per se condemnation’s of law that are proofs of Section 2 intent to monopolize and economic theft.

“The enforcement of free competition is the least business can expect”.

President Franklin Roosevelt

Intel Inside Tied Charge Back in Summary

Building on prior analysis reflecting on Intel Inside tied charge back the system metric can be summed up thus. That Intel Dealing Cartel combined cross enterprise cross market too venture back its own Cartel channel development in advance of the Intel microprocessor supply ramp.

Where Intel and PC Dealers paid for their media channel’s expansion plan from Intel rebate fee credits earned in advance on every future computer sale from a predetermined production plan. Presenting the basis of the laundering violation; USC 1956, well before Docket 9341 identified Intel off the book kickbacks to Dell and how many others recorded as PC sales revenue.

A cartel venture which combines a minimum of six separate markets; x86 microprocessors, PC component platforms, Windows Operating System & Applications, PC design producers, investment banking and the media.

With their push through system enabled between Intel Dealer Entry and Media Channel Exit Points from November 1991 through approximately 2006. After which push through system is more tightly coupled by Intel to individual PC Dealers on redesigned tying mechanisms that Docket 9341 and EUCC record as bribes and kickbacks.

In addition to Ziff Davis prominent Media Sales Agents include IDG PC World, CMP Windows Magazine, other technical and mass media; ZDTV?

Sales agency that would last through the cartel’s implosion in 2005/6 on hard copy publishing reconfiguration toward Internet dissemination compounded by Intel process hurdle to race microprocessor frequency past 3.8 GHz. A period where Intel artificial press of process lithography to maintain its fabrication monopoly morphs from tied charge back to first dollar and loyalty rewards which are clearly the outcome of a continuous racket.

Social Justice in Social Dynamics

Richard Brandt, 1961

Twenty year ironies of Intel domestic PC protectionism are three fold. First, the cost impact on society exposed to artificial accelerants, systematic growth and concentration of the Dealing group. Second, a combined cartel that did not deliver domestic PC protectionism but the system means for domestic economic theft.

Third, with Toshiba and NEC limited to secondary status in the PC dealing group, Soft Bank purchase of Ziff Davis and then teamed with CNET (CNET up to 10% Intel owned in period) positioned both media companies, along with International Data Group’s PC World, to capture majority of Intel Inside margin rewards through the tied charge back program.

Cross enterprise cross directorate because this sort of business combination can’t be coordinated singularly and requires mutual cooperation and direction. Although the network responsible for cartel operation’s including executives of Ziff Davis and other media responsible for enterprise infiltration to fill Cartel key man positions, in PC companies and Intel competitors, did attempt to keep the cartel’s coordination a secret.

From publisher’s top executives and regional ad reps who coordinated the placement’s to advertising and public relation agency personnel who policed the Intel sales system while acting as informant transfer bridges (along with some journalists) from Intel competitors back into Intel. The competitive rape of enterprises, industry and country for Intel tied charge back ad space sales, space commissions, publisher and agency directed client assignments and sustained employment that are network rewards of cartel membership.

A secret scheme reported by this analyst to his employers Cyrix, NexGen, ARM and AMD beginning 1991 through 1996 caused by Agent solicitations. On employer inaction and Intel Network Retaliation, followed by first reports to FBI in the summer and fall 1996.

Which was not the beginning of a legal system failure, but the beginning of an escalation in legal failures that has always plagued Intel case matter’s right up through 9341 result and the writing of this briefing today.

Intel monopoly profits are once again at their traditional inflated high. And that is because corporate fiduciary responsibilities, governance, regulatory and some in the Bar; no doubt specializing in serving white collar crime to sustain their attorney employments, have kept democracy stuck in Intel failure mode within the Intel lie that is a panacea of best practices meant to conceal criminal practice.

With Intel Network thumbing their noses and beating their chest’s in a victory over the FTC masking organized network crime. Where Intel CFO Smith on News Hour October 13 is positioned in front of posters that are microprocessor die photos resembling in gold hue the commercial bastions of Wall Street that are lower Manhattan office towers. Intel clinging too this constituency for support offers one indicator that all is not well in Intel Land.

For Docket 9341 Intel system structures prove intent to monopolize. Economic analysis points to monopoly consumer overcharge and Intel industrial price below cost. Intel explicit contractual agreements and their tacit provisions prove consumer price fixing of approximately 6%. All conduct proofs including commercial channel frauds are secondary in support.

There is no risk of antitrust false positive associated with these pointers to affirmative proofs; systems intent, consumer monopoly overcharge, industrial below cost, PC price fixing for holding the cartel and its tied distribution structure in place even now.

Added production examples on which 9341 consumer recovery is calculated.

Analysts June 4th brief estimates $88 billion in Intel consumer and industrial monopolization available for judicial recovery. Current consumer recovery estimate is approximately $47.2386 billion.

June 4th brief revision 2 and latter offers these three economic examples: Note: Graphs and economic plots not reprinted here available on request from author; campmkting@aol.com.

1) P3 code name Katmai 512 Desktop Performance pointer to consumer monopoly

overcharge of $300,990,000 and $764,517,480 in Intel Inside charge back values.

2) P3 code name Copper Mine 128 Value Mobile pointer to industrial monopolization;

$2,780,853,050 revenue less than average fixed cost, $351,211,950 less than variable

cost suspect below marginal cost end of run, and $187,923,900 in charge back values.

3) Cartel signaling embedded in P3 Xeon Tanner and P3 Cascades product dumping

RICO proof.

Not repeated here in its average weighted price version shows a steeper sheer

over Cascade than average price. Average price calculation tempts some QUANDA

traders to play. Those players likely lost on this short run in relation to average

weighted players who knew too stay away from run down values.

Pentium 3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop and P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Mobile are shown again below in their updated average weighted price versions. In this brief now joined by Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop, Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile and P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop.

Consumer overcharge, industrial monopolization, Intel Inside tied charge back is now estimated on refined average weighted price method, for 23 production short runs, in progress for discovery purposes.

As anticipated from note in July 4th brief analyst refinement from average price, to average weighted price on infra marginal speed splits, is causing the consumer recovery estimate to grow in value.

Economic analysis including latest input to FTC on October 29 is now calculated on Intel average weighted price on MDR Intel quantity estimates, by microprocessor frequency speed split, at Intel 1,000 piece stated price.

Resulting in ability to calculate consumer monopoly overcharge on exact infra marginal product quantities at monopoly price. Infra marginal ‘short lots’ of Intel microprocessors subjecting consumers to monopoly price overcharge associated with Dealer’s newest PC product introductions. Also where Intel Inside commission tied charge back values too Media Sales Agents are at their highest values.

Refined economic analysis beginning 9341 review period; January 1999 through 2002 is here meant to validate Intel monopolization before, during and following Docket 9288 negotiated settlement. With the objective of confirming Intel employee perjuries and criminal network manipulation of Docket 9288 result including this analyst’s push under in a covert security sting at that time.

A sting that includes by production record Intel executives, Intel security operators, three private security firms and regional law enforcement believed to be the working associates of corporate and contract security personnel. Analyst’s aim here is to show cause on witness tampering in an obstruction of justice; affirmative act of constructed fraud.

Too offer causal proof for forestalling 9288 remedies and Intel Network aim to disrupt the administration of justice in all following State, Federal and civil actions and case investigations.

“True reasons of the distinction upon which the probation's of voluntary restraints are founded are: 1st, the mischief which may arise from them, first to the party by the loss of his livelihood, and the substance of his family; 2ndly, to the public, by depriving it of a useful member.

Another reason is, the great abuses these voluntary restraints are liable to; as for instance, from corporations, who are perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as possible; as likewise from masters who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, in their custom, when they come to set up for themselves . C.J. Parker delivering resolution of court in Mitchell vs. Reynolds, King’s Bench, 1711, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep 347

Following eight examples 1998 through mid 2002 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC v Intel Docket 9288. That cause is intent to monopolize markets actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation cartel.

Monopoly pointers from MDR advance Intel production estimates, segmented by speed split, when multiplied by Intel Stated 1,000 piece price reveals a QUANDA relied on by INTC inside stock traders, PC Dealer procurement and Media Sales Agents.

A network game to calculate Intel revenue and margin potential on future Intel product route purchases including tied charge back values to Media Sales Agents out into future time. Note mechanism for cartel stock pumping 2002 demonstrated to FTC before October 29.

On average weighted price analysis analyst now suspects MDR estimates are the Intel supply schedule. The product of virtual network resource does MDR validate Intel production plan? Intel relies on external resources from which the organization gleans other’s ideas and makes them Intel’s ideas.

This analyst’s marketing ideas and plans have been gleaned by Intel marketing. Trailed in the field and made into a feature exhibit at one Intel marketing department luncheon; don’t talk to that guy at the Intel trade show booth was their aim to inform marketing and sales personnel. One of several encounters court ordered production shows Intel theft of analyst market plans from AMD in 1996.

Separate, analyst record for AMD Security that is theft of NexGen K6 development schedule and the transfer of NexGen AMD confidential product details to Intel in period.

“From a scientific standpoint, what counts is knowledge not talk . . . if we want to continue to talk metaphorically about things called answers, then we still do better to speak about finding the answer, than making it . . .”

- Gabriel Stolzenberg, Inquiry into the Foundation of Mathematics

New to this revision 3.0 brief find Pentium ll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile at .25 micron followed by Pentium ll Dixon 256 Performance Mobile at .25 and .18 micron process lithography.

Below Pentium ll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $537 on infra marginal quantity ‘speed splits’ at Intel stated 1,000 piece price.

On $25,679,260,000 revenue from total production of 77,952,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 1,580,000 units is $714,695,000. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $1,499.250,480. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing consumer recoverable from Pll Deschutes 512 Performance Mobile production short run is $2,501,907,280.

Above Pentium ll Dixon 256 Performance Mobile including price below Average Total Cost and suspect below Marginal Cost at end of run. For revenue of $6,104,196,000 on 18,029,000 units estimates industrial monopolization from dumping at cost monopsony period three at $1,574,703,000 where price is less than competitive equilibrium price range $329 to $350. Followed by $1,128,636,000 industrial monopolization periods four and five where price is less than Average Total Cost of $292 and suspect below Marginal Cost for .18 micron process lithography. Total industrial monopolization on 10,057,000 units estimates $2,703,339,000 approximate. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel mobile short run is $360,851,760.

Above revised P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop now indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal quantity ‘speed splits’ at Intel stated 1,000 piece price. On $12,741,958,000 revenue from total production of 34,124,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 11,195 880 units is $1,022,694,800.

Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $764,517,480. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing recoverable from P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop production short run is $1,787,212,280.

Mike Bruzzone, Camp Marketing Brief U.S. Senate Edition, January 2003

Below P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed splits by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Note consumer surcharge periods two and three on Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move supporting P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes period five through ten. Note consumer surcharge periods two and three on Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move supporting P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes period five through ten.

Above P3 Performance Desktop on MDR Intel supply schedule estimate 1 shows $37,995,339,220 revenue on 136,364,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 7,150,000 units is $1,103,498,344.

Consumer surcharge from monopsony setting up for predatory price on run down volumes period five through ten is $1,348,392,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $2,279,720,353. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop production short run equals $4,731,610,697.

The Principle of Personal Responsibility

Presentation to the Catholic Economic Association, 1953

Below P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed split by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Note consumer surcharge periods four through seven for Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move period eight on P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes through period ten. Tualatin 256 price regulates upward Copper mine 256 end of run average weighted price and in its own short run adds to the consumer monopoly overcharge value.

P3 Performance Mobile on MDR supply schedule estimate 2 shows $20,735,225,000 revenue on 57,050,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 16,325,000 units is $1,323,710,000. Consumer surcharge period’s four through seven for Dealer monopsony benefit and Intel predatory price on run down volumes is $1,440,325.000.

Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $1,244,053,500. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile production short run equals $4,008,088,500.

Below P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop priced at and below fixed cost. On revenue of $7,753,871,000 on 86,740,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $384,704,000 at Average Fixed Cost of $136. Further industrial monopolization of $7,405,167,000 where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel desktop short run is $465,232,260.

Below Pentium 3 Celeron Value Mobile priced at and below fixed cost. Revenue of $3,132,065,000 on 25,790,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $2,780,853,050 where price is less than Average Fixed Cost of $136; and $351,211,50 industrial monopolization where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost at production end of run. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel mobile short run is $187,923,900.

Next Pentium 4 Willamette 256 Performance Desktop indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed splits by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Analysis is simply that run is to long and price too low.

Consider the industrial social effect of at cost dumping monopsony periods six and seven and excess volume at period eight end of run.

Always calculating on the conservative periods four and seven priced below average total cost are close enough to efficient end of run scenario within $73 of monopoly competitive equilibrium and $95 of average total cost respectively. Both periods show the artificially low price inherent with all run down volumes and this short run overall.

Below P4 Performance Desktop on MDR Intel supply schedule estimate 1 shows $11,241,349,546 revenue on 49,594,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 2,200,000 units is $449,745,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $674,480,973. Total consumer recoverable from P4 Willamette 256 Performance Desktop production short run is $1,124,225,973.

Pentium 4 Foster 256 Xeon Workstation not shown here indicates $128,458,490 total consumer recovery from monopoly overcharge and tied charge back fix on 5,728,000 units and $1,616,119,000 revenue. Of interest both P4 short runs compared to P3 is tied charge back value now walking away in excess of the consumer monopoly overcharge values.

Summary of Intel Network Recovery Values; in Part 1/98 through 6/02; revision 3 method.

Consumer Monopoly Price Overcharge = $ 4,645,834,414

Consumer Surcharge Monopsony Price = $ 2,788,717,000

Consumer Tied Charge Back Price Fix = $ 6,073,747,316

Partial Consumer Recovery = $13,508,298,730

Industrial Monopolization Price < afc =" $">

Industrial Monopolization Price < mc =" $">

Industrial Monopolization Price < avc =" $">

Partial Industrial Recovery = $12,050,572,000

Note at cost dumping is calculated for FTC across 23 production short runs. However not recorded here as industrial monopolization when price is above average fixed cost pending that intent to monopolize outcome in litigation.

Microsoft industrial social harm calculated from eight Intel production short runs herein suggests $5,648,808,000 monopolization at $48 OEM price attached horizontally by Microsoft OEM license to 117,621,000 Intel microprocessors priced less than Intel marginal cost to produce. Up to $8,138,428,800 on $48 OEM price attached horizontally by Microsoft OEM license to 169,550,600 Intel microprocessors priced less than Intel Average Total Cost to produce.

In Conclusion

On pointers and proofs whether Intel employees and witnesses perjured themselves in a Network multipoint manipulation of the FTC, to deflect from core causes of action in Docket 9288, and again in 9341 are clear. System, structure, economic, conduct pointers and proofs examined under lens of legal case precedent reveals this fact. A premeditated network obstruction to forestall remedies and disrupt the administration of justice in all Intel case matters over the last twelve years including now.

Intel Network case matters are about insuring innovation production short run to short run. Assuring civil rights while preserving ability to innovate based on examples that demonstrate Intel methods of creative destruction can be very destructive economically, structurally, holistically and socially.

Intel Network RICO is proven. Section 1 and Section 2 case proofs wait to be discovered by FTC or sit delivered at FTC and DOJ.

I look forward to open Intel hearings for a transparency that will educate every American on forms of domestic economic terrorism caused by illegal monopolization, combinations, cartels, frauds, theft, deceit and the cover ups that have stymied these Intel Network case matters from their complete remedies and resolutions for over a decade.

Respectfully Submitted

Mike Bruzzone

Camp Marketing

FBI Original Source of Intel Network RICO; 1996

FTC Invited field reporter Docket 9288, 1998-2000

CDOJ and NYDOJ first to report; 1998

CDOJ lettered to work report; Intel Section 1 Framework; 2000 –

SEC Notice; 2007

U.S. Attorney NCD recognized FCA Relator; 2008

FTC voluntary analyst Docket 9341; under Labor Code 3363.5; 2009

Full Document and Source Click Here

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/64875161/Intel-Corruption---CEO-Paul-Otellini-Corruption

More on Intel Corruption at

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

Also Check Out Mass Proof of RICO Fraud and Proof of Intel Monopoly Actions and Anti-Trust Violations.
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/51737284/Proof-Of-Intel-Cartel---RICO-Proof

Posted Here by Investigative Blogger

Crystal L. Cox
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

CEO Paul Otellini Intel Corp. Continues to Ignore the Truth about Intel Corp

2010-12-02T23:36:00.000-08:00

Intel Corruption - CEO Paul Otellini Corruption

Proof of Massive Fraud at Intel Corp. - Intel CEO Paul Otellini is Covering Mass Corruption

2010-12-01T23:47:00.000-08:00

Click Here for Detailed Report on How bad Intel Corruption Is.

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/51737284/
Proof-Of-Intel-Cartel---RICO-Proof

More Proof on Corruption, Monopoly and Super Power of Intel Corp.

2010-11-12T06:14:00.000-08:00

"November 8, 2010; Nation’s Interest Publications release 1.2

To: FTC Inspector General
FTC Commissioners
SEC Commissioner
Senate & Congress
State Attorney Generals
United States Attorneys
Director Robert Mueller, FBI
Honorable Eric Holder, DOJ
Vice President Joseph Biden

Fm: Mike Bruzzone
6025 McBryde Avenue
Richmond, CA 94805
campmkting@aol
415.250.4652

Re: Intel Corporation Competition Case Update
- FTC Investigator Notice of Fiduciary Failure in Docket 9341
- Added pointers calculating 9341 consumer monopoly overcharge
- Lettered Relator Seeks Attorney; FCA, 31 USC 3279, recovery of monopoly & fraudulent cost imposed on Federal Government’s Intel based PC purchases.

“If the preoccupation of its official is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal
opportunity but is to be barter in the markets that is not liberalism, it is degeneration”.

President Herbert Hoover

FTC Inspector General, Senate, Congress, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys, FTC & SEC Commissioners, Director Mueller, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, DOJ Antitrust, DOJ Cartel Divisions and Vice President Joseph Biden:

On non address of $47.2386 billion consumer recoverable and no antitrust remedies associated with FTC v Intel Corporation Docket 9341 consent order, please find analyst comment on reorganizing Federal Trade Commission toward financial self sufficiency, pros and cons of Section 5 for competitive case investigation, summation of Intel Inside tied charge back, additional production examples on which 9341 Intel consumer recovery estimates are calculated.

Consumer Monopoly Overcharge

Similar to prior Intel production examples 9341 consumer recovery pointers document monopoly overcharge early in Docket 9341 review period. Herein five examples 1999 through mid 2002 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC v Intel Docket 9288.

That cause is Intel intent to monopolize markets for the next decade actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation Cartel. A cartel composed of Intel, PC Dealers, Media Sales Agents, investment banking, security operatives, corporate political relations and network confidence agents embedded by Intel and Media Sales Agents into x86 competitors to steal from and dismantle competition.

A network of extended relation’s who have long time concealed Intel vertical by horizontal matrix of integrated dealing cells streaming intra platform computers to end buyers in system field effects. Where Federal authority in position to resolve systematic economic crime, have not, raising the question of blocker or detractor?

Nothing in Docket 9341 consent order addresses these facts, continued Nation, society harms and consumer financial recoveries form this history of anticompetitive system’s conduct, racketeering, industrial and economic espionages understood by industry players for nearly two decades. And many in government authority who seemingly sit on the side lines? Where, in fact, the extent of those in DC with knowledge of the high level case investigation is really quite extensive.

“If such combinations be not destroyed all the advantages which would naturally come to
the public operating under the general laws of competition, will be lost, and the entire
commerce of an immense territory will be at the mercy of a single holding company.”

Justice Harlan Stone

All aspects of Intel monopolization beyond commercial fraud remain deleted from Docket 9341 consent order as accepted by FTC Commissioner’s on November 1. Resulting in this third Federal example of Intel Corporation dodging competition, racketeering and espionage violations pursuant to three investigative tracks that validate Federal agency failures to regulate competition, racketeering, cross enterprise, cross profession network crime including resulting economic espionages; DOJ v Intel 1991 – 1993, FTC v Intel Docket 9288 1998 – 2001, FTC v Intel Docket 9341 2009-2010.

How is one to explain the result of this continuous compounded series of misfeasance across Intel case matters for nearly two decades?

FTC Reorganization

On two of three Intel case anomalies this analyst suggests the Federal Trade Commission should be reconfigured for financial self sufficiency. $47.2386 billion and antitrust remedies is a lot of funding to leave off the table.

Too earn its keep can FTC be reconfigured to lead virtual competition case actions? Like any private plaintiff attorney partnership paid for monitoring, regulation, investigation, leading case work for competitive recovery from the very corporations the agency is suppose to regulate under Sherman and Clayton Acts.

Too modernize an agency held captive by the political agenda of corporate legal guild in relation to employment and professional placements beyond the agency itself. Including where corporate political and institutional influences are often responsible for making and sustaining employment placements in those agency’s in question.

Obviously not a fault of the institution or its Congressional Charter but of society and the personal boundaries of individual actor’s responsible for implementing and overseeing that charter. And where there are questions of oversight perhaps State Attorney Generals should be included as added check under FTC Congressional charter? Certainly more desirable than this Relator. Where, perhaps, State Attorney Generals should be able to initiate and oversee cases within FTC for spot control across the country?

Who’s been minding shop in DC? Where Intel case matters are concerned why are the continued symptoms of regulatory, oversight, corporate law enforcement and attorney fiduciary dysfunction so pronounced and for so long?

In the face of Intel Network again demonstrating administration of corporate and attorney fraternal ties that are greater than the Federal Power itself, making FTC financially self sufficient is designed to increase competitive effectiveness, to cut corporate ties, earn its keep under Charter on the very recoveries FTC is supposed to be delivering. No different from Relator under False Claims Act. Why shouldn’t FTC be rewarded operating returns on antitrust and commerce case recoveries?

In doing so like any partnership offer an incentive to federal employees on that return, under the Federal Power, which would surely keep FTC focused on the high value cases. With of course some ratio of funding for all other types of matters that require attention. Delivering on the administrative front a lean organization in step with its ability to self sustain organically. To counter corporate guild control it just might take a separate stronger independent public partnership.

On FTC case review under Section 5 of Antitrust Act

Having participated in two Section 5 investigations of Intel competitive practices; Dockets 9288 directly with FTC investigating attorney Mr. Lin, 9341 through attorney team liaisons Ms. Espeldon, Ms. Kransky and Mr. Cox, this analyst’s stated view has been that Section 5 offers an all encompassing umbrella to research, discover, validate Intel Network program and practices that harm competition and consumers. Providing broad vantage to detect and calculate the costs of Sherman and Clayton Act violations on enterprises, industries, consumers, society and Nations.

For 9341 perhaps Section 5 should not be considered an unusual first approach to research and validate antitrust claims and harms. Two decades of Intel Network concealing and misrepresenting harms and costs on competition and consumers requires a broad approach to systematically filter from superset too subset for stringent structural proofs.

Pointers and proofs decomposed from a monopoly broth relied on to conceal and divert from active system, structure and economic findings, error detection and correction through three Federal investigations, that is Intel Network monopolization for much too long.

Favorably Section 5 has revealed a springboard too evolve Section 2 case precedent concerning industry competitive effects claimed to cause competitor harms that may also be competition and consumer harms. Where Section 5 investigation has filled a gap in antitrust enforcement revealing a Section 1 path too hear on industry competitive claims.

Claims that are industry causes within system, structure and economic proofs of competition and consumer harms under Sherman, Clayton Acts, commerce and racketeering laws. This path to remedy industry claims through Section 1 affirmative findings offers a bracket too review and evolve Section 2 case precedent for industry competitors.

Long time industry claims are worth judicial review within the bracket of established antitrust, commerce and racketeering case precedent. On this strategy the total case cannot be lost; only won. Where it’s more important than ever for Commission too actively exercise its full Congressional authority under Section 5 judicial hearing.

Two decades of Intel Network concealing espionage that is intended to monopolize multiple industries and markets through corporate political multipoint manipulation of Federal, State, and inter nation authority by organized network crime cannot be left unresolved.

Anyone in DC who continues along non address of antitrust, criminal and commercial fraud should be questioned. And if incapable of doing this job for fear of what Intel Network will do to you and your family as done to mine find someone capable to do that job. Mr. Holder, Mr. Mueller, Ms. Varney please place individuals into these positions who will do the job. No more varnishing over eighteen years of a compounding misfeasance.

The FTC has shown itself hampered in monitoring, regulating, remedying Intel corporate crime network. The U.S. DOJ through its inaction is suspect of similar. The FBI informed of Intel marketing Media Agent spy ring over a decade ago and there are still no arrests? While these known individuals have buried themselves deeper into strategic influence positions in technology industry and society. One has to ask why and what’s the next step toward reorganizing Federal agencies for competition espionage and cartel case effectiveness for industry, public and Nation good.

Everyone close to these case matters knows the real Intel; society damaging enabler of cross enterprise, cross profession organized network crime. Demonstrating debilitating affects on society Intel Corporate Political Network must be reformed to achieve any rational level of enterprise, industry and competition reform. Docket 9341 consent order fails to state any antitrust remedies.

This analyst believes Docket 9341 consent order will be ineffective on sole address of industry commercial frauds and futile to administer from antitrust conduct left unaddressed. Apparently not to be monitored under the order?

Under 9341 consent order provision for Intel internal monitors of the order’s provisions has been established by the FTC. However, ironically, the very act of compliance monitors identifying out of bounds anti competitive practices, and pressing Intel for correction, can be reversed into an Intel advantage under the order.

Typical of Intel style a provision within the order enables compliance monitor’s to be dismissed by Intel for monitoring anticompetitive compliance beyond the order itself. This loop hole in compliance monitoring is significant and places monitors under Intel control. And other than for compliance monitors who are Intel moles presents a loosing proposition for any credible monitor.
Some academic attorneys suggest fault in FTC Section 5 to convene an investigation to find proofs of unfair methods of industry competition and deceptive practices that may not fit judicial interpretation within the range of established consumer antitrust cases. I acknowledge the criticism and FTC should have better prepared their complaint. That is to state specific Clayton Act and Sherman Act violations harming consumers under Anti Trust Section 5 authority in the face of Judiciary up front.

Where I suggest the key mistake blindly following parallel actions which contain built in faults ahead of 9341 research opening up the 9288 affirmative discovery paths. All the while FTC remained surrounded within the traditional confines of an Intel invented reality of no foul driven by Intel long time network manipulation intended to keep it that way.

Noteworthy Docket 9341, similar to Docket 9288 Section 5 investigation again deflects from channel causes that are antitrust true positives, to industrial causes that may or may not fit judicial interpretation as competition and consumer antitrust harms.

Plaintiff causes repositioned by media to deflect from Intel Dealer and Media Sales Agent tied channel monopolization known too harm competition and consumers. Including tactics per se condemned by the Sherman and Clayton Acts that is price fixed product routing and structured market rigging, deflected toward the litigation trap of whether industrial harms harm consumers.

Where case focus is deflected in this fashion, directed away from known antitrust violations toward industry harms that might fit as competition and consumer harms, Section 5 questions are raised.

This analyst would like to propose a corporate political concern with FTC reliance on Section 5. A transparency concern that Section 5 is being used to mask competition espionage and the crime syndicates responsible for concealing them. And discovery rules which grant Intel advance notice on what evidence to destroy or alter. And while there are multiple discovery cross checks to determine if Intel has destroyed or altered evidence, wouldn’t it be more effective to obtain a warrant on pointers and proofs, raid Intel, PC Dealers and Media Sales Agents, capture suspect and supporting documents and subsequently conceal discovery focus until the refined complaint is filed and criminal prosecution paths determined.

For a RICO case confronting the largest most financially destructive inter nation cartel in the history of modern business why would there be any other way? Perhaps this is not the FTC’s fault in poking around with their Section 5 action but indicative of drag within the U.S. DOJ Antitrust and Cartel divisions not stepping up to the plaintiffs desk sooner?

And FBI, where a problem in the San Francisco Bureau has been known for over a decade where Washington including the Director himself has always been copied on the complete case investigation as it progressed. Continued inaction in the case is a telling indicator of continued dysfunctional governance.

Network manipulation of FTC Section 5 inquiry has twice now confused and misinformed academics, attorneys, influencing observers, Congress and Senate affecting working views from information withheld. Has stymied DOJ, FTC, industry plaintiff case outcomes and how many others? By Intel Network deflecting commercial harm of their tied Dealer channel toward industry claims of harm that may or may not fit judicial interpretation of competition and consumer harms. The history of Intel investigation under 9341 & 9288 Section 5 has made government appear ineffective.

On 9341 repeated result of 9288; encompassing voids in overall remedies, Section 5 method again falls short by failing to tell the whole story. Similar to 9288 system, structure and economic violations that prove intent to monopolize have been left out of 9341 consent order. In doing so refocus on industry competitor conduct has caused confusion that Intel competitor harms may not be competitive antitrust and consumer harms. Obviously the most efficient way to address any litigation is facts on focused claims.

I suggest ambiguity the downfall of Section 5 method in relation to a laser beam focus to hear Sherman and Clayton Act violations from the start. Supporting secondary focus on industry commercial frauds that are competitor harms for their determination by the court as competition and consumer harms.

This upfront approach of discovery raid followed by complaint and criminal prosecution addresses criticism for FTC action out of the pubic and judicial oversight where a new layer of FTC law may now be added under established law. Perhaps too establish a layer of guild law under Federal competition law?

Or reaffirm Intel law above the Federal Power and Nation’s law? FTC, DOJ, U.S. Attorneys and State Attorney Generals supporting judicial review to determine whether competitor harms are also competition and consumer harms would undo these concerns. With Section 1 focus removes the question of chasing down Intel on false positives. And makes FTC and DOJ leader’s in supporting virtual private law satellites by detailing known discovery paths to affirmative antitrust true positives, opposed to negatives, supporting plaintiff actions including consumer actions.

For Docket 9288 and 9341 the core violation has always been contract, combination and conspiracy in an enterprise network fraud to conceal the Sherman Act Section 1 violation. A long time antitrust violation established on case precedent validated by established Clayton Act and RICO cases. This Section 1 violation has always been intended by Intel Combination and Cartel practice to monopolize markets maximizing their combined system economic benefit. Too limit and steal from competitors and manipulate consumers.

And has always been cost too consumers including hidden transport tax for product routing affixed to primary Dealer’s Intel intra platform PC end sales price. An illegal transport fee enabled by Intel and Dealers, taxed too consumers in PC end sales price, where 100% of this route fee is collected by Media Sales Agents many who are codefendant propagandists concealing their own involvement in these continuous enterprise network crimes.

In this Section 5 process failure Intel Network deflection from consumer to industry causes of action has been experienced by all of us. There can be no more reversing the obvious even as cover for FBI and DOJ investigative intervention. Its time to bring this racketeering case into the public light so all citizens can be instructed how to report and remedy competition espionage occurring in the domestic work place in real time and not over eighteen years time.
Regardless of FTC intention or bumble Section 5 false start has been a blessing in its success to reveal yet another Intel Network manipulation of federal regulatory and law enforcement. Including Intel Network media misrepresenting 9341 proposed consent agreement, as the final FTC settlement, prior to Commissioner’s November 1st acceptance. Limiting awareness of public comment opportunity?

Resulting in Commission acceptance I can not agree with on lacking remedies. However discovery and remedies that still support the consumer case, State by State if necessary, on exact causes of action freed from its industrial divergence. Now focused on consumer harms from Section 1 contract, combination and conspiracy for Cartel price fixed product routing raising consumer PC price 6%.

Section 5 ambiguities presenting a vague case disconnected from its complete set of facts has in fact benefited follow on case work from FTC exposure in a first round of Intel Network Judo. And will the FTC or Department of Justice now respond with Federal Jujitsu and Karate? Will State Attorney Generals? Will private actions? For FTC 9341 refilled under Clayton Act within the wrapper of Sherman, Clayton Act and RICO findings is an easily won round two toward recovering $47 billion stolen by Intel Network from consumers. And for industry plaintiffs to prove their commercial claims and recover financial harms under Section 2 assuring remedies that yield no undesirable concessions to Intel Network.

Having participated in a technical assistant capacity for both Docket 9288 and 9341, I agree with academic attorneys today who’ve chastised FTC hunting for antitrust causes of action that might fit under the Section 5 umbrella. What a waste of time Section 5 has been in relation to focused address on specific structure and system causes that are Section 1 and Clayton Act per se condemnation’s of law that are proofs of Section 2 intent to monopolize and economic theft.

“The enforcement of free competition is the least business can expect”.
President Franklin Roosevelt

Intel Inside Tied Charge Back in Summary

Building on prior analysis reflecting on Intel Inside tied charge back the system metric can be summed up thus. That Intel Dealing Cartel combined cross enterprise cross market too venture back its own Cartel channel development in advance of the Intel microprocessor supply ramp. Where Intel and PC Dealers paid for their media channel’s expansion plan from Intel rebate fee credits earned in advance on every future computer sale from a predetermined production plan. Presenting the basis of the laundering violation; USC 1956, well before Docket 9341 identified Intel off the book kickbacks to Dell and how many others recorded as PC sales revenue.

A cartel venture which combines a minimum of six separate markets; x86 microprocessors, PC component platforms, Windows Operating System & Applications, PC design producers, investment banking and the media. With their push through system enabled between Intel Dealer Entry and Media Channel Exit Points from November 1991 through approximately 2006. After which push through system is more tightly coupled by Intel to individual PC Dealers on redesigned tying mechanisms that Docket 9341 and EUCC record as bribes and kickbacks.

Where Intel in combination with primary PC Dealer’s and Media Sales Agents agreed to redirect revenues from Intel and PC Dealers stockholder’s, disguised as legitimate sales costs, too pay for the combination’s Media Sales Agent channel build out from 1993 through Pentium 4 exponential growth. A period of commercial set up by the Combined Cartel where Media Sales Agent’s promote Intel microprocessors routed in Dealer’s computers to end buyers tied to their own media revenue generation ahead of the Intel supply ramp.

A supply ramp detailed two year’s in advance on Micro Design Resource Intel forecast (now suspect as the actual Intel supply schedule by this analyst) under the ownership of the Ziff Davis Soft Bank Companies (1995 – 2000) headquartered in New York, New York and Tokyo, Japan. Followed in 2000 MDR purchase by Cahners Publishing from ZD Market Intelligence merged into Cahner’s Instat Market Research Group. In period ZDNet computer titles are purchased from SoftBank by CNET through final peak of Intel Inside tied charge back program.

In addition to Ziff Davis prominent Media Sales Agents include IDG PC World, CMP Windows Magazine, other technical and mass media; ZDTV?

Sales agency that would last through the cartel’s implosion in 2005/6 on hard copy publishing reconfiguration toward Internet dissemination compounded by Intel process hurdle to race microprocessor frequency past 3.8 GHz. A period where Intel artificial press of process lithography to maintain its fabrication monopoly morphs from tied charge back to first dollar and loyalty rewards which are clearly the outcome of a continuous racket.

“The essential subordinate status of social justice as a goal of rational political discontent is illustrated by the principle that any group will find it eventually unprofitable to redistribute income toward itself at the cost even of the smallest decline in the rate of economic development. For any group which succeeds in such a redistribution there will be some year in the future beyond which it will be worse off in an absolute sense because it effected the initial redistribution in its favor.

Social Justice in Social Dynamics
Richard Brandt, 1961

Twenty year ironies of Intel domestic PC protectionism are three fold. First, the cost impact on society exposed to artificial accelerants, systematic growth and concentration of the Dealing group. Second, a combined cartel that did not deliver domestic PC protectionism but the system means for domestic economic theft. Third, with Toshiba and NEC limited to secondary status in the PC dealing group, Soft Bank purchase of Ziff Davis and then teamed with CNET (CNET up to 10% Intel owned in period) positioned both media companies, along with International Data Group’s PC World, to capture majority of Intel Inside margin rewards through the tied charge back program.

The cartel did not protect domestic industry but acted as the catalyst for inter nation organized attachment. Soft Bank who purchased Ziff Davis in 1995 knew exactly the benefits of Meizaru Kieretsu (hidden cartel) operating within the Intel Zaibatsu (vertical monopoly business conglomerate). Is this what Intel monopoly was meant to protect? And in respect to Soft Bank, why not, Intel Combine is an American Cartel.

Cross enterprise cross directorate because this sort of business combination can’t be coordinated singularly and requires mutual cooperation and direction. Although the network responsible for cartel operation’s including executives of Ziff Davis and other media responsible for enterprise infiltration to fill Cartel key man positions, in PC companies and Intel competitors, did attempt to keep the cartel’s coordination a secret.

From publisher’s top executives and regional ad reps who coordinated the placement’s to advertising and public relation agency personnel who policed the Intel sales system while acting as informant transfer bridges (along with some journalists) from Intel competitors back into Intel. The competitive rape of enterprises, industry and country for Intel tied charge back ad space sales, space commissions, publisher and agency directed client assignments and sustained employment that are network rewards of cartel membership.

A secret scheme reported by this analyst to his employers Cyrix, NexGen, ARM and AMD beginning 1991 through 1996 caused by Agent solicitations. On employer inaction and Intel Network retaliation, followed by first reports to FBI in the summer and fall 1996. Which was not the beginning of a legal system failure, but the beginning of an escalation in legal failures that has always plagued Intel case matter’s right up through 9341 result and the writing of this briefing today.

Intel monopoly profits are once again at their traditional inflated high. And that is because corporate fiduciary responsibilities, governance, regulatory and some in the Bar; no doubt specializing in serving white collar crime to sustain their attorney employments, have kept democracy stuck in Intel failure mode within the Intel lie that is a panacea of best practices meant to conceal criminal practice.

With Intel Network thumbing their noses and beating their chest’s in a victory over the FTC masking organized network crime. Where Intel CFO Smith on News Hour October 13 is positioned in front of posters that are microprocessor die photos resembling in gold hue the commercial bastions of Wall Street that are lower Manhattan office towers. Intel clinging too this constituency for support offers one indicator that all is not well in Intel Land.

Intel Network is responsible for a lot of looting and laundering; $42 billion by Intel and Dealer financial records on Intel Inside explicit contract and tacit administration of the tying system. Taken from Intel and Dealer stockholders, advanced to media, intended to limit participation and monopolize their combined supply and distribution system.

These stolen funds sit waiting for consumer recovery within Intel, PC Dealer and some Media enterprises. Also I would think partner profit from INTC QUANDA players made within their investment banking operations. Using a secret tool, riding on other people’s money, and suspect as never crediting gains back to client’s accounts?

For Docket 9341 Intel system structures prove intent to monopolize. Economic analysis points to monopoly consumer overcharge and Intel industrial price below cost. Intel explicit contractual agreements and their tacit provisions prove consumer price fixing of approximately 6%. All conduct proofs including commercial channel frauds are secondary in support. There is no risk of antitrust false positive associated with these pointers to affirmative proofs; systems intent, consumer monopoly overcharge, industrial below cost, PC price fixing for holding the cartel and its tied distribution structure in place even now.

Added production examples on which 9341 consumer recovery is calculated.

Analysts June 4th brief estimates $88 billion in Intel consumer and industrial monopolization available for judicial recovery. Current consumer recovery estimate is approximately $47.2386 billion. June 4th brief revision 2 and latter offers these three economic examples:

1) P3 code name Katmai 512 Desktop Performance pointer to consumer monopoly
overcharge of $300,990,000 and $764,517,480 in Intel Inside charge back values.

2) P3 code name Copper Mine 128 Value Mobile pointer to industrial monopolization;
$2,780,853,050 revenue less than average fixed cost, $351,211,950 less than variable
cost suspect below marginal cost end of run, and $187,923,900 in charge back values.

3) Cartel signaling embedded in P3 Xeon Tanner and P3 Cascades product dumping
RICO proof.

Pentium 3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop and P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Mobile are shown again below in their updated average weighted price versions. In this brief now joined by Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop, Pentium 3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile and P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop.

Consumer overcharge, industrial monopolization, Intel Inside tied charge back is now estimated on refined average weighted price method, for 23 production short runs, in progress for discovery purposes. As anticipated from note in July 4th brief analyst refinement from average price, to average weighted price on infra marginal speed splits, is causing the consumer recovery estimate to grow in value.

Economic analysis including latest input to FTC on October 29 is now calculated on Intel average weighted price on MDR Intel quantity estimates, by microprocessor frequency speed split, at Intel 1,000 piece stated price.

Resulting in ability to calculate consumer monopoly overcharge on exact infra marginal product quantities at monopoly price. Infra marginal ‘short lots’ of Intel microprocessors subjecting consumers to monopoly price overcharge associated with Dealer’s newest PC product introductions. Also where Intel Inside commission tied charge back values too Media Sales Agents are at their highest values.

Refined economic analysis beginning 9341 review period; January 1999 through 2002 is here meant to validate Intel monopolization before, during and following Docket 9288 negotiated settlement. With the objective of confirming Intel employee perjuries and criminal network manipulation of Docket 9288 result including this analyst’s push under in a covert security sting at that time. A sting that includes by production record Intel executives, Intel security operators, three private security firms and regional law enforcement believed to be the working associates of corporate and contract security personnel.

Analyst’s aim here is to show cause on witness tampering in an obstruction of justice; affirmative act of constructed fraud. Too offer causal proof for forestalling 9288 remedies and Intel Network aim to disrupt the administration of justice in all following State, Federal and civil actions and case investigations.

Below from August 2000 find one of hundreds of analyst’s FTC and CDOJ original submittals to Messrs. Lin, Pitofsky at FTC, Mr. Greene at CDOJ, Ms. Reno, Mr. Klein USDOJ, entire Senate Judicial Committee followed by supporting economic pointers of Intel intent to monopolize and for proving Docket 9288 manipulated obstruction.

“True reasons of the distinction upon which the probation's of voluntary restraints are founded are: 1st, the mischief which may arise from them, first to the party by the loss of his livelihood, and the substance of his family; 2ndly, to the public, by depriving it of a useful member. Another reason is, the great abuses these voluntary restraints are liable to; as for instance, from corporations, who are perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as possible; as likewise from masters who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, in their custom, when they come to set up for themselves .

C.J. Parker delivering resolution of court in Mitchell vs. Reynolds, King’s Bench, 1711, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep 347

Following five examples 1999 through mid 2002 are meant to show economic cause why Intel Network manipulation of FTC v Intel Docket 9288. That cause is intent to monopolize markets actively concealed in real time at that time by an inter nation cartel.

Monopoly pointers from MDR advance Intel production estimates, segmented by speed split, when multiplied by Intel Stated 1,000 piece price reveals a QUANDA relied on by INTC inside stock traders, PC Dealer procurement and Media Sales Agents. A network game to calculate Intel revenue and margin potential on future Intel product route purchases including tied charge back values to Media Sales Agents out into future time.

On average weighted price analysis analyst now suspects MDR estimates are the Intel supply schedule. The product of virtual network resource does MDR validate Intel production plan? Intel relies on external resources from which the organization gleans other’s ideas and makes them Intel’s ideas.

This analyst’s marketing ideas and plans have been gleaned by Intel marketing. Trailed in the field and made into a feature exhibit at one Intel marketing department luncheon; don’t talk to that guy at the Intel trade show booth was their aim to inform marketing and sales personnel. One of several encounters court ordered production shows Intel theft of analyst market plans from AMD in 1996. Separate, analyst record for AMD Security that is theft of NexGen K6 development schedule and the transfer of NexGen AMD confidential product details to Intel in period.

Above revised P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop now indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal quantity ‘speed splits’ at Intel stated 1,000 piece price. On $12,741,958,000 revenue from total production of 34,124,000 units, consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 11,195 880 units is $1,022,694,800. Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% commission multiplied x2 representing Dealer Media Trigger and Intel Media Sales Agent kickback is $764,517,480. Total consumer overcharge and price fixing recoverable from P3 Katmai 512 Performance Desktop production short run is $1,787,212,280.

Next P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed splits by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Note consumer surcharge periods two and three on Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move supporting P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes period five through ten.

“Monopoly or monospony represents a kind of knot, kink, or distortion in the general field of the economic relationships, or a toll gate in the network of economic communications which enables some individuals to capture and exploit power positions which otherwise competitive forces would have eroded away.

The Principle of Personal Responsibility
Presentation to the Catholic Economic Association, 1953

Above P3 Performance Desktop on MDR Intel supply schedule estimate 1 shows $37,995,339,220 revenue on 136,364,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 7,150,000 units is $1,103,498,344. Consumer surcharge from monopsony setting up for predatory price on run down volumes period five through ten is $1,348,392,000. Intel Inside charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $2,279,720,353. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Desktop production short run equals $4,731,610,697.

Below P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile indicating consumer monopoly overcharge > $450 on infra marginal speed split by Intel 1,000 piece stated price. Note consumer surcharge periods four through seven for Dealer monopsony price suggesting Intel horizontal predatory price move period eight on P3 Tualatin 256 extension of Copper Mine 256 run down volumes through period ten. Tualatin 256 price regulates upward Copper mine 256 end of run average weighted price and in its own short run adds to the consumer monopoly overcharge value.

Above P3 Performance Mobile on MDR supply schedule estimate 2 shows $20,735,225,000 revenue on 57,050,000 units. Consumer monopoly overcharge on infra marginal production of 16,325,000 units is $1,323,710,000. Consumer surcharge period’s four through seven for Dealer monopsony benefit and Intel predatory price on run down volumes is $1,440,325.000.

Intel Inside tied charge back to Media Sales Agents on total revenue at 3% tied back charge multiplied x2 representing Intel kickback and Dealer trigger is $1,244,053,500. Total consumer recoverable from P3 Copper Mine 256 Performance Mobile production short run equals $4,008,088,500.

Below P3 Copper Mine 128 (Celeron) Value Desktop priced at and below fixed cost. On revenue of $7,753,871,000 on 86,740,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $384,704,000 at Average Fixed Cost of $136; and $7,405,167,000 industrial monopolization where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel desktop short run is $465,232,260.

Above Pentium 3 Celeron Value Mobile priced at and below fixed cost. Revenue of $3,132,065,000 on 25,790,000 units estimates industrial monopolization of $2,780,853,050 where price is less than Average Fixed Cost of $136; and $351,211,950 industrial monopolization where price is at or less than Average Variable Cost of $117 and suspect below Marginal Cost at production end of run. Intel Inside tied charge back consumer recovery value associated with this Intel mobile short run is $187,923,900.

Summary of 9341 Case Recovery Values; in Part 1/99 through 6/02; revision 3 method.

Consumer Monopoly Price Overcharge = $ 3,449,903,144
Consumer Surcharge Monopsony Price = $ 2,788,717,000
Consumer Tied Charge Back Price Fix = $ 4,941,447,443
Partial Consumer Recovery in 9341 Period = $11,180,067,637

Industrial Monopolization Price < AFC = $ 3,165,557,050
Industrial Monopolization Price < AVC = $ 7,756,378,950
Partial Industrial Recovery in 9341 Period = $10,921,936,000

In Conclusion

On pointers and proofs whether Intel employees and witnesses perjured themselves in a Network multipoint manipulation of the FTC, to deflect from core causes of action in Docket 9288, and again in 9341 are clear. System, structure, economic, conduct pointers and proofs examined under lens of legal case precedent reveals this fact. A premeditated network obstruction to forestall remedies and disrupt the administration of justice in all Intel case matters over the last twelve years including now.

Intel Network case matters are about insuring innovation production short run to short run. Assuring civil rights while preserving ability to innovate based on examples that demonstrate Intel methods of creative destruction can be very destructive economically, structurally, holistically and socially. Intel Network RICO is proven. Section 1 and Section 2 case proofs wait to be discovered by FTC or sit delivered at FTC and DOJ.

I look forward to open Intel hearings for a transparency that will educate every American on forms of domestic economic terrorism caused by illegal monopolization, combinations, cartels, frauds, theft, deceit and the cover ups that have stymied these Intel Network case matters from their complete remedies and resolutions for over a decade.

Respectfully Submitted
Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing

FBI Original Source of Intel Network RICO; 1996
FTC Invited field reporter Docket 9288, 1998-2000
CDOJ and NYDOJ first to report; 1998
CDOJ lettered to work report; Intel Section 1 Framework; 2000 –
SEC Notice; 2007
U.S. Attorney NCD recognized FCA Relator; 2008
FTC voluntary analyst Docket 9341; under Labor Code 3363.5; 2009 "

Intel General Counsel Bruce Sewell Contacted by iViewit - Eliot Bernstein

2010-10-25T19:27:00.001-07:00

Eliot Bernstein of Iviewit Message to Bruce Sewell Former General Council of Intel Corporation.

More on Intel's Corruption Concerning the iViewit
www.BruceSewell.com

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

and www.Iviewit.TV

Intel Multi-Trillion Dollar Fraud Over Stolen Iviewit Technology - White Collar Crime Complaint to SEC.

2010-10-04T15:31:00.000-07:00

CEO of Intel Paul Otellini KNOWS of Mass Fraud on Shareholders and DOES Not Disclose to Intel Corp. Board, Auditors or Shareholders.

"" SEC COMPLAINT INTEL CORPORATION Page 2 of 8

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Re: Complaint - Regarding Intel Corporation and Possible Trillion Dollar Fraud on Intel

White Collar Crime Division and Any and All Compliance Division Heads and Related
Offices:

I, Eliot Bernstein, of 2753 NW 34th Street, Boca Raton, Florida 33434 as the
Original Owner and Inventor of key "backbone technologies" for video and imaging as
further described herein, am filing this formal complaint against Intel Corporation ( Intel ) with United States headquarters located at 2200 Mission College Blvd, Santa Clara, Ca, 95054-1459, and bring to your attention ongoing investigations involving multiple federal offices around the country as well as International investigations pertinent in this matter.

Intel is a primary wrongdoer as a named defendant in a presently pending Trillion
Dollar international RICO conspiracy lawsuit1 involving the theft and fraud of my
Intellectual Property rights as further set out herein. In addition to liabilities claimed in this lawsuit, are separate direct primary liabilities and obligations from signed agreements including Non Disclosure’s, Strategic Partner Agreements and Licensing Agreements.

Further, on information and belief Intel corporate management including at least the
President, Paul S. Otellini and corporate counsel Bruce D. Sewell, and Stephen R.
Rodgers are also involved in an ongoing and undisclosed massive international Fraud
against the Intel shareholders and investors.

Upon information and belief, the frauds include but are not limited to the failure
to disclose both the lawsuit and the Intellectual Property infringements in direct violation of various SEC laws and rules including but not limited to FASB No. 5 requirements for disclosing liabilities and more. Merely one claim in this lawsuit involves the attempted Murder upon my family by an Iraqi style car bombing that blew up three vehicles in addition to mine during the early phases of the high stakes corporate theft and fraud of my Intellectual Property rights. Notably, federal Judge Shira Scheindlin referred to this as a case involving Murder that has also been marked as legally “related” by Scheindlin to an ongoing Federal Whistleblower case2."

Full Document and Source
http://iviewit.tv/CompanyDocs/United%20States%20District%20Court
%20Southern%20District%20NY/20090325%20FINAL%20Intel%20SEC%20Complaint%20SIGNED2073.pdf

Did Paul Otellini Help Enron to Get Away with YOUR MONEY..

2010-09-08T14:52:00.001-07:00

What connections does Intel Corp. CEO Paul Otellini have with Enron.. and thereby the Protection of Corrupt Law Firm Proskauer Rose ??

Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission In the Matter of Intel Corporation FTC Docket 9341

2010-09-08T00:45:00.000-07:00

"" August 21, 2010; revision 3.12, Nation Interest Publications

To: Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission
In the Matter of Intel Corporation FTC Docket 9341

c/o: Office of the Secretary
Federal Trade Commission
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580

cc: Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, the U.S. Senate
Congressional subCommittee on Commerce, Trade, Consumer Protection
State Attorney Generals

Christine Varney, DOJ Antitrust
Michael Hertz, DOJ Criminal Fraud
Joyce Branda, DOJ Civil Fraud
Director Robert Mueller, FBI
Honorable Eric Holder, DOJ
Vice President Joseph Biden

Fm: Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing Consultancy

Re: FTC Docket 9341 Comment on Proposed Settlement

- Intel consumer & industrial monopoly recoverable grows to $88 billion
- $42 billion subset due consumer return; $43.827 billion industrial monopolization.
- RICO proofs of Intel Insider stock trading & NASDAQ market rig.
- Lettered Relator Seeks Attorney; FCA, 31 USC 3279, recovery of monopoly & fraudulent cost imposed on Federal Government’s Intel based PC purchases.

Secretary Federal Trade Commission for Commissioners, Senators, Congressmen, State Attorney Generals, Antitrust Chief Varney, Mr. Hertz & Ms. Branda, FBI Director Mueller, Honorable U.S. Attorney General Holder, Vice President Biden:

Pursuant to Camp Marketing Consultancy ongoing Intel Network case assessment: Consumer recoverable Intel Inside transport charge, monopoly price premium, industry monopolization on Intel economic and financial analysis grows total intent to monopolize recovery, by 12%, to $88 billion.

Additionally Docket 9341 Intel production analysis across 23 consecutive short runs suggests minimum $3.489 billion in MicroSoft operating systems monopolization. Industrial recoverable is associated with tying OS horizontally by OEM license to Intel x86 surplus microprocessors sold at a price less than Intel cost to produce.

With over two decades of computer related expertise, twelve years x86 microprocessor and PC products marketing employment experience, through 130 months providing Federal Trade Commission, Federal agencies, Senate and Congress, State and Federal Attorneys this research assessment documenting Intel market harms and costs imposed on consumers, industry, enterprises, individuals, society, States and Nations, my vantage on Docket 9341 proposed settlement agreement before public comment.

That entering into Bureau of Competition Docket 9341 proposed consent agreement with Intel Corporation would enable continued monopolization and non address of standing violations of Federal Law including antitrust, commerce and trade, racketeering, penal and securities law by the Federal Trade Commission.

Any ruling away from complete documentation of Docket 9341 case facts, in open proceedings, would deny the United States, American People, elected representatives in Congress and Senate the knowledge reference to act on the complete set of case facts.

Facts and data assembled through 130 months of research between the lines of Docket 9288, and now 9341, I trust verified by FTC in discovery and waiting to be documented through proceedings yet to be delivered.

That is for a complete Intel situation analysis crucial for democracies’ definition of anti trust law augments, including new Federal and State competition, commercial, civil and civil rights laws.

The Intel Corporation case matters are a green field for evolving constitutional, federal & state, competition, civil, labor & world human rights laws & legislation.

This opportunity for evolution of man and human potential cannot be brushed aside.

Lacking complete record, competition and commerce and trade law evolution into the new millennium will be blocked here at Docket 9341.

A misguided political twist too steer Congress and Senate away from whole assessment for whole remedies. Too overlook a closed technical guild’s truly anticompetitive by law channel control and tying mechanisms.

With Docket 9341 remedies overlooked two decades of dire system’s effects on competition and society are clear. Continued Intel abuses if the matter’s most urgent components are left unaddressed by FTC consent agreement as proposed.

And it’s not like Bureau of Competition has to go back to the drawing board for detailing a complete assessment for all encompassing remedial framework.

That capable of regulating one of technocracies greatest system failures; artificially accelerating and network directing industrial economies, enterprise values, the multiple lateral exclusions, vertical by horizontal structural restraints, financial and legal frauds, industrial inefficiencies, propagandist communication controls and covert security operations that by law must be examined to fully correct the core of these Intel case matters.

A precedent setting case that crosses many traditional antitrust and commerce case matters. Where the knowledge of past antitrust cases is relied on by a constituent franchise to construct anticompetitive systems, in structure, on which Intel’s integrated monopoly is sustained even now.

Further scuttling the full record of Docket 9341 case facts, through incomplete proceeding transcript, would deny cross profession FTC monitors complete case assessment for Intel system and structural ongoing audits under their charge. The key concern being how will any thoroughly audit for what they do not know about?

The nature of Intel Network artificially accelerated system structural manipulations, real time future time effects of technically novel market rigging systems, including notoriously destructive Intel Inside tied charge back deserve full Docket 9341 disclosure for Congressional and Senate law consideration. Only from full disclosure can Congress and Senate consider augments and new law legislation from the realities that are Intel Networked masked for much to long.

Break through or break down. For Commissioner’s vote to brush over Bureau of Competition gapping holes, within a Docket 9341 negotiated settlement, would indicate a continued social system, law and democracy breakdown.

Vote no on Intel enculturation of democratic State.

Vote no on continued movement toward the dark side of corporate cooperation.

Vote no on Federal Trade Commission corporate legal services.

What the Regulatory Commission is may need a word of explanation even for American readers: First devised in the 1880s to regulate railroads and grain terminals, the function of the regulatory agency is to make private enterprise function in the public interest under conditions of “natural” monopoly where competition cannot effectively do the job.

These agencies, by and large, have three functions: to maintain as far as feasible competition in the service area; to protect the public interest against exploitation by “natural” monopolies through control of prices and service standards; and to limit the earnings of “natural’ monopolies whether railroads, airlines, power companies or broadcasters, to a “fair return” geared to the cost of capital.

The “regulatory agency” thus presents an attempt to find a “third way” between the uncontrolled private monopoly and - equally uncontrolled – government monopoly.

Peter Drucker, Management, Harvard Press 1973

Noteworthy, Docket 9341 like Docket 9288 fails to specifically disclose and fully error correct real time future time margin ties that are the diamagnetic attractors of Intel structure. Driven on Intel artificial acceleration of production start’s which continually moves this current time future time effect which is the Intel channel distribution bridge.

A worm hole constantly morphing and folding onto itself when Intel current time attractors lead into future time enabling Intel Network too fix their future. Reliance on a two element value tie that is just one of many discoveries central to the Sherman Act Section 1 core of Docket 9341 which proves Section 2 intent to monopolize per se. Demonstrating along with other anti competitive restraints Intel’s monopolization of many relevant markets from one microprocessor production short run too the next.

This leading attractor is an Intel and Media first. Two margin charges tied for their leading after effects. Classic antitrust restraints from sales agency that when combined with limiting mechanisms from other sciences morphs into something unique. Where market share allocation tied too a leading attractor today, offers 1st Tier Dealers a leading market share advantage into their Intel franchise future.

Where Microsoft riding this Intel PC Media tie, tied too Intel below cost surplus dumping destroys most of the Nation’s independent software industry. And between the three, and beyond ARM which follows in time, wipes out an entire generation of domestic microprocessor design developers and design manufacturers.

Whether to persuade or from incompleteness to steer Docket 9341 conclusion away from Sherman Act core facts, assures continued non regulation of these destructive current time future time practices by legal void. Invented by Intel for all too see, and now copy, a setting up of society for continued damages.

A network tragedy of secret scheme’s that jump organic time on the weight of skimmed product and surplus value ties that destabilize enterprises and industries. Occurring within the chaos of a planned industry concentration where the sales revenues of one company, can be network directed by Media to another company, on Intel Dealer system mechanics. Mechanics that have enabled a criminal gang to take system’s control, to loot enterprises, industry, consumers, society, Nation’s, capitalism and democracy, democracy and capitalism.

Known causes of Federal Action on Intel 9341 discovery and research assessment:

Sherman Act Section 1 Contract for horizontal combination as a restraint.
Sherman Act Section 1 Conspiracy to conceal contract & combination.
Sherman Act Section 2 Intent to monopolize and predatory conduct.

Clayton Act Part 2 Certainly channel discrimination & sabotage of facilities.
Clayton Act Part 3 Limiting by product routing; barricaded essential facility.
Clayton Act Part 4 Attacking competitor employees who refuse to participate.
Clayton Act Part 5 Unfair and deceptive practices.

Clayton Act Section 13c Payment/acceptance commission compensation to route.
Clayton Act Section 13d Payment for services or facilities for processing a sale.
Clayton Act Section 13e Furnishing services or facilities for processing/handling.
Clayton Act Section 14 Pressed into agreement not to use competitor’s goods.

USC 1961 RICO - 222 Cross enterprise, cross professional network crime.

USC 1341 US Mail Fraud Consumer Route Fee paid on PCs mailed across State lines.
USC 1956 Laundering Intel bribes paid to PC Companies recorded as revenues.
Corporate Procedure 1714.9 Attorney & Client conspiracy.

Penal Code 182 Crimes against public justice.

Known consumer and industrial financial recoveries calculated for 9341 discovery:

On analysis of Intel financials for misrepresented costs and economic analysis across 23 Intel production short run’s; calculated on MDR Quanda by quarterly Intel production estimate, multiplied by Intel stated price.

$44.173 billion consumer cost of harms on Intel intent to monopolize.
$43.827 billion industrial monopolization harms on Intel intent to monopolize.

Economic calculations represent a partial four year subset of the 10 year Intel total production set within Docket 9341 review period; 1/1/99 to current.

Executive Review

Proposed consent agreement should be partially accepted for plaintiff relief and partially denied for antitrust omissions. Chartered to act under the laws of the Unites States Bureau of Competition Docket 9341 negotiated settlement proposal in current form is insufficient on antitrust environmental circumstances of fact, discovery, law precedent and Commission fiduciary responsibilities.

Sent back to the negotiating table where the future of democratic capitalism and civil society are truly at stake. We cannot overlook all the major Intel Network System crimes or the fiduciary and governance breakdowns.

Including seven of the most hideous system crime categories;

1) Vertical by horizontal tying.
2) Intel multiple laterals of combination.

3) Intel tied charge through channel’s metering devices.
4) Intel Corporate plus Media tied sales attraction.

5) Network political & jurist multipoint and consumer manipulations.
6) Intel Insider Quanda stock and market rigging systems.
7) Microsoft OS horizontally tied by OEM license to Intel below cost product.

These seven categories of Intel systems deliver debilitating tendencies. System, social, and financial consequence’s on competition, enterprise, industry, regulatory, law enforcement and protection, political body, Nation’s stability, financial markets and capital creation potential. And continue to perpetuate hurdles in the way of system remedies from over 18 years of not owing up to many Intel and Microsoft antitrust violations, and concealing PC Media system crimes that have destroyed industries, competition and legitimate governance functions.

Accordingly back too the negotiating table for some Intel admittance. Docket 9341 should proceed accordingly too FTC hearing stage focused on Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 per se condemnations of law known under the Section 5 umbrella which is Docket 9341. On these tracks address should continue forward on:

FTC Focus -

1) Competitor limiting by vertical restraints for multiple laterals of combination.
2) Limited by horizontal contract in combinations including conspiracy to conceal.
3) In combinations cartel routing & price fixing raising consumer PC price by 6%.
4) In combinations monopoly price impact on consumers from media manipulation.
5) Validate recovery for consumer monopoly price, routing & price fixing harms.

Finally, for Docket 9341 in hearing too verify the criminal components of these competition case matters in proceeding transcript for Department of Justice timely follow on complaint;

DOJ Focus -

1) Recovering consumer monopoly price, product routing and price fixing harms.
2) Prosecuting competition, commercial frauds and racketeering that are criminal
components of the FTC Docket 9341 competition case violation’s themselves.

SEC Focus –

1) Documenting Intel Accounting Fraud & with DOJ prosecuting Stock Market Rig.

Analyst Background: Invited by Bureau of Competition lead attorney to input as field reporter for Docket 9288 May 1998, now inputting to FTC Docket 9341 case team on Commissioner referral to case team under Department of Labor Code 3363.5#, this analyst is the FTC’s longest time Intel case expert.

Bringing industry, direct witness, Docket 9288 and 9341 case work too the examination of Intel Network practices.

This expert finds Bureau of Competition Docket 9341 settlement proposal artfully crafted and diplomatically presented. But does not address standing violations of law, consumer recoveries from Intel competitive harms, market rigging, and remains ineffective on non address of the foundation causes of Intel monopoly which continue regardless.

This analyst finds Docket 9341 settlement proposal;

1) Artfully crafted too address and patch current industry competitor claims which I support and will address within my profession and case expertise herein.

2) Diplomatically presented too guard Commissioners and Commission employees from Intel Network retaliation including future employment blacklist, however, ineffective for guarding constitutional, employment, civil and human rights of witnesses who are case contributor’s such as myself.

Including continued blacklist, Intel, Intel Attorney and Security Operation’s retaliation in a constructed fraud meant to obstruct justice, abuse court and Officers. Too conceal Intel Network crime including many forms of direct and indirect retaliation against this Federal Reporter covered up, white washed or misrepresented for a very long time.

Which is what can happen to investigative reporters when a criminal clan buried into corporate enterprise, media, Bar, for two decades, take over critical decision and control functions within industry and State to loot it. Too protect and conceal their Network, to protect and conceal their looting, to protect and conceal their looters.

No less than a citizen responsibility to report in this war zone and very scary looking back. Perhaps as scary looking ahead. Yet essential to reverse an eleven year sting from the encounters, interactions and the counter intelligence retrieval now part of this record. So why a continued corporate political fraud meant to conceal Intel antitrust violations, RICO, industrial espionages, market, law, criminal fraud, civil fraud and jurist rigs?

Everyone has known about this Intel Network problem for a long, long time

3) Does not address Intel monopoly consumer harms, or financial recoveries calculated from those known causes which are core too the Commission’s charter.

4) Similar to this analyst’s Docket 9288 public comment a decade ago, that Docket 9341 settlement proposal will be ineffective for curbing Intel monopoly momentum & enabling the growing of industry competitor market share against an Intel illegally achieved process fabrication monopoly.

Which is a current time infrastructure barrier now exponentially expanding which Docket 9341 remedy barely touches’. And whose remedy actually changes the dynamic of competition to some degree.

Specifically, Docket 9341 settlement proposal does nothing to address the history of Intel’s monopoly derived surplus barrier, how and why it got that way, its cost on consumers, industry, society and Nation, as a result of Intel defending that monopoly grown and sustained industrial surplus barrier from legitimate competition on the merits and where as proposed there are very limited 9341 remedial solutions.

On antitrust 3x estimate of Intel total harms committed against economies, industries, enterprises, competition, consumers, society and Nation’s = $264,000,000,000.

And on that classic business school inquiry what is Microsoft OS monopoly take on cost on society to produce? Estimate Microsoft OS attach to Intel 1999 through 2002 < AFC Units of 72,697,900 quantity multiplied by $50 OS price estimate less $2 manufacturing cost = $3.489 Billion industry recoverable.

Docket 9288 infiltrated by Intel confidence men who were witnesses for the FTC ten years ago, did not resolve the Intel matter on diminutive causes concealing the major ones. How are diminutive remedies proposed in the current 9341 consent agreement any different for resolving the major ones today?

On specifics of the proposed settlement from analysis of proposed consent order:

Through first days writing on what proposed consent agreement includes for consumer and plaintiff’s in the way of Intel competition controls, it became obvious comparing FTC Analysis of Proposed Consent Order, with the Order itself, that the really fascinating paths address what the Proposed Order does not address and cannot control. There’s a lot left out.

First, consumers are harmed by Intel conduct, resulting in monopoly price impact and the illegal transport tax clandestinely charged to consumer PC purchases between 1993 and 2006.

Nothing in Docket 9341 aims to recover for consumer harms or prevent consumer sales manipulation by Intel Networked including Media co-conspirators into the future.

Intel Network methods of monopoly and surplus market tying charges, for product routing and consumer manipulation, have stymied nascent innovations from growth, and established innovations from commercialization.

Between Intel 286 too 386 microprocessor market transition and today, 22 years, the breadth of industry contributions for consumer microprocessor and PC product choices have been reduced.

Many have been exposed to some of the innovations quashed by Intel Network. Where ever Intel margin values are threatened Intel Network will quash competition, democracy and legitimate justice.

Bureau of Competition states, “The Proposed Consent Order will bring immediate relief in the relevant markets and puts Intel under the Commissions order.” Where those implementing the system have a great deal too do with that outcome. By leaving out many Docket 9341 findings which enable only the limited incomplete outcome proposed.

Plaintiff Industry Relief

Certainly the order as proposed brings current time relief to nine industry competitors. However does nothing for recovering any of the long time consumer harms. Does not remedy any of the anticompetitive conduct left unaddressed.

And even some that is addressed provides no remedy including Part IV 3 B which place competitors into less than sales parity with Intel. First, on the antitrust causes omitted from Docket 9341 action unaddressed by the commercial fraud ‘sales’ remedies alone. Second, on Intel manufacturing cost advantage from a monopoly built business infrastructure.

In this expert’s opinion the proposed order is too plaintiff industrially limited to bring whole forms of relief. And does not protect society and consumers including in the relevant markets which are many more than the complaint addresses.

The x86 microprocessor market and intra platform PC component’s markets, Microsoft horizontally tied Windows platform and the affects on independent inter platform computing markets all need to be considered. All these markets are contained, limited and under stress by Intel’s process fabrication, x86 microprocessor and intra platform monopolies which continue regardless of the consent agreement.

Ironically, in this up front summary so please continue, proposed consent agreement does not regulate against any of the commercial forms of sales relief proposed if all competitors chose too adopt them. So where has the proposed consent agreement actually guarded competition, consumers, added to or evolved industry antitrust science or competition regulation? That answer is no where.

Docket 9341 proposed consent patches up certain current time industrial competitor harms on Intel conduct which this analyst supports. The order does not address or resolve the systematic dismantling of enterprises, industries, markets, society and Nation’s economic potentials by Intel. Or Intel combination and cartel subset’s in a cross enterprise, cross profession organized crime ring.

With some of the most notorious examples including Intel Network direction of production values, predatory product dumping, multiple laterals of combination including corporate plus media combination in a tied sales system, and the market rigging Quanda left unaddressed. Proposed consent agreement leaves total set of causes out and complete remedies incomplete.

The order “seeks to undo the effects of Intel’s past restraints on industry competition by enhancing the ability of AMD, Nvidia, VIA and others to compete effectively with Intel;

1) To make it easier for AMD, NVidia and VIA to use third party foundries to manufacturer products for them.

2) To give AMD, NVidia and VIA flexibility to secure modifications to change of control provisions in their Licensing Agreements with Intel.

3) To extend VIA a 5 year Intel intellectual property license.

4) To provide 6 year assurance to plaintiffs of complimentary and peripheral products that they will be able to connect their devices to Intel CPUs.

5) For FTC to manage intellectual property infringement claims, commercial distribution frauds and contract disputes for up to 10 years.

On remedies Bureau of Competition states “these provisions compel Intel to make certain offers; they do not compel a third party to accept them.

The goal is to require Intel to open the door to renewed competition, not to force a third party to take any particular action”. So remedies are all on a negotiated basis among the industry parties with FTC administrative oversight.

Plaintiff and industrially limited, proposed consent agreement does not address and therefore does not undo the effects of two decades of Intel monopoly restraints on industry, society, consumers including the Federal and State governments. That is throughout the Docket 9341 review period which is January 1, 1999 through too now.

For Bureau of Competition to even suggest that the very narrow limits of Docket 9341 industrial focus addresses, and could “undo the monopoly effects” of Intel sustained restraints, the now multi segmented product category hurdles, surplus barrier and fabrication monopoly which are the result of two decade’s of multiple laterals of vertically tied horizontal dealing combinations, is absurd.

With all the Section 1, industry, channel, racketeering and cartel proofs is even more so.

For industry plaintiff Part III of the order does patch over some real time claims including foundry immunity from Intel patent suit over products and technology cross license questions and disagreements; between Intel and plaintiffs only and their chip stage manufacturing foundries. No foundry wants to be sued for contract fabrication of a customer’s products that might infringe another firm’s patents, lacking appropriate license provisions, which this remedy is designed to address.

Consequently proposed consent agreement’s big winners, in fact, are not consumers or the independent plaintiffs themselves but their independent foundry partners who now get a clean opportunity to displace the Intel monopoly derived surplus barrier.

Those are TSMC and UMC in Taiwan, Global Foundries in Germany and Taiwan, SMIC in China, IBM in Vermont and New York, and Samsung in South Korea and Texas.

Beyond prototype or short run fabrication operations, there is currently no merchant leading edge commercial logic lithography process located in the United States beyond Intel facilities. IBM is primarily a short run captive operation. Global Foundries has been constructing an advanced commercial facility in State of New York to go on line in 2012.

There is other worldwide leading edge logic process availability but none tuned for x86 microprocessor fabrication. Samsung, like IBM and Global Foundries a common process platform alliance member, would likely entertain the contribution of a high margin microprocessor to their product fabrication line up. There is leading process lithography for memory and legacy analog fabrication located in the United States.

Looking forward there are no Intel conditions within Docket 9341 addressing Intel’s reintegration of a fabrication industry into the United States which the Intel monopoly is responsible for destroying. Holding municipalities to ransom Intel continues threat to move offshore.

No remedy in Docket 9341 addresses the greater than $43.827 billion in industrial monopolization stolen from competitive enterprises, by Intel, for their recovery and competitive reinvestment in semiconductor fabrication back into domestic economy.

Proposed consent agreement continues Under Part II A through D to enable connection of plaintiffs peripheral components to Intel central processing units; through the PCIe standard, which in period will become obsolete for keeping up with processor memory bus throughput requirement; in processor, to coprocessor or accelerator.

Thus limiting future time competitive connection primarily too input output subsystems like storage. Everyone will need to design and implement their own AMD Hypertransport® HTX and Intel Quick Path® like processor direct bus implementations or license them.

Under this provision Intel continues to block competitive access to the North Bridge microprocessor to main memory control subsystem. That is to push competition away from an Intel control block using the second control subsystem, South Bridge, as an Intel negotiating chip. South Bridge is the peripheral input and output connection into the microprocessor main memory core sub system.

Intel reason for push away is simple, competitive access to the North Bridge sub system enables microprocessor substitute competition directly at the microprocessor socket level. And graphics component sub system replacement competition at the microprocessor system bus level.

In other words any microprocessor company can compete for substitution within that PC main board socket, with Intel, when the PC main board is designed to fit all x86 instruction set compliant microprocessors. And any graphics subsystem can compete for replacing Intel graphic options when the microprocessor system bus is openly accessible.

At the microprocessor level the good of socket substitution is truly an open market commodity PC. The bad is margin commoditization for main boards and the class of microprocessors generally designed for them. Typically lower priced given the multi competitor effects and scale economy of basically one main board designed to fit all.

Especially true when Intel dumps these class of microprocessors on competitors at or below cost. No wonder ARM constituency is aimed to win world PC for the masses.

Given this Intel North Bridge IP block, since 1998 mainstream x86 microprocessors have moved away from substitutes; referred to in industry as ‘socket stealers’, to incorporate their own patent protected North Bridge main memory to microprocessor control system.

NexGen initially and then AMD with Hyper Transport lead in this ‘replacement platform’ evolution away from the open Socket 7 PC standard. And today all AMD x86 instruction set compliant processors require a main board specifically designed for them which is the HyperTransport bus open licensee able which can talk through PCI lanes from microprocessor to graphics subsystem.

Product Segment Aggregate x86 Compliant Microprocessor Market Share

2Q 09 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10

Intel 78.9 81.1 80.5 81.0 80.7
AMD 20.6 18.7 19.4 18.8 19.0
VIA 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3

Source: International Data Corporation, August 2010

The pro for HyperTransport open system specification is widely accepted performance. Con is HyperTransport main board production economies are tied to AMD approximate microprocessor share of 20% in relation to Intel’s 80% share.

From a producer’s standpoint main boards for Intel microprocessors have much greater manufacturing scale economies on cost for price. This pegs Nvidia head to head with AMD unless an Intel compatible board products license opens up that 80% of the market.

There are pros and cons for platform replacements. The pro is no socket stealing PC commoditization, although, the nature of this type of competition is most competitive and very consumer friendly from a price standpoint. The con is all industrial sales margins are reduced unless an informal price floor is observed.

The consumer may also realize fewer evolutionary enhancements to the PC’s system bus compared to optimized variants of the HT standard or Intel Quick Path option that can offer higher sales margin potentials from their individual enterprise optimizations. Although, Socket 7 PC delivered the same sort of competitive system bus frequency improvements by Cyrix, AMD and IDT Centaur which Intel always lagged.

Truly to open the PC platform market industrially speaking, FTC would authorize x86 microprocessor competition universally at the microprocessor socket level. And graphics competition universally at the microprocessor system bus level.

Under Part III consent agreement extends VIA current license to attach to Intel microprocessors, through PCIe, for 5 years. And provides third party immunity from Intel patent infringement suit for 30 days during any other enterprise’s initial acquisition talks with VIA and then up to one year following acquisition.

For VIA lacking access to Intel North Bridge license and tied to its own 0.03% market share, means Socket 370 or another system bus option or be pigeon holed within its own microprocessor share tied to its own main board production. Access too PCI connect to Intel processor main memory system offers VIA and Nvidia a five year development Window to somewhere else.

Regardless a very real barrier remains and that is VIA competing with its own customer base, with its own processor plus main board design, against Intel and compatible board designs that are 99.7% more. For Nvidia the hurdle is being placed outside of Intel platform graphic’s co-development by Intel.

One of the real interesting questions is do VIA and Nvidia merge? Nvidia lacks minimally a validated x86 microprocessor design. VIA has the compatibility suite and the embedded x86 microprocessor portfolio where Centaur could produce more sophisticated designs, but VIA lacks the high performance graphic’s components.

Sounds like a complimentary relationship when two MPU and APU teams compete. And is FTC being played to play match maker? A creative but socially costly Bar divergence from Docket 9341 core antitrust claim’s by some members refocusing the case from consumers, law and society considerations, to their own business considerations? If this is a corporate attorney divergence too confuse from core Sherman Act claims society is about to lose.

Plaintiffs do have cause. And if denied Intel platform license access Nvidia essentially ends up in the same boat as VIA, competing with AMD ATI graphics subsidiary on 20% of all AMD compatible PC main boards. Or against Intel on PCI track or Quick Path license; if a license is obtainable, and only if an Intel based PC BIOS recognizes the Nvidia graphics option, and Intel hands over system control on OEM pre-configuration or user specification at system set up. Nothing in the proposed consent agreement addresses this long time industry concern.

For AMD, VIA and Nvidia consent proposal further addresses Intel reconfiguration of product platform licensing field, and platform access for complimentary component computer product planning.

Under Parts V and VI Intel must provide plaintiffs a real 5 year product platform plan similar to other Intel compliments. Plaintiffs receive a negotiation position with Intel on the effects of those plans and Intel reconfiguration of the plan including knowledge of x86 instruction set extensions. All which impact competitor investment, access and continued computer industry participation. Negotiation stale mates apparently go back to the FTC for the next decade. So will the FTC be hiring more engineers who are contract attorneys? And is this truly the FTC’s mission?

Considering Parts V and VI further in this revision 3, as a market analyst my prior public comment versions focused on business manager perspective reviewing the proposed settlement agreement. With this version I’d like to propose what concern engineers.

That is not the Intel road map which is published; now also to competitive compliments under the proposed order. The issue which concerns engineers is advance standard body provisions that drive Intel platform road maps, which Intel has always been instrumental in defining. This includes computer performance benchmarks. Most urgently with many hardware standards now maturing, in the face of Intel vertical integration, the consent proposal does nothing to address Intel manipulation of future computer platform development standards that benefit Intel Network above all others.

Intel monopolization must always be stopped at their starting blocks and proposed agreement no where takes this into account. Including through its’ standards omissions.

Rigged Benchmarks

On deceptive practices, under Part VII, consent agreement requires Intel within 90 days, to inform market at large that its own application program compilers are optimized for Intel microprocessor architectures, and not for competitive microprocessor architectures.

Nothing in the agreement requires Intel or a third party software tool developers to rewrite Intel compilers too recognize both Intel and competitor’s unique architectural implementations, and to enable them ‘turned on’ when software applications are run using these compiled applications. Which include computer system benchmarks for establishing real time processor sub system and central processing unit performance capabilities validation.

Nor does the proposal require third party software developers including Media benchmark and software application operations, to pass along this required Intel disclosure. And does nothing to assure that Media and other influencers will rig their own benchmark suites too favor Intel microprocessors and misreport the performance of competitive processors. Which under the proposal might occur even more on both sides of the debate leaving consumer’s even more in the middle for determining what computer product solutions actual do for them.

Bureau of Competition states “the proposed Consent Order is designed to protect the ability of customers and existing and future Intel competitors to engage in mutually beneficial trade.” Here Docket 9288 and next 130 months of case research incorporated into Docket 9341 really comes into play. This analyst finds the proposed consent agreement incomplete.

Beneficial Trade

Under Part IV A & B, proposal addresses activities effecting commerce including licensing, development, production, manufacture, marketing, promotion, purchase or sale, and certain Intel pricing and bidding practices. Where this expert specializes in market(ing) restraints, economic and communications controls within CDOJ defined Section 1 strategy of per se condemnation, this comment will focus on market and commerce aspects of proposed Intel Docket 9341 consent agreement.

Proposed consent agreement states “respondents shall not invite, enter into, implement, continue, enforce, or attempt to enter into, implement, continue or enforce, any condition, policy, practice, agreement, contract, understanding, or any other requirement that conditions any benefit to a PC OEM or PC end user”.

Sounds all encompassing, however, reviewing provisions within the proposed consent agreement fails to address many Intel practices. Those are the classic antitrust practices that enable Intel too condition a benefit to purchases, to exclude competitors, to artificially maintain or raise consumer PC prices.

Conditional benefits that are addressed in proposal prevent;

a) Intel offering value rewards in exchange for exclusive PC OEM, partner and channel commitments on purchase requirements.

b) Intel bribes to PC OEMs for stalling out and/or discontinuing their competitive microprocessor based PC product introductions and platform developments.

c) Payoff’s to PC OEMs for blocking, countering, removing competitor component and product line tapers into what are primarily an OEM Intel PC product line up.

d) Withholding PC OEM incentive values when competitive components are incorporated in PC platform including branded to compliment Intel components in that platform.

e) To prevent Intel from focused targeting to eliminate a competitive component stronghold earned on competitor’s product technical merits.

f) To prevent Intel from selling any product or bundle of products below cost.

g) Limits Intel to 10 PC OEM relationships over next 10 years where only new product development investment can be tied exclusively to Intel component purchases.

h) Limits Intel to single bid focus and prevents conditioning any one bid on volume purchase using the leading attractor of progressive discounts on future purchases.

i) Forbids the progressive retroactive discount and sales reward; 1st Dollar and Loyalty Payments, for PC OEM kickback on unit, segment, product category, platform milestone attainments after the initial sale.

j) Forbids allocation of free units on milestone attainment; unless competitor is engaged in the exact same practice in anyone specific sales negotiation. With the sole exception of Intel 10% reward on no more than 10 maximum units; buy 10 get 1 free on the standard Intel VAR Boxed program.

k) Proposal here forward mandates Intel to a volume price discount schedule for real time orders at specific volume breaks.

Noteworthy, under Section IV B 3, any of the above conditional limits placed on Intel, are nullified, if Intel believes any of these forms of conditional benefits are being offered by a rival component supplier. And if every supplier chooses to utilize these restraints all can use them regardless of the terms of the proposed consent agreement. Proposed consent agreement does little to regulate industry ‘restraint free’ competition over the long term despite FTC placing Intel under up to 10 years of oversight administration.

Further proposed consent agreement addresses only upfront bribes and after the milestone forms of sales rebates and lump sum loyalty rewards. Under Section IV B 1, in fact, “Intel is not prohibited from conditioning benefits on sales terms not expressly prohibited by the order.” Only Dealer rewards that are retroactive after the milestone progressive rebates or discounts, or the upfront bribes and kickbacks designed too exclude competition in the here and now are included. On this kickback finding, by the way, GSA False Claims Act recovery is proven in part.

Docket 9341, similar to Docket 9288, again negates direct address on those forms of rebates with current and future time lag effects. Those supporting closed loop vertical value stream maintenance, program catalysts for multiple laterals of combination, the dual value rebated fee scheme, tied product channel throughput registering mechanisms including destructive Intel Inside tied charge back and preferred Dealer product bridging. All these forms of anticompetitive schemes raise rival costs and limit consumer choice. And their competitive address is deleted from Docket 9341 review and remedies. Proposal addresses commercial fraud but none of the long term antitrust causes of action.

In fact the proposal negates to address any of the causes or competition problems from Intel Dealership and Media Sales Agency throughout the entire period of Docket 9341 review. Except that under Part IV B 3c consent proposal does limit PC OEM Intel margin reward claims within one year of the purchase.

This addresses some of the real time future time effects, but none of the known limiting restraints, their causes and debilitating affects on competition and consumers. Docket 9341 avoids, in facts steers away from all of Intel Network’s standing Clayton Act, and Sherman Act Section One and Two per se condemnations of law. For a fiduciary oversight so obvious this analyst must ask why?

Nothing in the proposed consent agreement specifically prevents Intel implementation of real time future time ties within a one year period. That period is not in calendar, but a rolling period, that can then cross Intel product introductions leaving the springboard for margin values earned on last product generation to launch any number of next generation products. This has always been a traditional limiter associated with Intel Inside rebated fee tied charge back.

So nothing in the proposed consent agreement would prevent reemergence of the notoriously destructive Intel Inside vertical by horizontal sales tying and metering systems, their real time future time competitor concentration effects, network’s consumer manipulation techniques, costs and harms.

The real eye opener is that Docket 9341 proposed consent agreement addresses the commercial channel frauds, but none of the last decade’s traditional anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act or Clayton Act. And appears too skip entirely over anticompetitive conduct per se condemned by the Sherman and Clayton Act.

While upfront bribes and kickbacks are certainly a fraud, there is no Section 2 case precedent specifically condemning an 80% market share monopolist from buying the remaining 20% of a competitive duopolist’s market share with channel loyalty rewards, bribes and kickbacks. Since there has been no hearing on this specific Section 2 subject the task is left unaddressed and not complete. So why not address it in antitrust hearing?

On the other hand there is substantial precedent that vertical by horizontal combinations are per se illegal under Section 1. Including Intel novel forms of value tie’s associated with antitrust case precedent on sales agency. Intel Network matters show many of the vertical system restraints on lateral structure that transform laterals into an Intel horizontal dealing combination. Intel vertical by horizontal matrix of integrated Dealer’s cells who stream their Intel intra platform solutions to market in field effects.

Here’s where competition and commerce law can really evolve on these many Intel firsts. Firsts which are the gray areas of condemned marketing and sales practices from over one hundred years of competition case precedent. Which is why as a marketing practitioner antitrust law is interesting to me. It’s all about the gray areas of going to market. About when enterprise’s cross the competitive line of going to market or going in too racketeering together.

Beyond the presumed 9341 umbrella of intent to monopolize there has been no hearing. Absolutely zip of this proposed order addresses specific Sherman and Clayton Act condemnation’s which are many despite FTC claim of resolving on exclusive limits. And that too me is an astonishing statement on why Bureau of Competition, including Department of Justice, need to join up and go back to the negotiating table with Intel. Not necessarily to rework what has been agreed. But too extend on the agreement to the known situation’s whole remedies.

No where in Docket 9341 proposed consent agreement are consumer price fixing or the combined multi laterals of Intel Dealership and Media Sales Agency addressed. With the exception; Part IV B 8, where Intel may negotiate exclusive component sales where there has been extraordinary development assistance; minimum $50 million, for Intel new product segments only, and to no more than 2 customers per year over 10 years.

Thus the provision actually establishes the foundation for an entirely reborn form of Intel platform dealing group. And disregards Intel’s current and ongoing storage subsystem licensing and contract main board manufacturing deal’s which include exclusive provisions.

Like any conspiracy the scheme only requires 2 unique players operating in a vertical or horizontal relationship. Intel Dealers operating in horizontal combination have traditionally been a minimum of 3 PC OEM channel entry points tied to their respective Media Sales Agent channel exit points. Intel product volume passing across this channel bridge is what widens the Dealing Group to more participants operating across tied market laterals in accelerated Intel time. So in 24 months is Intel combination back in business?

From 1987 through 2008 docket 9341 research shows a minimum of 3 PC OEMs vertically conditioned by Intel into a horizontal combination tied vertically again to their lateral of Intel Sales Agent channels, including a media cartel, operating in combination with Intel and channel entry points. All are Intel Dealers.

Nothing in Docket 9341 addresses these facts. In fact, like Docket 9288, Intel Network again seems to be covering this up in Docket 9341 and that is the atrocity of enterprise network corruption.

Docket 9341 proposed consent agreement leaves Section 1 and 2 including per se violations unaddressed. Subsequently sufficient reason for Commissioner’s to deny consent proposal under Anti Trust Act § 5 in the consent proposal’s current form

Under Part IV B 3 consent proposal goes on to address conditional benefits Intel can provide relative to competitor product sales offerings.

a) Intel may offer benefits similar to competitor benefits on the same type and quantity of products competitor is offering that customer is wanting.

b) The sole differentiator being that Intel may offer no exclusivity clauses for purchase regardless of whether or not competitor’s product sales offer include exclusivity provision.

c) Intel cannot offer sales benefits attached to purchase for more than one year. No
provision is made for within year, rolling calendar, or across product generations.

d) Intel may condition bid on purchase for a minimum number of units only.

Under Part IV B 4, nothing in order prevents Intel from winning all of a customer’s business so long as the Intel offer meets the customer’s exact bid specification including volume with any discount break(s) spelled out in contract up front.

Sans the payola restraints outlawed in Part IV A, the Part IV B restrictions change very little the terms of Intel salesmanship vis-à-vis competitors. In fact moots the longest time and most relied upon competitor advantage.

That is selling customers the marginal utility value of a product that performs 5 to 10 % less than Intel product for 20 to 30% less than Intel price. Because under the terms of the proposed consent agreement Intel can now match that competitive price and benefit package without competitive question; unless there is a below cost question. And will competition again price below cost to complete?

Ironically the proposed consent agreement places competitors into less than a parity sales condition with Intel. Intel Network has placed competitors into Parity before where the P-Rating benchmark system is a foremost example. Intel Judo placing competitors in parity with Intel Network destroys competition in the marketplace. In this particular sales instance limiting competitive product sale’s differentiation to solely a technically superior performing product, or combination of products, for the same as the Intel price.

This appears quite rational of course. And is exactly what a remedy should address, that Intel cannot limit competitive sales of technically superior products with conditional sales benefits that impact competitive sales price performance. Yet, for this one concession in relation to all proposed concessions provided to Intel more than flattens the sales field in Intel’s favor. Essentially reversing a lot of what industry has learned about selling against Intel. And that is because Intel monopolization means Intel can always sell at a lower price and still be above the enterprise’s fixed cost to produce.

Intel price can always be used to eliminate most competitive product performance differentiators; especially when Intel offers a lower price regardless of competitor performance on any bundle of benefits.

On sales parity the supply chain has always chosen Intel on availability of supply, main board economies of production, brand recognition produced by Intel Inside, and Intel Inside tied charge back’s ability to throttle tied products down sales channels in network directed field effects.

On parity performance and a lower price Intel will always win the supply relationship.

On parity performance and equal price Intel will most always win the supply relationship.

On competitor superior performance and parity price against Intel anticompetitive restraints that are a real time future time tie, not remedied in Docket 9341, Intel Network has always won the supply relationship. It’s hard to beat Intel product routing in accelerated field effects. Especially when anticompetitive, extra economic costs on society and consumers are being hidden; masked in a network crime manipulation.

Intel manufacturing scale economies built up into the monopoly over 20 years of illegal market competition and sales practices cannot be eclipsed by any Intel competitor. In any one sales negotiation, Intel price can always be less than any of the plaintiffs and still above Intel’s average fixed cost; on a three month rolling basis as the proposal defines.

Leaving competitor’s only capable of competing on superior product performance that are their technical merit’s for the same Intel sales package price. Which is what plaintiffs seem too want. That a competitor who offers a technically superior product against Intel on performance merits; applications processing throughput, processor speed, low power, effective package/footprint, bundles and price, suffered from Intel exclusionary price schemes benefiting commercial channels of product integration and distribution. Where Intel commercial frauds exclude competitive products from competing on their technical merit’s within platform integration and distribution channels.

On superior competitor performance at Intel parity price, competitor may win the supply relationship. Dependent on if the PC OEM or IDM sees some long term, sustainable product category or segment performance and margin benefit from competitive component specification.

This is where the question of supply and allocation traditionally comes into play. For competitor survival against Intel this mean’s never spreading supply among the customer base too thin. Enterprise sustainability against Intel is always secured from the mass of the component company’s supporting constituency. Constituents including customers that are either above being bought by Intel or cannot be bought off by Intel.

The proposed consent agreements ‘parity sales’ clause is not a remedy where Intel price can always be less on monopoly scale, yet more then fixed cost. Or, where the truly destructive anticompetitive schemes not addressed in Docket 9341 are used by Intel lacking condemnation and control under the proposed consent agreement.

Plaintiffs have given up a lot in relation to solving some license, contract and sales disputes with Intel. That is by being placed into what can be less than sales parity. Including vulnerability too all the traditional antitrust schemes not addressed and not remedied within proposed consent agreement. So the question remains have enterprises, industries, consumers, States and Nations actually been protected by proposed consent agreement? This analyst believes partially, but not completely if FTC somehow voids their Congressional reason for competitive existence.

Conclusion

Has Bureau of Competition been misguided by some Intel influencers; within the B

ar? Some supposed witnesses or experts meant to reverse the obvious? Similar to Docket 9288 and Paul vs. Intel consumer class action, has Intel Network steered Docket 9341 remedies away from the major industry and consumer recoverable to the minor industrial foreseeable? Redirecting the antitrust case into a commercial frauds minor divergence? A way to address some fact’s while leaving many antitrust facts out.

And if Bureau of Competition needs help, join in. It’s well known that Intel Network will surround a group with influencers to get their way. Cognizance of Intel network manipulation techniques is always a learning hurdle for newbie’s to Intel Nation and Intel law. And that is to recover our Nation’s Law for everyone.

Recognizing the long time network market rig presents a professional hurdle for attorneys, and if for Bureau of Competition attorneys then let’s address that hurdle. By DOJ, Federal and State’s Attorneys joining in with FTC for competitive mass over Intel Networked.

With Bureau of Competition address on plaintiff’s fraud and contract disputes, FTC should move Docket 9341 to 1st amended complaint. Preparing for DOJ too enter the matter anticipating movement to hearing stage and criminal prosecution. For a RICO case why would there every have been any other way?

There is too much evidence now across the Weiss Lurie Stockholder Class Action, Paul Class Action, AMD vs. Intel and FTC Docket 9341 and 9288 that Intel Network has been influencing decisions to rig their way.

That can include the type of bar, jurist and witness manipulation known by this plaintiff personally. Cooperative, or under threat, or out of ignorance I do not know. But the repeating patterns from two decades of Intel Network influences continue to support this analysis.

Weiss Lurie could have entered into evidence Intel BOD documents indicating awareness of antitrust violations. Paul class action was aware of Intel Inside tied charge back including prior 14 months where this knowledge was again overlooked.

And negated too certify the Federal Government as class member despite Judge Farnam major IT participant requirement. AMD holds system structure, economic and RICO proofs but did not present them in their recent litigation with Intel.

Mismanaged, blown or thrown? How about insufficient mass and limited reference for competing against Intel Networked? Or has Intel worked everyone over?

So to recognize the needed Federal and State assistance too address the core of Docket 9341 Sherman, Clayton Act and RICO violations. That is Federal and State Attorney’s paralleling FTC. To take on portions of the case matter for discovery implementing toward complete set of remedies including righting the criminal harms and recovery of consumer antitrust financial harms.

For reasons stated herein Docket 9341 consent proposal should be accepted in part for plaintiffs sales remedies, but denied by Commissioners; sent back for further consumer harm and antitrust documentation and implementing on the antitrust remedies.

In current form proposed consent agreement on case facts omits harms leaving incomplete and non existent remedies which promote Intel market monopolization, system rigs, criminal concealment and consumer harms in violation of Section 5 of the Antitrust Act, the Sherman and Clayton Acts.

FTC, DOJ and States are responsible to resolve Intel Network crime. Sufficient Nations’ mass too forever resolve these Intel case matters for society, democracy and open market capitalism. Too remedy the debilitating states of Intel Nation. Too transform Intel into a responsible corporate citizen. A two page list of attachments follows.

Respectfully Submitted,

Mike Bruzzone, Camp Marketing

FBI Original Source of Intel Network RICO; 1996
FTC Invited field reporter Docket 9288, 1998-2000
CDOJ and NYDOJ first to report

1998, CDOJ lettered to work report; Intel Section 1 Framework 2000 –
SEC Notice; 2007
U.S. Attorney NCD recognized FCA Relator; 2008
FTC voluntary analyst Docket 9341; under Labor Code 3363.5; 2009

Exhibits in Attachment -

Bruzzone Project Capability & Resume

FTC Syllabus of Intel primary and secondary case research;
Assessment and Models of Technical Business Systems

To SEC, Senate, Congress, State AGs, States Attorneys. FTC, FBI. DOJ, White House
Intel Corporation Competition Case Update of July 4, 2010

Journalism Oversight for Democracy Prerequisite; August 2010 (follows in this word doc)

To States Attorneys, State AGs, Senate, Congress, FTC, FBI. DOJ, White House
Intel Corporation Competition Case Update of September 30, 2009

To State AGs, Senate, Congress, ACLU, FTC, DOJ, FBI. CIA. HLS, White House
Intel Corporation Competition Case Update of March 11, 2009

To FTC Commissioners, Senate, Congress, State AGs, FTC
Intel Competition Case Update of October 15, 2008

To NAAG, Senate, FBI, CIA, FTC, SEC, Congress
Intel Corporation Competition Case Update for Media Version; November 1, 2007

FTC acknowledgement Bruzzone’s Intel Antitrust Notice; January 1, 2007.

To Senate, Department of Justice, State AGs, CIA, HLS, ACLU, Joint Chiefs, BOD Semiconductor Industry Association, Competition Case Update of November 1, 2001

To National Association of Attorney Generals; February 27, 2001
For FTC; Intel Discovery, Invention, Adaptation, Application, Connection; August 2000

For FTC; Antitrust compliance of anticompetitive activity; August 2000
CDOJ lettered to Intel case work report by Chief Assistant AG; March 21, 2000

To Department of Justice Notice November 11, 1999 and February 1, 2000

FTC acknowledgement Bruzzone Docket 9288 Public Comment; May 19, 1999

For FTC; Docket 9288 Remedy Intel System anticompetitive practices; April 1, 1999

To FTC Morgan / Bresnahan expert proofs; August 23, 1999

For FTC Intel Structural Manipulation, Component Jugular, Integrated / Disintegrated, Porter expert proof; March 12, 1999

To CDOJ on system structure identification of Intel horizontal dealer combination; March 9, 1999

For FTC Network effect is like a magnet; March 5, 1999

CDOJ acknowledgement Bruzzone report of Intel competition violations, 12/1/1998

Intel BOD acknowledgement; cease and desist anticompetitive conduct and Federal Reporter Tampering, Barrett Receipt Confirmed; 9/9/1998. Intel Confidential Document Subject to Protective Order #12050DOC00076.

Intel BOD acknowledgement; cease and desist anticompetitive conduct and Federal Reporter Tampering, Moore Receipt Confirmed; 9/1/1998. Intel Confidential Document Subject to Protective Order #12050DOC00078.

FTC acknowledgement Bruzzone correspondence to Messrs. Pitofksy, Lin; 9/22/1998
NYDOJ acknowledgement Bruzzone report of Intel competition violations; 8/17/1998
One of two in time period.

Intel contract for Bruzzone too provide Intel description of anticompetitive conduct experienced in field; 8/8/1997.

Intel production noting “Intel Capital has home bugged” 9/7/? Intel Confidential Subject to Protective Order

Bruzzone 1st FBI report; Intel anticompetitive practices, espionage, retaliation 10/11/96

Bruzzone AMD Internal marketing document Intel Inside market barrier; May 20, 1996.
Intel Confidential Document Subject to Protective Order #12052DOC00549, 550, 551.""

Why is the FTC Protecting Intel Corp.?

More Information at www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

posted here by
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
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Intel FTC - Statement From Mike Bruzzone FTC TA Operating in Civic Service Capacity. Intel Docket 9341

2010-09-07T20:23:00.001-07:00

Intel FTC

"" September 7, 2010

To: Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger

Fm: Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing
FTC TA Operating in Civic Service Capacity

Re: FTC v Intel Docket 9341 Public Comment
Nation Interest Publication version 3.12

Here's my FTC v Intel 9341 public comment.

You may have noticed Intel, and the Intel Communications herd, quickly followed August 4, 2010 FTC announcement of finalizing 9341 Proposed consent agreement . . . as the confirmed settlement.

Which of course is not true pending Commissioner public comment review, and then potential ratification of proposed consent agreement in all or part.

I believe the consent agreement will be accepted in part and denied in part.

Honest, even for me from industry, I have never witnessed Intel comms spreading so much disinformation so quickly on August 4.

Also believe Senate and Congressional Committee's on Commerce are watching this outcome; as a potential regulatory breakdown. We'll get to see just how with it, or out of it, Wash DC is with this outcome. We know it bad . . . but can it show worse?

If the proposal is not accepted . . . that is a hopeful indicator toward governance & regulatory fiduciary responsibility

Obviously the FTC had a hand in this misrepresented settlement pitch. A little premature for Chairman Leibowtiz, Counsel Brill and Bureau of Competition Director Feinstein to be swept up with Intel Network to position the matter as settled . . . when in fact settlement is pending Commissioner ratification and they all know this . . .

There's an FTC video of the August 4 proposed consent agreement press conference . . . and oh was that an Intel celebration.

Perhaps the Chairman is a little bite more cunning?

Perhaps Intel Network and comms herd are about to experience a severe conceptual discontinuity; Commissioner non acceptance of consent order as proposed.

That would be fateful twist.

And I would think spark the legitimate press to lead in legitimate counterpoint response.

Mike Bruzzone

Summary Overview of 9341 proposed consent agreement; attached in full:

That entering into Bureau of Competition Docket 9341 proposed consent agreement with Intel Corporation would enable continued monopolization and non address of standing violations of Federal Law including antitrust, commerce and trade, racketeering, penal and securities law by the Federal Trade Commission.

Proposed consent agreement should be partially accepted for plaintiff sales relief and partially denied for antitrust omissions.

Chartered to act under the laws of the Unites States Bureau of Competition Docket 9341 negotiated settlement proposal in current form is insufficient on antitrust environmental circumstances of fact, discovery, law precedent and Commission fiduciary responsibilities.

And should be sent back to the negotiating table where the future of democratic capitalism and civil society are truly at stake.

We cannot overlook all the major Intel Network System crimes or the fiduciary and governance breakdowns which proposed order omits.

Including seven of the most hideous system crime categories;

1) Vertical by horizontal tying.

2) Intel multiple laterals of combination.

3) Intel tied charge through channels metering devices.

4) Intel Corporate plus Media tied sales attraction.

5) Network political & jurist multipoint and consumer manipulations.

6) Intel Insider Quanda stock and market rigging systems.

7) Microsoft OS horizontally tied by OEM license to Intel below cost product.

These seven categories of Intel systems deliver debilitating tendencies.

System, social, and financial consequence’s on competition, enterprise, industry, regulatory, law enforcement and protection, political body, Nation’s stability, financial markets and capital creation potential.

And continue to perpetuate hurdles in the way of system remedies from over 18 years of not owing up to many Intel and Microsoft Antitrust Violations, and concealing PC Media system crimes that have destroyed industries, competition and legitimate governance functions.

Accordingly back too the negotiating table. Docket 9341 should proceed too FTC hearing stage focused on Sherman Act Section 1 and 2 per se condemnations of law known under Section 5 umbrella which is Docket 9341.

FTC Focus -

1) Competitor limiting by vertical restraints for multiple laterals of combination.

2) Limited by horizontal contract in combinations including conspiracy to conceal.

3) In combinations cartel routing & price fixing raising consumer PC price by 6%.

4) In combinations monopoly price impact on consumers from media manipulation.

5) Validate recovery for consumer monopoly price, routing & price fixing harms.

Finally, for Docket 9341 in hearing too verify the criminal components of these competition case matters in proceeding transcript for Department of Justice timely follow on complaint;

DOJ Focus -

1) Recovering consumer monopoly price, product routing and price fixing harms.

2) Prosecuting competition, commercial frauds and racketeering that are criminal

components of the FTC Docket 9341 competition case violation’s themselves.

SEC Focus –

1) Documenting Accounting Fraud and with DOJ prosecuting Stock Market Rig.

In Summary -

Any ruling away from complete documentation of Docket 9341 case facts, in open proceedings, would deny the United States, American People, elected representatives in Congress and Senate the knowledge reference to act on the complete set of case facts.

Complete assessment of proposed order and included oversight clauses attached.

Regards,

Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing Consultancy ""

Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission - In the Matter of Intel Corporation FTC Docket 9341

See Link Below for More Information
http://www.ceopaulotellini.com/2010/09/commissioners-of-federal-trade.html

www.CEOpaulOtellini.com
my Blog on Intel Corruption

Intel FTC

FTC 9341

Intel Conspiring with FTC? Intel Communications is Spreading "DisInformation" Right Now as Fast As Possible?

2010-09-07T19:50:00.001-07:00

Why? is it is to affect the Fall FTC Changes?

Intel FTC

Pompous Ass CEO Paul Otellini Yaps about Job Creation at the Apen Forum...

2010-09-01T22:06:00.000-07:00

CEO Paul Otellini knows How to Get Er' Done and he is Letting the US President Have it.. See the way to Create JOBS... you See is to Murder Inventors, Steal Technology... Create a Cartel.. a Technology Monopoly.. Now that is the Intel Nation way.

See at iNtel Nation... the way to Stimulate the Economy is to Buy off Judges, Settle in Secret Rooms for Big Money, Steal Trillion Dollar Technology such as the Iviewit Technology, Buy off Attorneys, Pay off SEC Investigators, Pay Lobbyists, Pay Politicians, Constantly Buy off or STOMP out Competition, Threaten and Ruin the Lives of FTC Investigators, Rig the Market, Participate in Insider Trading... Make deals with Gateway and Dell... Lie Cheat and Steal.. Make Consumers and Shareholders pay for Intel Nation CEO's to GET filthy RICH.. and well.. can't hurt to have connections inside the SEC, control District and Federal Court Judges and well RULE THE WORLD...

Look at the Investigative Report at www.CEOpaulOtellini.com - look at www.BruceSewell.com These guys are all in bed together and JOB creation is NOT their Game.. Corruption, Cartel, Evil, Monopolies, Economic Terrorism.. and in some cases attempted murder.. now that Job Creation at the SUPERPOWER known as Intel Nation..

Intel is Corrupt... and Above the Laws that Smaller Companies say with hundreds of million and not Billions... well they have to obey the Anti-Trust Laws.. BUT not the Intel Mafia...

So CEO Paul Otellini - YOU Arrogant Ass - STOP blowing Smoke.. you are CORRUPT and your kind of Job Creation is Deadly, Life Ruining, Competition Stomping and WE pay the Price.. Enough is Enough ... your Government Agencies.. the SEC, FBI, FTC, DOJ and more KNOW full well of the CRIMES of Intel and can do nothing for Intel is a Super Power.. Read the Report .. Don't Believe Me. .anyone that Can Read Can prove the GUILT of Intel..

Here is the Latest Yap from the
Pompous Ass Paul Otellini CEO of Intel Nation.

"At the Aspen Forum this week, Intel CEO Paul Otellini blasted the Obama administration for not understanding "what it takes to create jobs."

"I think this group does not understand what it takes to create jobs," CNET reports the CEO as saying. "And I think they're flummoxed by their experiment in Keynesian economics not working."

Otenelli's remarks thrust him into a growing crowd of chief executives who have publicly doubted or outright slammed the Obama administration's economic policies.

As the midterm elections approach, this powerful interest group has ramped up its attacks on the White House.

And as they compare the administration to communists or to Hitler, some of America's CEOs are starting to sound more like, well, politicians. "

Source of Quote
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/26/ceos-anti-obama_n_695405.html

Oh and "Ramps up Attacks" on the White House .. what a Crock. .the Whitehouse ... PROTECTS iNtel NaTion.. so don't believe that YAP either !!!

More on Iviewit's Stolen by Intel Technology

www.Iviewit.TV

www.DeniedPatent.com

posted here by
Investigative Blogger
Crystal L. Cox

Intel Corrupt

2010-08-28T15:36:00.001-07:00

Intel FTC

Intel FTC 9341

Are Intel Dealers and Publishing Agents Cheating on their Organic Probabilities?

2010-08-27T15:26:00.001-07:00

"Statistical Analysis of Intel intra platform product routing by Dealer computer brand model in International Data Group’s PC World Top PC Sales Racket follows.

Note: Post rebated fee year 2008 level market high = 233%; market average = 166%."

Graphs and Details at www.BruceSewell.com on Top of Blog

" Statistical analysis reveals some Intel dealers and publishing agents are cheating their organic probabilities.

That is by placing more of certain Intel Inside branded PCs for sale given their known high level of commission values waiting media release from dealer rebate fee pools accumulating for Intel Insider charge back.

The Media Agent’s sales reward is paid for moving computer brand models to consumer from stocks and discharging their effect on the supply system in exchange for the charge back value.

Through this function Media Sales Agent register Intel product movement from Dealer stocks reporting back to Intel for their ‘metered’ sales reward; the commission.

Method 2 on Media Agent Percentage of Total Editor’s Choice Awards

Statistical Analysis of Editor’s Choice skew on intra platform product routing by Dealer Computer Brand Model, April 1987 through August 2008, in the Bill Ziff Davis Cartel, PC Magazine, PC Sales Racket:

Please consider PC Dealer Analysis using Method 1; for PC Magazine; PC Company comparison solely on product review space, allocated to 48 companies across 104 issues.

Frequency of product review space placement mean average is 0.02083.

Time Period is February 2000 through August 2008.

Above, comparing skew on Editors Choice to space allocation reveals Intel Dealing Group, tied by the charge back, to PC Magazine Media Sales Agent channel.

Findings from Decomposition of Intel Economics

Decomposing components of the Intel Economics Simulation has revealed a number of hidden aspects concerning Intel’s business, the PC Dealing Combination and Media Cartels who are and have been Intel’s primary business partners.

First, Intel's primary business is not the microprocessor or compute platform business. Intel's primary business is selling product routes that PC Companies bid on and
Media Sales Agent’s determine their future case flows on.

Obviously this form of racketeering restrains inter brand computer and PC platform, and x86 microprocessor price competition, and is a per se illegal under the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Title 48 pursuant to GSA procurement including the 1986 anti kick back Act.

The power of Intel to fix the price of the product which it manufacturers with a tied charge back, which broker dealers and agents scramble to benefit from, and to whom all have been and are actual or potential competitors is a powerful inducement to abandon competition.

Active and vigorous competition then tends to be impaired, not from any preference of the end buyer for an Intel microprocessor based computer, but from the preference of Intel broker dealers and agents to accrue the benefits of a tied rebate matched by that broker dealer, and charged back to Intel, for payment to media agents on every future computer sale.

This analyst believes on the weight of findings, FTC Docket 9341 First Amended Complaint will add forms of Intel price fixing to government current claims.

Precariously, some individuals within FTC might also now be threatened by Intel Network; to bury the case and its anticipated affirmative outcomes.

When Intel Network has a history of hooligans sent in to remind competitors how to compete, and for this Docket 9341 case, the post FTC employment and Bar potentials of either competing, or not competing with Intel Network.

Second, the Quanda is relied upon by Intel PC Dealers to determine which Intel microprocessor product routes to bid on given Intel searching for highest price taker.

Savvy procurement can use the Quanda to simulate the optimum microprocessor routes to
jockey purchases given their revenue, margin potential and Intel retrospective sales rewards including the sales system tying charge back value.

Third, horizontal competitors operating under a Cournet economic assumption rely on the Quanda for determining their Nash equilibrium; which isn't under Intel methods of selling at and less then Average Fixed Cost.

Nor does an oligopoly welfare space exist in many Intel microprocessor production short runs.

Fourth, Intel media sales agents including the Bill Ziff Davis Cartel used the model to calculate their revenue and sales commissions from Intel and PC Dealers; retrospectively, up to two years in advance.

Media knows values misrepresented in Intel and Dealer financials as Intel Inside marketing expense are 100% recoverable by them; as a sales commission for pushing computers onto consumers for the Intel Inside tied kickback.

As they did very successfully for 15 years until the model disintegrated under Intel production constraints and a distribution channel reconfiguration. Approximately 2005/6 Intel Inside tied charge back morphs into the first Dollar discount scheme. First dollar discount values also need to be calculated.

The $22.657 billion Intel Insides tied charge back value from January 1, 1999 through program end in 2006/7 remains fully recoverable by FTC. Intel Inside tied charge back is addressed within Docket 9341 claims, discounts & rebates, for whom this analyst is the FTC documented original source.

By FTC Record this analyst is also believed original source concerning some Intel benchmark rigging claims addressed in Docket 9341.

Where this analyst was previously responsible for designing patches that worked around some rigged benchmark’s in efforts with PC User Groups across the country; as a Cyrix, NexGen, AMD and IDT Centaur employee or consultant.

This includes Docket 9288 field reports concerning Intel run time benchmark rig and PC User group work around. ""

Full Document and Source:
www.CEOpaulOtellini.com
on Top of Site...

Information by
Mike Bruzzone
Intel Case Technical Analysis since 1996
Camp Marketing Consultancy

posted Here by
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger

Got an Intel Insider Trading TIP?
Have you Been Threatened by Intel ?
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

FTC in Intel Settlement Talks; before July 22? Intel Closed Door Settlements with the FTC? Intel Executive Amnesty???

2010-08-27T14:56:00.001-07:00

"FTC in Intel Settlement Talks; before July 22?

Please be advised this analyst is opposed to Intel closed door settlement with FTC on or before July 22; transparency being at issue.

Commissioners and discovery team know RICO, Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 per se violations are documented.

This analyst encourages the September hearing proceed accordingly for full disclosure, full remedies, consumer recovery which is a core value of the FTC’s charter.

Advantageously and for hearing efficiency, all Section 2 Rule of Reason claims lacking specific per se condemnation precedent, can be reviewed between the Section 1 and RICO Proofs, without fear of FTC 9341 overall case loss.

Including waste of Federal financial and manpower resource, further, that FCA has already been won on weight of evidence and is itself capable of recovering a portion, if not all, FTC 9341 litigation costs.

This analyst believes it important that every American know how to spot competition espionage occurring in the work place in real time, how to report in real time, how to resolve in real time and not over 18 year’s time as in my case.

In this continuing case of Intel Monopoly analysis, meant for FTC and DOJ discovery, leadership, error correction, law augments, inter Nation competition policy evolution, Intel Network, system and structural improvement, RICO and competition remedies and consumer recoveries.

In addition financial recovery of the economic damages for all targets harmed and pushed under by Intel Network, including in the Docket 9288 case obstruction are required under Intel’s DOJ antitrust compliance obligations.

That is for Intel and Network Executive Amnesty and or immunity from maximum antitrust and RICO damages. This would seem to include those associated with FTC Docket 9341.

I’d presume Intel is Participating in reversing the frame and fraud associated with Docket 9288 obstruction.

Alternatively in the face of a known obstruction in the administration of justice which includes witness tampering, fraudulent construction and white wash, the Docket 9341 clock could be reset to June 11, 1991.

June 11, 1991 is the inception of the Intel Insider Scheme enabling a complete Intel monopoly consumer recovery.

Pursuant to Docket 9341, I am concerned that $72 billion dollars in monopolization have been calculated.

And that the worldwide consumer recoverable from Intel tied charge back, and monopoly price of up to $42 billion, will be left un-recovered or left on the negotiating table in any FTC closed door Docket 9341 settlement.

Our knowing this fact of the consumer recoverable, legitimately, consumers are due their return from Intel and Network members.

The history of Intel class actions suggests any privately litigated consumer class action will be blown or settled on disproportionate values too harms.

This attorney opinion is supported by historical evaluation, including attorneys who would take the FCA, if not for their knowledge of the history of Intel market rigging, the various corporate political, time trap and litigation hurdles.

Intel Network adverse litigation for year’s has been sand bagged, blown, thrown and settled on minor causes with slim remedies and minor financial recovery in relation to harms. Here our countries history of private antitrust litigation ends until attorneys who would risk toughest corporate, political, legal and judicial hurdles resolves itself.

FTC and DOJ can restart that tradition of private antitrust litigation with full Intel Network disclosures, monopoly encompassing remedies and recoveries, where world wide consumer recoveries are due consumers including the Federal government.

Bursting boilers and the Federal Power, Garrison Dam Disaster and the Federal Power, Bar Pilots and the Federal Power, Finance & Securities Disaster and Federal Power, broken oil well valves and the Federal Power, broken regulatory & the Federal Power; fixing broken Intel and the Federal Power, transparently, offers the potential for one of Intel’s greatest legacies.

A cornerstone on which willing members of Bar and Bench, and corporate entities, will see and take action regulation seriously. Lacking Bar and Bench free from corporate political network control, I fear broken regulatory will remain.

A functional regulatory, Bar & Bench, are required first lines of monopoly and rackets error detection and correction.

Pursuant to FCA, I will be requesting Congress and/or President Obama please assign a Federal attorney for qui tam representation.

A case to whom I am recognized Relator and hold the U.S. Attorney recovery reward letter, having been steward for many years before and following my official Relator status.

No legitimate private attorney will take the case in the face of the market rig.

Fifth, finance and investment bankers use Quanda model, with price projection tools, to model Intel revenue and margins; like media retrospectively, to play the stock up to two years in advance.

Sixth, Intel inside individual stock traders can do the same thing as I’ve demonstrated to FTC and U.S. DOJ.

Seventh, the Intel Quanda on mass weight of use, retrospectively, extended Intel’s x86 and PC market rigs to the NASDAQ; including in relation to other exchanges.

Think about it, Intel Insider ability to play the stock of Intel and PC Dealers up to two years in advance is an extreme catalyst to rig not only individual stock prices, but the NASDAQ index itself.

The Quanda was used to rig markets;
Intel had DOJ 1st report responsibility.

Eight, combination and cartel proofs exist throughout Intel economic and system structural proofs. Structural proofs are easily deciphered from their component patterns and prove intent to monopolize per se. No other conduct proofs are required.

Nine, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are well aware of the Section 1 per se condemnations, Section 2 per se intent, RICO, Quanda and its reliance by Intel Network as one of their many market rigging tools.

Ten, for FTC there is no risk of Docket 9341 case loss where all Section 2 Rule of Reason claims concerning access to Intel component taper, Intel benchmark rigging, false statements to Federal procurement by Intel, Dealers and Agents concealing fraudulent and monopoly costs assessed on the Federal Government computer payment claims.

All can be heard within the bracket; Section 1 structure, Section 2 intent and RICO proofs. Please consider one of multiple proofs below:

In the RICO proof below, find partial classic Intel Xeon Tanner and Xeon Copper mine economic analysis. Playing signaling revealed by the Quanda, savvy PC Dealers were informed to stick with the quasi static equilibrium and back eddy offered by Xeon Tanner, and to avoid being washed over the falls that is Xeon Cascades.

Cascades is the Intel desktop microprocessor Copper mine 256, repackaged as a high performance Xeon server product at monopoly price premium and for dumping onto AMD. Xeon Cascades was not a high performance product and by June 2000 main board suppliers serving the broker system market, had rejected it, causing Intel to cancel its retail boxed version of the Cascade product line. Cascade’s was then left to sell through Intel primary Dealer channels.

Please note that AMD Opteron code names; Sledge Hammer and Claw Hammer, follow in response to Intel Network notice of Tanner signaling and pending Cascade predatory product dumping. Dumping is relied on by Intel a lot.

Strategically to stop current competitive product flows in channels or to make it unprofitable for competitors to enter that product category.

Full Document and Source:
www.CEOpaulOtellini.com
on Top of Site...

Information by
Mike Bruzzone
Intel Case Technical Analysis since 1996
Camp Marketing Consultancy

posted Here by
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Got an Intel Insider Trading TIP?
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Tom Dunlop and Bruce Sewell were Intel Chief Counsels when Analysts were PAID off to STOP Telling the Truth. Obstruction of Justice? ya Think?

2010-08-27T14:43:00.001-07:00

More Turning up on the Corruption and Back Room, Dark Alley Deeds of Bruce Sewell.

Tom Dunlop and Bruce Sewell were Chief Counsels at Intel.

Tom Dunlop and Bruce Sewell involved in Suppressing the Truth, Manipulating Investigators, Covering up Technology Theft, and "offering" settlements to SHUT up Truth Tellers.

No Big Surprise as the Corrupt Bruce Sewell knew of the Trillion Dollar Technology Theft of the Iviewit Technology, and Bruce Sewell is Now the General Counsel for Apple Computers. Bruce Sewell is Corrupt, tons of Proof.. Guess Money can Buy pretty Much Anything Right Bruce Sewell ?

Was Bruce Sewell and Tom Dunlop involved in Constructed Fraud, Obstruction of Justice and Witness Tampering in in FTC Docket 9288 ?

Got a Tip on the Dirty Deeds of Tom Dunlop and Bruce Sewell ?
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Has Intel Corp. Stripped you of Your Title, Kept you From Getting Work and Forced you into Economic Hardship ? Has Intel Corp. Cronies Framed YOU ? Email me Your Tip...
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

I have not been able to find work since and their continuing to strip me financially. There are signs that I am still being framed over and over again.

What do you know aobut Corrupt or Dirty Deeds from Intel Cronies McManus Faulkner Law? Got a Tip on McManus Faulkner Law ?

Has McManus Faulkner Law BLOCKED you from
Decision Makers inside the Intel Corporation?

Has a Corrupt Court found you guilty of contacting Bruce Sewells Secretary, or emailing Intel and Set You up for ANY Reason.. ??

Has am Intel Security Operator threatened you, interfered with information... ??? What did Bruce Sewell Do to YOU before he went on to be the Corrupt General Counsel for APPLE?

Does the Intel Corp. Board know how bad things Really are ? I mean surely they know so why do they Do Nothing? Is the Intel Board afraid of Economic Terrorism, their Career Ruined, Set Ups, Jail Time, Death of them or a Family member...??? Got a Tip - Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Why Won't Intel Corp. Except their fiduciary responsibilities in resolving the issues they know full well they are guilty of?

Do Rogue Security Operators at Intel Corp. Actual Attempt to Murder
in order to Silence the TRUTH... ??

Intel Manipulation Techniques are Well Known
and Far Reaching and Well ~ You Lose.

Attempted Murder of Truth Telling Analysts??? Gee Intel Would NOT Do that .. Now Would THEY.. a Mean Trillions of Dollars.. Some GUY.. ah .. well. .. hmm.. Intel Collateral Damage...

So Bruce Sewell Time to Come Clean on ALL the Dirty Deeds you Were Involved in as the Intel General Counsel ...

Just a Curiousity Really... but What Say you Steve Dowling, bigtime APPLE PR guy?

What kind of Spin would Super Duper Steve Dowling put on this Story should ANY real media exist that would dare to cover the TRUTH on Intel Nation ???

Proof Of Insider Stock Trading? Surely the SEC does NOT know about THIS?

2010-08-27T14:04:00.004-07:00

SEC - FTC - DOJ - Judges - State Attorney General - and more.. they DO know ..

I think that whenever they need some Xtra Cash... IN MY OPINION.. they just initiate an Intel Lawsuit then Settle.. and WELL you.. the Little People. .the Millionaires.. the Investors.. the Good Attorneys.. the Taxpayers. .the Analysts and Investigators... ahhh Shucks.. WELL your Just Collateral Damage...

So What's this About PROOF of Insider Trading at Intel
and Well RICO Proof and ....

" Quantitative Model confirms RICO Proof of Intel Insider Stock Trading.

In analyzing the economics of Intel Production Short Runs for FTC, this analyst has been decomposing the components of an Intel insider stock trading tool.

Recomposed components of the tool yield a rudimentary Intel Economics Simulation.

The tool requires one quasi public, and one public signal, that when filtered together enable the inside trader to estimate changes in Intel’s revenue and margin out into the future.

And can specifically be used to estimate Intel Profit Margin ahead into future time; for playing the stock price, INTC.

Input to perform the necessary economics calculations to Play the Stock are supplied by the quasi public signal from Micro Design Resource; which are Intel Quarterly Microprocessor quantities estimated two years into future time.

The public signal is Intel change in price notices which are widely publicized in business, finance and trade news sources; including New York Times, PC Week, CNET, Register and other hard copy and web publications.

Who knew they were more then simply Intel Price Announcements?

Intel change in price notices have traditionally been released to the public audience, trade and Intel supply channels 90 days ahead of the actual price changes taking affect.

This lag effect gives the Intel Inside Stock Trader a 90 day window for recalculating change in Intel revenues and profit margins for playing the stock. And can be accomplished simply with two inputs; price change calculated against Micro Design Resource quantities estimated into future time.

Typically the Inside Trader could Project Intel Revenue and Margin Value 3 months ahead on Intel Advance Notice of changes in Microprocessor Prices.

Periodically, public notice of Intel price change has been shorter then 3 months.

And multiple price changes have occurred within some
Intel Quarterly Production periods under analysis.

Mr. Gwennap who is principle analyst and proprietor of Micro Design Resource (MDR), raised concerns on his perceived misuse of MDR Intel production estimates, by the investment banking community, to this analyst in 2001.

Mr. Gwennap provided the Intel Production Estimates on which this analyst has decomposed the Quanda against Intel 1,000 piece stated price.

Resulting in a tool for retrospectively playing Intel Corporation Stock Price and for calculating monopoly costs and consumer harms based on change in quarterly revenue and margin potential.

Several questions exist concerning future time Micro Design Resource estimate of Intel microprocessor quantities on wafer dice estimates.

First are they purely an MDR estimate of Intel production capability?

Second, might estimates be Intel’s actual production forecast passed to MDR for industry publication?

Third, if purely MDR estimates were quantities confirmed by Intel end of quarter, as quarterly PC shipments are confirmed by PC Companies to PC industry analysts?

Fourth, how accurate are the MDR estimates? Fifth, and the wild card, are estimates fictitious designed by late 1990’s MDR owner, the Bill Ziff Davis Publishing Company, purely to lead and pump the stock price?

Micro Design Resource estimates of Intel Production are widely accepted as accurate.

Given the best price projection and economic tools Intel Inside Traders can calculate change in Intel revenue and margin, by microprocessor product line, and from the outcome play the stock on quarterly financial outcomes up to two years into the future.

I have no doubt all major trading houses knew of the Quanda, including Robertson Stephens, and were running this software simulation on Intel Xeon Servers performing similar exchange calculations and financial simulations.

Noteworthy the Quanda is also how Media Sales Agents calculated their future revenue flows from Intel Network.

Retrospectively, the Quanda enables the Media Sales Agent to calculate their Intel Inside charge back flows from Intel Combine up to two years into the future.

On this cash flow projection media based their Intel product production plan; the amount of Intel dedicated page space, Dealer PC product reviews and sales coverage.

The Quanda can also be used to estimate advance PC company revenues and margins; specifically Intel Dealers; Dell, Gateway, others by extending the simulations inputs to two additional public signals.

Those Signals are sales space invested by Ziff Davis, IDG and other publications on PC product coverage and review pages.

Media Sales Agents push computer brand models known to carry the highest value Intel Inside charge backs.

Media focuses on skimming these Intel and Dealer values through their focused PC review coverage.

Intel product allocation to Dealers can be estimated by the specific weight of PC Company Brand models that Media Agents push onto consumers in real time.

Two metrics can be used for determining which Dealer’s computer brand models Media Sales Agents are pushing onto consumers for their Intel ‘tied charge’ kick back.

The best metric here shown in PC World analysis, below, is purely the page space allocated to any one Dealer’s PC brand model product reviews.

With this method there is no subjectivity associated with Editorial Accolade, the sole determinants being Media Sales Agent cost of page space and kick back revenues on this investment in Intel Dealership.

The second metric is more subjective, harder to prove as a stand alone indicator, potentially much more evil from the standpoint of an affront to journalism.

That is when the Media Sales Agent begins skewing Editor’s Choice and similar Product Awards to Dealer’s brand models.

This tactic is relied upon for accelerated sales and major capture of the Intel tied charge back. Note that Media Sales Agents compete with one another for total kick back values associated from anyone Intel production short run.

For the purpose of this analysis that charge back value is always 3% (times 2; one half representing Intel Kick Back, the other is Dealer half representing charge back trigger) calculated against Intel total revenues from anyone production short run. ""

Full Document and Source:
www.CEOpaulOtellini.com
on Top of Site...

Information by
Mike Bruzzone
Intel Case Technical Analysis since 1996
Camp Marketing Consultancy

posted Here by
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Got an Intel Insider Trading TIP?
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Intel Corp. Owes Consumers Lots of Money - Monopoly Price Premiums. Intel Planned Economy..

2010-08-27T13:21:00.000-07:00

SEC, U.S. Senate, Congressional Committees, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys, FTC have ALL been Notified of Intel Corps. Crimes.

"" Consumer Recovery Subset 2; Monopoly Price Premiums -

The remaining 15% consumer subset recovery of $3.785 billion is associated with personal computer end buyers paying a monopoly price premium on some Intel PC purchases.

That percent of product, one Intel product generation to the next, where consumers paid a monopoly price for the microprocessor above the monopoly competitive or equilibrium price. Which means computer’s containing the latest and greatest Intel microprocessors.

Computer’s featuring the highest speed, or most microprocessor cores, or the highest combination of performance and power savings in a notebook model. Microprocessors typically offered in the high performance computer brand models within Intel Dealer PC product lines. But can also be associated with computers containing Intel value priced microprocessors.

$3.785 billion dollar sum is conservative and advantages Intel on analysis which uses average price on quantities. Using preferred average weighted price across product types, the monopoly price premium can grow.

Infra marginal product, that which Intel makes least of and charges most for, offers highest end buyer recovery potential for these small short lots of monopoly priced microprocessors.

Product associated with Intel new microprocessor and new PC product introductions displaying patterns of 1st degree price discrimination, exclusive dealing, the raising of microprocessor price following predatory price moves designed to monopolize markets and to stop channel sales flows of competitor’s products.

Competitors include x86 microprocessor horizontal competitors including AMD, chip set & graphic vertical rivals and compliments, like VIA and nVidia, other x86 and inter platform computers and some PC platform replacements.

One of the consumer monopoly price premium examples -

Below find partial economic analysis from the Intel Planned Economy; Pentium 3 risk production code name Katmai, 0.25 micron lithography, 450 to 600 MHz clock speeds.

Katmai average weighted price is calculated on Intel 1,000 piece price and Micro Design Resource quantities on speed splits.

Micro Design Resource quantity estimates are long time and widely accepted by technology, finance and media industries who are Intel customers, stake holders and stockholders.

MDR Estimates are in fact the intra industry regulator itself, that was made into an inter industry sales game by Intel Network.

For Katmai, economic analysis below reveals $300,990,000 in consumer loss from paying a monopoly price greater than $450 for first quarter’s production of 1,905,000 units.

Monopoly competitive equilibrium price is $363 which suggests a monopoly deadweight cost of up to $400,106,000 on second quarter production of 5,438,000 units.

Run down quantities are less than $363, with end of run quantities priced $262 down to $178; are between average total and average fixed costs.

No below fixed cost production is recorded for this specific desktop microprocessor short run. Although quantity and revenue difference in analyst and MDR Intel estimated shut down points are raised.

Foremost, consumer monopoly price premium of $300,900,000 and $764,517,480 in Intel Inside charge back values are recorded. Charge back values represent matching halves of the Intel and PC Dealer tie passed through to Media Sales Agents.

In this estimate at 3% each on Intel total production revenue’s of $12,741,958,000. The specific percentage pass through value is defined contractually within the Intel Inside contract agreement between Intel, Dealers and Media Sales Agents.

An evolutionary series of guidelines concerning tied charge back I’ve encouraged FTC to discovery for a decade now.

Katmai analysis is not a proof, but a pointer to two consumer losses totaling $1,065,417,480 for FTC Docket 9341 discovery.

Findings from this analyst are passed on by FTC to Intel, for Intel rebuttal. So what has FTC learned from Intel’s document production in rebuttal?

Consumer Recovery Time Frame

$3.785 billion consumer monopoly price recovery is calculated on Intel product runs occurring between January 1, 1999 and July 2004.

The analysis is undergoing a third evolution of refinement.

For FTC Docket 9341 review period, additionally, six years of Intel production estimates are currently missing from this specific analysis. Both the existing and remaining
production and price data require FTC and or DOJ discovery from Intel for validation as a monopoly proof.

RICO; specifically Cross Enterprise, cross profession network driven markets rigging is proven regardless. Proven on structure and directly witnessed conduct.

Industrial Subset 3

Industrial subset is estimated principally on Micro Design Resource estimates of Intel product short runs; estimated quarterly quantities at Intel stated price in period, cross referred against Intel average total cost, average fixed cost, variable cost determined on Intel financials.

Finally, the marginal cost estimate to produce a single microprocessor from economic analysis cross checked with variable cost from Intel Financials.

Classic economics analysis is used because classic era rules appear to offer the foundation of Intel’s economic technology until Pentium M 2005 product segmentation phase.

In decomposing Intel systems structure academic theory of the 1930s through 1970s is insightful. This key for decomposing Intel systems theory appears established using similar texts that Messrs.

Moore, Grove, Barrett and other executives might have been taught, as the syllabus of FTC primary and secondary case research documents. Although practiced on a slightly more sophisticated level then solely running the neighborhood breakfast shop or determining the customer demand for egg dishes. Intel system mechanics appear to be designed by engineers and system theorists.

Economic Calculations

Five primary calculations are used in Intel Economic Analysis Decomposing a cost based quantitative mathematical model relied on by inside traders for playing the Intel stock price.

Price multiplied by quantities to determine quarterly revenue and change in revenue.

Change in price and quantities to determine price elasticity.

For a cost based model, change in revenue (suspect as change in total cost), divided by change in total quantity for estimating marginal cost average.

The result can correlate with variable cost cross check from financials. Change in revenue (suspect as cost) divided by change in quantity suspect at Marginal Revenue Approximation.

Actually an indicator of Intel Product Stocks .. ""

Full Document and Source:
www.CEOpaulOtellini.com
on Top of Site...

Information by
Mike Bruzzone
Intel Case Technical Analysis since 1996
Camp Marketing Consultancy

the Point: Intel Corp. is Lying - Cheating and Stealing and if your a Shareholder, Consumer, Taxpayer.... WELL you are Paying the Price.

Do you have a Tip on Intel Insider Trading, Corruption, RICO Complaints, Flat OUT Fraud, Intel Bullying, Intel Corp. forcing Economic Terrorism onto you or your Company? Email your Tips - Documents - Videos to me, Crystal L. Cox ~ Investigative Blogger - Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Cartel Proof Constantly PROVEN - Yet intel Steal STOMPS on Competition Constantly.

2010-08-27T11:20:00.001-07:00

Wake Up Intel Shareholders Before You Lose Everything !!!

Cartel Proof - Intel Kick Backs - Cartel Margin Gain - Intel Annual Pages
Consumer Transport Tax - Competitive Limiter - Intel Economy - Intel Microprocessor Product Routing - SEC was Notified of Intel Market Rigging - Variable Commission Rewards - Documented DELL Accounting Fraud -

Computer Consumers Pay The Hidden Costs.

Investors - Shareholders PAY when Intel is Caught ?

"" Combined Cartel Proof

Additionally, for Dell and Gateway certainly, Intel PC Dealers earn a cartel margin gain from their Media Sales Agents as a result of their Intel Inside Kick Back.

Cartel Margin Gain on this routing fee is secured when any PC Dealer’s annual advertising pages exceed Intel’s annual advertising pages.

Under Intel Inside Contract Guide all PC Dealers receive the Intel Corporation advertising page frequency discount rate from Media Sales Agents.

Note the competitive limiter here for non Intel Dealers lacking this form of Intel Network scale economy.

For PC Dealers who advertise at a greater annual page frequency rate then Intel Corporation annual pages, Cartel margin gain is secured on the difference in frequency discounts applied to Intel pages verse any Dealer’s deeper ad discount rate from Media Sales Agents.
Media’s ad frequency discounts, called network buys, are based on any one Dealer’s annual volume page purchase agreement with Media Sales Agents.

When anyone Intel Dealer’s annual pages of advertisement exceed Intel Annual Pages, added margin value is earned on every Intel Kick Back for every future ad insertion by these foremost cartel members.

System diagram of cross enterprise industry bottleneck monopoly is depicted above. ( at www.CEOpaulOtellini.com )

PC Company matching half of the media sales tie triggers the tied charge back match from Intel’s Dealer Accruals to Media Sales Agents.

That value tie is misrepresented in PC Dealer Financials as an advertising cost applied to every computer sale.

Taken together computer end buyers pay both halves of this hidden transport charge in their computer’s end sales price. 100% of the consumer charge is taken by Media Sales Agents for directing Intel PC consumer search. Making consumer search focused, quick and easy.

This hidden consumer transport tax for Intel microprocessor product routing, taken by Intel and PC Companies from consumers, and paid to Media Sales Agents, is meant as a sales commission to pay for Media’s cost of Intel product sales; communications medium, display space, news coverage, Intel and Dealer content development including Dealer’s PC product reviews.

For ZD, certainly, this payment was also a form of extorted tribute.

Because the tie is based on a variable commission reward on Intel Microprocessor Price, Media Sales Agents tend to push computers to consumers containing Intel’s highest priced; latest and greatest microprocessors.

Or will focus on moving large lots of slow moving Intel microprocessor based computers that have been clogging up the Intel supply system; those capable of delivering a large total reward value to Media, when routed together until discharged from Intel PC Dealer inventories.

The existence of this Intel Tied Charge Back System is the accounting compliment to Dell Corporation Misrepresenting Intel Kickbacks;
rebates and loyalty rewards,
as sales revenue now under investigation by the SEC.

Intel’s half of the Dell Accounting Fraud is Documented as cooperative advertising accounts misrepresented within Intel’s own financials since 1993.

There is currently a rather extensive accounting fraud being hidden within Intel, by Intel and Intel Network.

And I would presume under current investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission?

Intel market rig was reported by this analyst to SEC in 2007; HO 1248999.

Intel tied charge back misrepresented in financials as a cooperative advertising expense documented contractually with Dealers x 2 for total set consumer calculation.

Reported in $ Billions .. ""

Source with Graphs and Full Details
www.CEOpaulOtellini.com
Document On Top of Blog - Download It..
Written by
Mike Bruzzone
Camp Marketing Consultancy

The .. SEC, U.S. Senate, Congressional Committees, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys - they Know and your Left to Fend for Yourself.

No Wonder Shareholders of Intel Corp. and Many other Major Companies will Soon Pay Trillons as there is a Decade of Without a Doubt Proof on the Iviewit Stolen Technology and Intel's Involvement. ( www.DeniedPatent.com )

Oh and Don't forget you need some Corrupt SEC Investigators, Corrupt Attorneys, Bought of Judges - Corrupt Patent Attorneys such as Foley and Lardner and Proskauer Rose Corrupt Patent Attorneys Chris Wheeler and Kenneth Rubenstein (MPEG LA's Golden Boy) .

Got a Tip on Dell, Gateway, Intel Corruption - Monopolies..
did they Bully You, Intimidate you, Threaten You..
Got a Video.. ??

Email Me
Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

www.InvestigativeBlogger.com

Beginning Docket 9288, May 1998.. So How Long has the FTC, SEC, DOJ Protected Intel Corp.?

2010-08-27T09:58:00.000-07:00

Over a Decade. WHAT !!

Prior Reports IGNORED by those Paid to Protect YOU???

"" Beginning Docket 9288, May 1998, various reports and analysis are submitted by this analyst to FTC now operating in voluntary civic service capacity under Department of Labor Code 3363.5. Today a decade of analysis delivers tens of Docket 9341 discovery proofs or pointers to proofs.

Many of which this audience are familiar from prior reports by this analyst submitted to U.S. Senate, Congress, State AGs and U.S. Attorneys.

Under Docket 9341 discovery rules, work from this analyst is passed by FTC Bureau of Competition to Intel for legal rebuttal.

Three Components of Monopoly Recovery

Monopoly recovery is a worldwide financial value having three main components:

1) Consumer recovery is based on the system costs of Intel Inside tied charge back for routing Intel microprocessors across state lines and inter nation boundaries inside a computer chassis. See prior analyst submissions for specific details covering the illegal aspects of this market rigging rebate fee scheme.
SEC, U.S. Senate, Congressional Committees, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys

2) Consumer recovery from monopoly price premium associated with some Intel microprocessor and PC product introductions.

3) Industrial harms which include predatory product dumping, Intel selling at a price less then average total cost, measures of variable down to average fixed cost. Finally, estimation of the marginal cost for Intel to produce a single x86 microprocessor in relation to price sought with variable cost cross check. Where price is within or lower then average fixed cost, variable or marginal cost, revenues
from those quantities are recorded as an industrial monopolization recovery value for FTC discovery.

Consumer Recovery Subset 1; kick back, in violation of Sherman Act Section 1, Section 2, Clayton Act Section 2, 3, 4, 5, 13e, 13c, 13d, Title 48, 1986 anti kickback act

Of the $26.442 billion subset of consumer recovery documented from Intel production estimates (where $42 billion total set is documented by contract), $22.657 billion or 85% is associated with Intel Inside tied charge back sum misrepresented in Intel and PC Dealer financials. That sum is split between Intel and PC Companies 50:50 for the purpose of this analysis based on the Intel Inside monopoly system metric. Yet Intel’s portion is known to increase, and PC Companies decrease, over the 15 year duration of this Intel Insider operation.

Intel financials associate Intel Inside as a marketing cost credited to PC Company micro- processor sales. When this commissionable sales value is actually an accrued Dealer rebate passed through Intel as a sales reward for Media Sales Agents taken as their fee, to sustain the supply chain’s product distribution ties between Intel, PC Dealers and Media Agent’s sales channels. Sales Channels include PC Week, PC Magazine, Computer Shopper, Family Computing, PC World, Windows Magazine, other PC and some general media.

Rebate values are sustained from back in time with forward time purchase agreements. Production short run to short run, Dealer’s microprocessor purchases are unnaturally weighted to benefit them guiding Media Agents sales preferences. Intel 1st tier Dealers purchase microprocessors in excess of end demand solely to strip margin values, including consumer transport charge, prior to reselling overage into secondary broker channels. PC Dealers who are Intel’s 1st tier brokers monopolize majority of Intel margin values, including tied charge back, sustaining their Media Sales Agent artificial attractor and the cross industry distribution tie in total.

This relationship is a financially driven one, planned and implemented for Media Sales Agents to register, meter, report level’s of Intel microprocessor flows through PC dealer channels back to Intel. That is the nature of the charge back; for media registering and reporting back channel sales flows through PC Companies to Intel. Over time the system evolved into one which accelerated Dealer product flows artificially from one Intel product generation to the next, on the weight of Intel kickback placements meant to discharge certain Dealer inventory, to end market buyers, on an Intel time schedule.

SEC, U.S. Senate, Congressional Committees, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys ""

Source of Post
Document the FTC, DOJ, SEC, State Attorney Generals, FBI and more know of and seem to be ignoring.. Go to www.CEOpaulOtellini.com document at top of blog...

Crystal L. Cox
Investigative Blogger
Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Your Government, your "Officials" KNOW and they aid and abet Intel Corp.

2010-08-27T09:51:00.000-07:00

" Honorable Commissioners, Senators, Congressmen, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Vice President Joseph Biden:

Pursuant to Camp Marketing Consultancy ongoing Intel Network case assessment: Consumer recoverable Intel Inside transport charge, monopoly price premium, industry monopolization on Intel economic and financial analysis grows total intent to monopolize recovery, by 12%, to $88 billion.

Monopoly recovery estimate is based on two investigative tracks. First, Intel monopoly system metric applied to Intel sales revenues on manufacturing estimates of Intel microprocessor quantities, per quarter, by Micro Design Resource. Second, sorting out Intel monopoly system expenses misrepresented as legitimate costs within Intel financials.

Data analysis parallels FTC Docket 9341 time frame and covers day one on January 1, 1999 through mid 2004 on production; extending to 2006 on Intel financials.

For the purpose of optimizing in period recovery estimate, data from both investigative tracks are SEC, U.S. Senate, Congressional Committees, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys
relied.

Findings include proofs and pointers of RICO, enterprise network corruption and Sherman Act Section 1 and 2 per se condemnations of law.

Findings are submitted to FTC, U.S. DOJ Antitrust, DOJ Criminal and Consumer Fraud, New York State DOJ for follow on discovery from Intel Network.

Revision 5.1 of this briefing updates State Attorney Generals on particulars of the case matters.

Is meant by this case steward; the Relator original source, too solicit counsel for False Claims Act recovery of fraudulent and monopoly costs imposed on Federal government’s Intel microprocessor based computer purchases.

This analyst believes FCA is now proven on weight of Intel false statements to conceal. Monopoly and fraudulent costs imposed on Federal government and related GSA computer procurement claims.

Further this analyst encourages dialogue between State Attorney Generals and U.S. Attorneys for establishing a coalition to recover consumer harms, in each State, which can be calculated by the domestic ‘Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area’ subset of what is a worldwide consumer recovery value.

Make sure your State and Federal District get its actual share of the consumer recovery in relation to not calculating this amount subject to worldwide distribution.

Recover the transport charge ‘kick back’ value stolen by Intel Network, from general consumers within your State and Federal buyers within your District, and not a penny less.

To estimate the recovery in your own State House and Federal Building: 1) go to the IT Department; 2) find out how many Intel based PCs have been purchased and deployed their annually since May 1993; 3) multiply that amount by $25.50 each to determine your combined Federal Building and State House recovery values. "

Is your State Attorney FLAT out Ignoring this 18 Years of Proof? Why? Who is paying off these guys and making you pay the price ?

So what is ... "" Honorable Commissioners, Senators, Congressmen, State Attorney Generals, U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Vice President Joseph Biden"" Doing about the Intel Fraud that they Flat Out Know About? Contact them and Ask...

Source:
Document on Top of
www.CEOpaulOtellini.com

Intel Swallows ALL Competition whether They Like it or not..

2010-08-27T09:49:00.000-07:00

And News like the Press Release Below makes YOU think Wow, invest in Intel Corp. - they are doing so well.. yet behind closed doors.. secret meetings.. bullying.. Economic Terrorism is happening and these companies that COULD have brought you a better product at a better PRICE.. well not know as intel NOW brings you the PRODUCT at the Price they Say..

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67Q3J820100827